Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches A, 4, 10 & 12A ; Maps 3, 4, 12, 13, 14 & 15)

Very soon after daylight on the 27th August, British troops began to pour into St. Quentin. The 1st Cavalry Brigade and most of the 2nd were fed and sent a few miles south to Grand Seraucourt, where they arrived, men and horses completely exhausted. The duty of forming a covering screen to the north of the town was therefore assigned to the 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General H. de la P Gough), which, together with the Composite Regiment of Household Cavalry, had reached a position at Homblieres just to the east of St. Quentin at 4 A.M. or two for rest and food, the men recovered in an astonishing fashion ; when they resumed their march, they were no longer silent and dogged, but cheerfully whistling and singing. The 5th Division then pursued its way, after a halt for the re-arrangement of the column, without any interference from the enemy, and before dark was in position south , of the Somme about Ollezy, with its ranks and batteries sadly thinned, but ready again to meet the enemy.

The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, acting as rear guard, was equally unmolested. It was joined at 10 A.M. by that part of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General H. de B. de Lisle) which had marched westward across the rear of the II. Corps on the 26th and retraced its steps eastward at dawn on the 27th. Not until 2.30 P.M. was there any sign of the enemy advancing southwards in this quarter, (The enemy seen, according to Bülows Sketch Map 2, was divisional . cavalry of the VII. Corps, the right of his Army.) and then the 3rd Cavalry Brigade fell back deliberately to Itancourt (4 miles south-east of St. Quentin), E Battery exchanging a few rounds with the German guns before it retired. West of St. Quentin, the 9th Lancers (2nd Cavalry Brigade) found contact with the enemy near Fresnoy, but did not withdraw from that place until 6 P.M. and then only to Savy (south-west of St. Quentin). There they and the greater part of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade took up their billets for the night, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade being on their right at Itancourt, and the 1st in support at Grand Seraucourt.

Further to the west, the 3rd Division was hardly more molested than the 5th. After turning west from Bellicourt (8 miles north by west of St. Quentin), it halted from 9 A.M. until 1 P.M. at Hargicourt, and then continued its way south to Villeret (2 miles south-west of Bellicourt). There a small party of German cavalry, accompanied by guns, made some demonstration of pursuit, but, having no wish to engage what seemed to be British infantry, speedily retired when greeted by a few rifle bullets from the men of the 109th Battery. The division next marched to Vermand, where supplies were issued about 4 P.M., and at 10 P.M. it resumed its march to Ham. The 9th Brigade acted as rear guard throughout, having suffered little in the battle of Le Cateau.

The 4th Division on the left was followed up rather more closely by the German cavalry. The 11th Brigade, from Serain, moved across country to Nauroy, just to the south-east of Bellicourt, on the morning of the 27th, and halted there at 8.30 A.M. to allow the 3rd Division to pass.

Rather more than an hour later the cavalry squadron of the 3rd Division reported the enemy's presence in the adjacent villages, and, before the brigade had left its billets, German guns opened on Nauroy at a range of a thousand yards. To cover the retirement of the brigade, Br.-General Hunter-Weston ordered Colonel S. C. F. Jackson of the Hampshire to engage the guns. Acting on these orders, the latter sent two parties to take up a position to the east of Nauroy and open fire on them. After an engagement with enemy's dismounted cavalry and cyclists, Colonel Jackson was wounded and taken prisoner, but his men stood fast until the retiring brigade was out of sight, and then withdrew, eventually rejoining the brigade on the high ground beyond the canal. The main body meanwhile had moved south-west to Villeret, picking up en route Major Prowse's party of the Somerset L.I. from Ligny, a party of the l/Rifle Brigade under Captain Hon. H. C. Prittie, and other men who had stayed late on the battlefield. Thence the 11th Brigade, " fairly all right " as Br.-General Hunter-Weston reported, marched through Tertry, where it struck the divisional route to Voyennes.

