Merci à notre ami Paul Greenwood qui nous a rédigé ce texte

An attack with tanks against Cambrai had first been proposed by J.F.C. Fuller (one of the chief protagonists of tank warfare) back in June, 1917, and Byng, commanding the Third Army, forwarded the plan for Haig’s consideration. Haig at that time, very much preoccupied with his plans for the battle round Ypres, delayed a decision until the increasing difficulties of the Passchendaele offensive made him approve the plan in September.

Up to that time tanks had not made their much hoped-for impact on the war. Used fitfully on the Somme, disastrously at Bullecourt and now ineffectively at Third Ypres, this time they were to be given what might be their final chance to be used en masse across relatively unspoiled, hardened chalky ground in a surprise attack against the Germans’ Siegfried Stellung – (which was at present somewhat undermanned because of providing reinforcements to the continuing battle at Ypres). The attack’s original object was to break and capture the enemy front line and support systems. Then the strongpoints of Flesquieres and Havrincourt were to be taken before a further advance reached a line about 250 yards north of the Cambrai/Bapaume road. Cavalry would then pass through the attacking divisions, capturing Cambrai and Bourlon wood. The infantry in turn was then to consolidate and relieve the cavalry who would push on and further exploit the success. Nineteen divisions of Byng’s Third Army were involved, fourteen of them already mauled from the slaughter at Third Ypres.

Opposing them was Georg von der Marwitz’s XIIIth Corps (Gruppe Caudry) - part of his German Second Army - made up of the 20^th, 54^th, 9^th Reserve and 183^rd divisions.

Two British Corps were to lead the attack, the IIIrd on the right between Crevecoeur and Bonvais, with cavalry in the rear waiting to exploit the bridgehead that would be formed. The IVth Corps to the north was to capture Havrincourt and Flesquieres, after which cavalry would take Bourlon Wood and its important ridge of ground. The IVth Corps’ sector from Gonnelieu to the Canal du Nord was held by six divisions (the 12^th, 20th, 6^th, 51^st (Highland), 62^nd (West Riding) and 36^th (Ulster)). The Guards Division was on the adjoining sector. Prior to the attack the infantry had undergone intensive training with tanks, and other preparations for the assault had been equally detailed.

On the 62^nd Division’s sector, an outpost line ran through Havrincourt wood and Wigan Copse to the destroyed bridge at the Canal du Nord. To deceive the enemy, the West Ridings had placed a line of brushwood to hide the guns sited on the track known as Hubert road. All troop movements and light railway construction were confined to the hours of darkness, and while north-bound traffic remained lit, all wagons travelling south were ‘blacked out’.

The trains carrying the tanks had arrived behind Havrincourt wood, where the Mark IV monsters were cautiously manoeuvred from their wagons, filled with petrol and ammunition and brought forward into the wood itself.

A German artillery barrage during the night before the assault hinted the enemy might have had warning of the coming attack. However, the troops and the tanks were all in place by 06 00 on the morning of the 20^th November 1917, and at 06 20 a barrage of smoke and high explosive erupted from over 1000 guns.

The Commander of the Tank Corps, Brigadier-General Elles, not only had planned his force’s tactics but was leading the attack in person in his tank, ‘Hilda’. As the barrage lifted, almost four hundred tanks moved forward with infantry behind them.

One of them on the 62^nd Division’s sector, controlled by Driver Bacon, moved steadily (and noisily) down ‘Yorkshire Bank’, by ‘Wigan Copse’, then on and up to the impregnable Siegfried Stellung. The barbed wire approaches that had caused so many previously failed attacks now were flattened by a row of tanks moving at full throttle. Once clear, the tanks came under intense gun and rifle fire, with bullets sounding ‘like hailstones on a corrugated iron shed’. Enemy infantry tried to climb onto the slow moving monsters, only to be shot by the crews or crushed under the monstrous treads.

Some tanks had been equipped with grapnels to pull aside the barbed wire, while others carried fascines – large bundles of wood – to lower into the Siegfried Stellung’s colossal main trench. Using them, the tanks were soon across that obstacle, and the infantry following met varying degrees of resistance. Most of the enemy had fled or were prepared to surrender, though one private of the 36^th {Ulster) Division reported ‘fighting through shell holes like Kilkenny cats’.

On the right, the men of the 12^th (Eastern) Division had reached their first objective at Lateux Wood and dug in as ordered. The 20^th (Light) Division fought its way through La Vacquerie and captured the bridge over the St Quentin canal at Masnieres. The destroyed bridge (which delayed the cavalry} was probably broken by the weight of tanks trying to cross it. Within a matter of hours the 62^nd Division’s Engineers had produced some sort of a road through to Havrincourt and field guns, supplies and reinforcements were moving up.

By now Bacon’s engine was beginning to overheat and a pause had to be made to allow it to cool (and for the crew to share lunch on a bottle of whisky).

Von der Marwitz’s troops were quick to respond to the crisis.