The 10th Brigade and 4th Cavalry Brigade (in touch with General Sordet's cavalry on the left) had meanwhile passed on to Roisel (8 miles south-west of Le Catelet), where both made a short halt ; the 12th Brigade, which had gone on with the artillery, deployed at Ronssoy (4 miles south-west of Le Catelet), with the Carabiniers, borrowed from the 4th Cavalry Brigade, at Lempire to cover it, as several German aeroplanes flying over the division and the appearance of a few cavalry scouts were indications that the enemy might be in close pursuit. Nothing, however, happened. The 10th Brigade then pursued its way to Hancourt, where it arrived at 4 P.M. The 12th Brigade retired from Ronssoy at 11 A.M., and reached Hancourt between 5.30 and 6 P.M., where Major Parker's party of the King's Own overtook it. At Hancourt, by divisional orders, these two brigades entrenched and rested, awaiting the enemy; but none appeared. At 9.30 P.M. (all wounded and transport, which included many requisitioned and country wagons, having been sent off two hours earlier) the march of the 4th Division was resumed in inky darkness by Vraignes, Monchy Lagache and Matigny upon Voyennes. There was not the slightest hindrance from the enemy, but men and horses were so utterly weary that the usual hourly halts were omitted for fear that if the whole division w ere once halted and the men sat or lay down, they would never be got moving again.

The stoppages and checks inseparable from the march of a long column in the dark were doubly nerve-racking to the Staff during this period ; for not only might they mean that the division would be delayed and have incredible difficulty in restarting, as men were lying on the roads careless of whether wheels went over them or not, but also that enemy cavalry had cut in ahead or on the flank of the column. With strained ears the officers listened for firing, and only breathed again when the tremor of movement crept down the column and they heard the glad sound of the crunch of wheels on the road. Such was the discipline, however, that not a single shot was fired in alarm during this and the many other nights of marching in August and September 1914. Under direction of the divisional staffs, parties sent on ahead blocked all side and cross roads, so that units, even if gaps in the column occurred, could not go astray. Measures were taken by the interpreters (A French officer or soldier was allotted to each Staff and unit as interpreter and go-between in business with the local officials.) in all the villages passed through to detect the presence of spies, generally by the simple process of a language test.

But for this precaution and the difficulties of adjusting the foreign harness of the requisitioned vehicles, officers and men might have dreamed, and many did dream, as they mechanically moved on that they were back at autumn manoeuvres.

The Carabiniers remained in position about Lempire till noon, by which time German infantry came into sight; but, though heavily shelled, the 4th Cavalry Brigade withdrew unharmed to Hesbecourt, and after waiting there till 2.30 P.M. fell back westwards in rear of the 4th Division by Bernes, Hancourt and Cartigny to Le Mesnil, thence going south, finally crossing the Somme after nightfall and reaching Rouy, near Voyennes, at 1 A.M. on the 28th. The 4th Division, three hours later-at 4 A.M., began passing the Somme valley into Voyennes, at the very spot where Henry V. had crossed the river in his retreat northwards on Agincourt. At Voyennes Br.-General Hunter-Weston with the main body of the 11th Brigade rejoined.

Thus by dawn on the 28th, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had practically brought the whole of his force to the south of the Somme, thirty-five miles from the battlefield of the 26th.

The position of the various formations was approximately as follows :

1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades :

In a semi-circle, four miles south of St. Quentin, from Itancourt, through Urvillers and Grand Seraucourt to Savy.

The remainder of the force was south of the Somme, with rear guards on the northern bank.

5th Division and l9th Brigade :

South-west of the cavalry brigades, at Ollezy and Eaucourt, near where the Crozat canal meets the Somme.

3rd Division :

On the left of the 5th :

7th Brigade, Ham, on the Somme.

8th Brigade, On march to Ham from Vermand.

9th Brigade, Ham.

4th Division :

On the left of the 3rd, at Voyennes on the Somme.

4th Cavalry Brigade :

On the left of the 4th Division, at Rouy.