‘Whilst we had rested the Germans had brought up reserves, the shrapnel fire had increased and there were several holes in the exhaust pipe on top of the ’bus’. When we moved forward again a fusillade of bullets rattled on the front armour plating, telling of a gun crew waiting for a duel. I quickly closed the window and drove by means of a pinhole aperture. The firing got hotter and hotter and it was obvious more than one gun was concentrating on us. No matter how I zigzagged they stuck to it, and soon white hot sparks were flying into my face as I peered out. The tank’s periscope was shot away. A sponson gunner, only slightly exposed, had a bullet rip from his palm to his elbow. Another gunner, reaching up to shut the roof hatch, had his trigger finger blown off.’

That first day’s fighting, compared with other WWI battles, produced a spectacular advance. ‘When night had fallen on the 20^th November all three West Riding brigades had won through their allotted objectives and had achieved what, for that period, must be a remarkable performance, having advanced almost five miles (8 km), overrunning two powerful defence systems and capturing two villages’. (Divisional Narrative). The 62nd Division indeed had made amazing progress. By the end of the day Havrincourt had been cleared and Graincourt and Anneux were in their hands.

‘We went on through the villages of Graincourt and Anneux to the Bapaume/Cambrai road,’ Bacon reported, ‘occasionally ‘mopping up’ pockets of resistance, but there was little more we could do that day,’ As dusk fell, he halted his tank by a brick factory, now being used as a Field Dressing Station.

The Ulstermen of the 36^th Division reached the Bapaume-Cambrai road that day, but at the village of Flesquieres the Highland Division could make no progress against the strongpoint defended by Germans under the command of a Major Krebs. Forty tanks were knocked out, sixteen of them by one gun manned by a single gunner. That day the 21^st Division took Flesquieres and Cataign, and Third Army Headquarters decided to tell IIIrd Corps to consolidate on the line reached, and the IVth Corps to advance and take Bourlon ridge.

Accordingly, at 19 00 hrs, orders arrived from IVth Corps’ headquarters to continue the advance the following day. The 51^st Division was to attack Flesquieres at dawn and advance to Graincourt and Fontaine. TheYorkshiremen were to take the high ground west of Bourlon wood and Bourlon village.

As the Germans had retreated from Flesquieres during the night, the 51^st Division was able to occupy it. The 62^nd Division troops made a brutal way through Anneux, clearing it house by house, but the final objectives were not reached. German resistance was being strengthened by constantly arriving reinforcements, the tank crews were exhausted, it was difficult to replenish supplies of petrol and ammunition, and two days’ fighting had equally exhausted the infantry.

Would it be better to advance or consolidate? To consolidate would mean withdrawing to Flesquieres Ridge – to advance would mean further fierce fighting if Bourlon ridge was to be taken.

Haig decided on another advance, but the troops were incredibly weary. November 22^nd had to be spent in consolidating ground and repelling German counter-attacks. The positions above the Bapaume-Cambrai road were first lost then recaptured, and the fact that the 51^st Division was driven out of Fontaine soon after noon, added to the confusion caused by the German counter-strokes, caused the temporary abandonment of the Bourlon attack.

The 40^th Division relieved the 62^nd that night. On November 23^rd, the 51^st Division attacked Fontaine and the 40^th Division Bourlon Wood (now held by fresh troops of the 32^nd and 224^th Brandenburg Divisions}.

Late in the evening of the 24^th the 62^nd Division again was sent forward to the Bourlon Wood area to relieve the 40^th Division. Sniping, desultory machine gun fire and heavy shelling went on all night. By the following night the Division had fought its way through the wood and reached Marquion trench.

A conference took place on the 26^th in Havrincourt chateau grounds at which Haig, Byng, General Braithwaite and the other divisional commanders decided to continue the offensive. The attack would be renewed at dawn on the 27^th. The 62^nd Division (Braithwaite’s men) were to attack Bourlon village while the Guards Division assaulted Fontaine.

The preliminary barrage on Bourlon village was delayed, as it was thought troops from the previous attempt were still there, holding pockets of resistance. However, they were contacted and withdrawn overnight, and the artillery opened up at 6 20 on the 27^th. The northern edge of Bourlon wood, its crest and Bourlon Village were reached in spite of heavy losses, but German counter attacks regained a good deal of the ground. During the day the Guards captured Fontaine, only to lose it again that afternoon. On the left flank, the Germans repulsed repeated attacks against the feature known as Tadpole Copse.

Heavy artillery exchanges took place all through November 28^th, but there were few alterations to the positions held.

The West Riding Division was relieved that night by the 47^th (London) Division and although the British reached the Bourlon crest and held it, they suffered 4000 casualties within three days, for Gruppe Arras had sent four divisions to reinforce the defenders. The major German counter attack on November 30^th used von Hutier’s new infiltration methods (where groups of elite storm troops fighting their way through weak points, leaving the stronger sections to be dealt with later) caused havoc. In spite of fierce fighting on the ridge, the headquarters of the 29^th and 12^th Divisions were almost overrun with their staffs.

By December 3^rd the Germans had captured Vacquerie and the British had to withdraw east of the St Quentin canal to bring an end to the battle. Once again a major engagement had ended in stalemate with both sides having taken some 45,000 casualties.

Although Cambrai had proved the value of tanks and given Britain an excuse to celebrate with the ringing of church bells for the first time in the war, the Germans, too, had learned new infantry tactics that were to stand them in good stead in their 1918 spring offensives.