It was tolerably evident that the German pursuit, if it can be said ever to have been seriously begun, had been shaken off. There were, as a matter of fact, already some indications that General von Kluck was pressing south-westward rather than southward. General Sordet's cavalry corps and the 6lst and 62nd Reserve Divisions had been in conflict with German troops about Péronne on the afternoon of the 27th, but British cavalry re-entering St. Quentin at dawn on the 28th found no sign of the enemy. These indications, however, came too late to be of any help to the British Commander-in-Chief on the 27th. As regards the German II. Corps, the most westerly of Kluck's Army, the reports of air reconnaissances in the early morning, taken in conjunction with General Smith-Dorrien's verbal report at midnight on the 26th/27th after the battle of Le Cateau, were reassuring. The road from Le Cateau was absolutely clear ; there were neither British rear guards to be seen north, nor German advanced guards south of a line drawn east and west through Péronne. But, near Guise, a heavy column (Bülow's X. Reserve Corps.) had been observed moving southward on the road between La Groise and Étreux (12 and 6 miles, respectively, north of Guise), besides other troops at Le Nouvion (10 miles north-east of Guise) ; and Sir John French had as yet no clear information to show whether these were friendly or hostile. Soon after 7 A.M. he received, through the French Mission, an encouraging telephone message from French G.Q.G., that the Fifth Army had been ordered to make a vigorous attack abreast of Vervins-Guise against the enemy forces (Second Army) which were following it, and that Sordet's cavalry corps would protect the B.E.F. against an enveloping attack on the left. The enemy forces on the British front, it continued, appeared to be worn out and not in a state to pursue : in these circumstances the B.E.F. could retire methodically, regulating its pace by that of the Fifth Army, so as not to uncover the flank of the latter. At 11 A.M. General Joffre visited Sir John French at Noyon to impress on him that he was already preparing his counter-stroke, but, in order to effect it, needed to fall back further than he had first intended to a line from Reims to Amiens, of which he proposed that the British should occupy the section between Noyon and Roye (12 miles north-west of Noyon). In furtherance of this plan, Sir John French, in a message timed 8.30 P.M., directed the II. Corps, with the l9th Brigade, to be clear of Ham by daylight on the 28th, to march to Noyon and cross to the left bank of the Oise ; the 4th Division to cover the retirement from ground north of the Somme ; and the Cavalry Division to cover both the II. Corps and the 4th Division. He added an order that all unnecessary impedimenta and all ammunition not absolutely required should be thrown away, so that vehicles might be available to carry exhausted men.

On the 27th, although clouds made air observation difficult, the Flying Corps was asked by G.H.Q. to ascertain enemy movement from the line Cambrai-Landrecies southward, also any movement of enemy cavalry on the western flank, and to obtain news of the I. Corps. Communication was established with the latter, and a message brought from General Haig ; but, as the German First Army was leaving the area which was to be reconnoitred, and the Second Army only just reaching it, little was seen of the enemy : the march of the German 7th Division from Le Cateau to Le Catelet was, however, correctly reported. Most of the troops seen on the roads were British, and one airman, who came down so low that he could distinguish khaki, was heavily fired on. A report stating that there were three battalions in Bernes (9 miles north-west of St. Quentin), on the eastern flank of the line of march of the 4th Division, was forwarded to Major-General Snow by G.H.Q., with the addition that they were probably Germans. The officer despatched to reconnoitre soon established that they were units of the 3rd Division. Troops were also reported marching westwards from Péronne ; these are now known to have been French.

A spirit of pessimism, entirely absent from the three divisions which had fought at Le Cateau, seems to have prevailed at G.H.Q. in the evening ; for Colonel Huguet telephoned, for the information of General Joffre, that he had gathered the British Army would not be in a state to take part in the campaign again until after a long rest and complete reorganisation : this for three out of the five divisions would require a period of several days, even several weeks, and under conditions which it was not yet possible to determine : the British Government might even insist that the whole force should return to its base at Havre in order to recuperate.

After the very strenuous efforts of the previous days, a further retreat with hardly a moment's rest was a very , serious trial to the II. Corps, for many of its units were still on the march when the orders to continue reached them. At 4 A.M. on the 28th the 5th Division marched from Ollezy for Noyon, with frequent halts, since the day was oppressively hot. As many men as possible were carried on vehicles of one kind or another. The 52nd Battery of the XV. Brigade, far from being demoralised by the loss of all its guns, had already been formed into a corps of mounted rifles ; on its way it passed Sir John French himself, who praised its good work and assured it that this had not been done in vain, since the battle of Le Cateau had saved the left flank of the French Army. After a short halt at Noyon, the 5th Division moved on to Pontoise, and there at last went into billets. The 3rd Division followed, halting at Crissolles and Genvry, just short of Noyon, between 6 and 7 P.M. Physically it was nearly worn out after marching sixty-eight miles in fifty hours, but morally its spirit was unbroken. Last came the 4th Division, not less exhausted than the rest. At 4 A.M. this division had received, by motor cyclist, G.H.Q. orders, issued at 8.30 PM. on the previous evening, to occupy a position north of the Somme ; but whilst preparations to do so were being made, later orders arrived about 6 A.M. directing it to be ready to continue the retirement at 8 A.M. Leaving the l2th Brigade for a time on the northern bank to work in combination with the rear guard of the 3rd Division, the remainder of the division, which still consisted of artillery and infantry only, took up positions on the south bank of the Somme. The retirement was continued at 1.30 P.M., the 3rd Division having withdrawn its rear guard from Ham about an hour earlier. The 4th Division reached its halting-places, Bussy, Freniches and Campagne, just north of those of the 3rd Division, shortly before midnight.

Meanwhile, of the Cavalry Division, the 3rd Brigade had extended eastward, seeking touch with the I. Corps, and its movements will be related in due course with those of that corps. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, after completing its reconnaissance at St. Quentin, fell back with great deliberation to the Somme at Ham, whence, having crossed the river, it moved southwards to Berlancourt. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade likewise fell back by Douilly upon Ham, and halted just north-east of the 4th Division at Le Plessis and Flavy le Meldeux. Patrols of German cavalry had been seen at Douilly, but no force of greater importance. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, on the extreme left, withdrew shortly before noon to Cressy, a short distance south of Nesle and four miles north of the 4th Division, leaving French cavalry and guns, with which it had been in touch, to deal with enemy troops reported to be at Mesnil, just north of Nesle.

The worst trials of General Smith-Dorrien's force were now over. Since the 23rd August, the II. Corps had fought two general actions, besides several minor affairs, and had marched just over a hundred miles, measured on the map by the route taken by the 3rd Division.

At 1 A.M. on the 27th the Staff of the French Fifth Army arranged with General Haig that the road through Guise should be left to the British ; (The Reserve divisions crossed the Oise by bridges above Guise.) and, since there was no choice but for the whole of the I. Corps to march by this single highway, unless part were sent by less direct roads on the west side of the Oise, all vehicles were " double-banked," and staff officers were sent forward to Guise to provide for the passage of two distinct streams of traffic through the town. The operation promised to be critical, in view of the gap between the I. and II. Corps having widened rather than decreased on the 26th, while to the north and north-east the enemy was reported to be in considerable strength. The situation was not rendered less anxious by a false report, which was current early in the afternoon, that the Germans were also in great force just to the north of St. Quentin. General Maxse's (the 1st, Guards) Brigade was detailed as rear guard to both divisions ; General Bulfin's (2nd) Brigade as a western flank guard ; and the 2/Welch, with the 46th Battery R.F.A., as eastern flank guard. Great stress was laid on the importance of holding the enemy at a distance from the high ground on the north-west between Fesmy and Wassigny, so that he should be unable to bombard Étreux, where supplies were to be issued to the troops as they passed through. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was sent well to the west on the other side of the Oise, with instructions to follow a route, parallel to the divisions, by Grougis, Aisonville, Noyales and Hauteville. Meanwhile, Br.-General Chetwode, its commander, led it to a central position five miles to the west of Étreux, between Mennevret and Le Petit Verly, and pushed out patrols to the north and north-west.

The corps was under way by 4 A.M., the 1st Division remaining in a covering position until the 2nd Division had all moved off. The latter reached its billets without the slightest molestation, but the march for the 5th Brigade from Barzy to Neuvillette (8 miles south-west of Guise) was long ; the 2/Highland Light Infantry, in particular, having been employed in repairing the roads at dawn, did not arrive at its halting-place until 10 P.M., after a tramp of thirty miles. The false alarm of the enemy's presence at St. Quentin kept the entire division in movement longer than would otherwise have been necessary, for the 4th (Guards) Brigade was sent out westward as a flank guard, and the 6th Brigade spent the night entrenching itself just east of the 5th, about Mont d'Origny.

The 1st Division remained in position until late in the afternoon, with rear and flank guards out, waiting for the road to be clear ; but there was no sign of serious pressure upon the line north-west of Etreux, to which so much importance was attached. In Br.-General Maxse's rear guard, the 1/Coldstream were about Oisy (2 miles north of Etreux), beyond the canal, and the 1/Black Watch and 1/Scots Guards just to the west of them, in touch with the western flank guard at Wassigny ; the R. Munster Fusiliers, with two troops of the l5th Hussars and a section of the 118th Battery R.F.A., all under Major P. A. Charrier of the Munsters, formed the rear party east of the Sambre canal, and had been under arms, facing north-east, since dawn. The general position of this party was four miles from Étreux, and extended for two miles, from Bergues through Fesmy to Chapeau Rouge, where it struck the north-south road from Landrecies to Etreux. The eastern flank guard was in position to the south-east, on the hill south of Bergues. The ground here falls gently westwards to the Sambre canal, which flows first on one side, then on the other, of the Landrecies road. The country lent itself to defence, being divided into small enclosures by thick hedges, which were passable at certain gaps only. During the morning a thick white mist lay upon the ground, and later there was a thunder-storm, so that visibility was never good.

Two companies of the Munsters were about Chapeau Rouge as screen, watching the roads that run north-westwards and northwards to Catillon and La Groise, and the remainder of the rear party were half a mile to the south-east in front of Fesmy. Later, half a company, and one troop of the l5th Hussars, were pushed south-eastwards to Bergues. No sign of the enemy was seen until 9 A.M, when a German cavalry patrol came down the road to Chapeau Rouge from the north, halted within five hundred yards, and fired a few shots. The Munsters made no reply, but the Germans did not come closer. There were indications of another column of the enemy to the north-east, moving south-westwards from Prisches upon Le Sart, straight at the centre of Major Charrier's force ; but its advanced party had galloped back on the appearance of a corporal of the l5th Hussars. By 9.30 A.M. all was again quiet, and Lieut.-Colonel C. B. Morland of the 2/Welch informed Major Charrier that he was going to withdraw the eastern flank guard to Boué (2 miles north-east of Étreux). Br.-General Maxse directed the Munsters to hold on to their position until ordered or forced to retire, and Major Charrier sent back word that, the choice of the route being left to him, he also should fall back by the road to Boué. The best part of an hour passed away, when, towards 10.30 A.M., German infantry came down again from the north-east and opened an attack on Bergues, which a little later was extended also to Chapeau Rouge. The Munsters being by this time entrenched, held their own with little difficulty ; the two guns found a target in a German column to the north-west, and all went well.

At 11 A.M., whilst this action was in progress, the 3rd Brigade was at last able to start southward from Oisy ; at the same time Colonel Morland's flank guard also moved south upon Boué. The firing died away, and at noon Br.-General Maxse confirmed Major Charrier's choice of the road for his retreat, at the same time sending to all units of the rear guard their final instructions for retirement, the hour only being left blank. By 12.20 P.M. the road at Etreux was reported clear of all transport ; and a little later Br.-General Maxse despatched orders (time 1 P.M.) to every unit of the rear guard, " Retire at once." This message, though sent by two routes, failed to reach the Munster Fusiliers.

Meanwhile, at 12.30 P.M. or thereabouts, German infantry developed its attack in greater strength on both flanks, at Bergues and at Chapeau Rouge, though, as yet, without the support of artillery. As the pressure became heavier, in accordance with Major Charrier's orders the two companies at Chapeau Rouge gradually withdrew south-eastwards towards Fesmy. The men, finding good shelter in the ditches by the side of the road, worked their way back with very slight loss, and by shooting down the Germans as they showed themselves at the gaps in the hedges, forbade any close pursuit. The guns also opened fire, first towards the north, and later to the north-east, in which quarter the enemy was now observed to be in greatest force. Following up the Munsters slowly, the Germans delivered a strong attack upon Fesmy, their guns now coming into action for the first time ; but they made little progress. The Munsters' machine guns did very deadly work, firing down the road from Fesmy to Le Sart ; the Germans tried to mask their advance by driving cattle down on the defenders, but to no purpose. At 1.15 P.M. Major Charrier sent to Br.-General Maxse this short message : " Am holding on to position north of Fesmy village, being attacked by force of all arms. Getting on well. The Germans are driving cattle in front of them up to us for cover. We are killing plenty of them."

Thus holding his own, Major Charrier's chief anxiety was for his detachment at Bergues. He pushed out a platoon to the eastward, in the hope of gaining touch with it, but the platoon was driven back by superior numbers. The troops at Bergues were, in fact, about this time forced out of the village and compelled to retreat southward to a farm ; here, after checking German pursuit by fire and then counter-attacking, the detachment retired westward to the Sambre canal, and thence down the road to Oisy.

Meanwhile, Major Charrier continued his defence of Fesmy with great spirit; he had now the whole of his battalion, except the half-company at Bergues, under his hand; and he had need of them. So resolute was the onset of the Germans that, in places, they approached to within a hundred and fifty yards of the village ; a few actually broke into it and shot down two of the artillery wagon teams. Every one of these bold men was killed or captured, and at 1.50 P.M. Major Charrier sent off the last message which came through from him to Br.-General Maxse : " We have German wounded prisoners, who say that about two regiments are opposing us and some guns. They belong to the 15th Regiment." (They really belonged to the 15th Reserve Regiment, of the 2nd Guard Reserve Division (X. Reserve Corps) of the Second Army. The history of this regiment (p. 65) speaks of " receiving fire at every turn of the road, whilst marching off it was impossible owing to the 2-metre high hedges, threaded with wire and almost impenetrable. , Everywhere thick hedges ! We are always getting fired on, we can't tell from where, cursed the field-greys. The only course was to plaster the hedges with lead." )

About this time-1.45 to 2 P.M., the 2nd Brigade, the western flank guard, marched away from Wassigny for Hannapes, south of Etreux, with little hindrance; the Northamptonshire, who brought up the rear, lost only four men, and claimed on their side from forty to fifty German troopers killed, wounded or taken prisoner. (They belonged to the 16th Uhlans, the corps cavalry oft he VII. Corps, the right of the Second Army (" Geschichte des Ulanenregiments Nr. 16," p.106)). Thus the greater part of the 1st Division was now in motion to the south; the 3rd Brigade was within an hour's march of Guise ; and there remained only the rear guard to bring off.

Major Charrier, having struck the enemy hard, with little loss to himself, at 2.30 P.M. threw out flank guards wide upon each side and began his retreat upon Oisy The movement was necessarily slow, the flanking parties being impeded by hedges, and it was some time before the rearmost of the Munsters and the two guns left Fesmy. At 3 P.M. the cyclist, who had failed to deliver the copy of Br.-General Maxse's final order to Major Charrier , reached the Coldstream Guards near Oisy, and gave them their instructions to retire forthwith. Simultaneously, the detachment of the 15th Hussars and Munster Fusiliers from Bergues came into Oisy and took over the guard of the bridge there. But it was now evident that the gap between the rear guard and the corps was increasing rapidly, the 3rd Brigade being by this time at Guise, the 2nd Brigade closing in upon Hannapes, some five miles in rear, whilst the 1st, at another five miles distance, was still in position at Oisy. The 3rd Brigade was therefore halted at Guise, and the l/South Wales Borderers and the XXVI. Brigade R.F.A. were sent back north about three miles to Maison Rouge, where at 3.30 P.M. they took up a position to cover the retreat of the 1st (Guards) Brigade.

By that hour the Coldstream Guards, Scots Guards and Black Watch had begun to withdraw. but neither the permanent bridge over the canal near Oisy nor the temporary timber structure south of it (made by the 23rd Field Company R.E. by felling trees, as the permanent bridge was in full view of the high ground adjacent) was blown up or destroyed, although prepared for demolition, as at the last moment the instructions to do so were cancelled by triplicate orders sent by the 1st Division, 1st Brigade and C.R.E. Shortly after 4 P.M. the rear-guard cavalry reported strong hostile columns moving south upon La Vallee Mulâtre, immediately to the west of Wassigny, and the three battalions of the 1st (Guards) Brigade, upon reaching the level plateau to the south of found themselves threatened from the north and west by a German cavalry division (The Guard Cavalry Division of Richthofens corps.) and two batteries. There was a good deal of firing as they retired over the next three miles of ground to the southward, but it was confined chiefly to the artillery; for the enemy was held at a distance without much difficulty by the British batteries at Maison Rouge. Thus the three battalions reached Guise with trifling loss, the 5th Cavalry Brigade retiring parallel to them on the west. At dusk the firing died down, and the 1st Division went into bivouac, the 3rd Brigade at Bernot, just north of the 2nd Division at Mont d' Origny, at 9 P.M., and the 2nd and 1st Brigades at Hauteville and Jonqueuse, north-east and east of Bernot, at 11 P.M. The 2/Welch of the eastern flank guard also reached Bernot at this hour . it had been much impeded by refugees, but, beyond a few rifle shots, had not been interfered with by the enemy. The 5th Cavalry Brigade also came into the same area for the night ; the detachment of 15th Hussars at Oisy marched southward on to Mont d' Origny, which it reached at midnight. The men were greatly fatigued by their long and trying day, but they had been little pressed by the Germans. A cavalry division had, indeed, appeared very late from the north-westward, but no infantry had threatened them from the north, and the reason for this must now be told.

As it left Fesmy the rearmost company of the Munsters had become engaged with German infantry, but was able to disengage and rejoin the main body of the battalion, then, about 5.45 P.M., half-way to Etreux, and continue its retreat. But as it approached the village, Germans were seen crossing the road ahead, and fire was opened not only by German infantry from the houses on the northern outskirts, but from a battery not more than fifteen hundred yards away to the eastward. Then for the first time the Munsters began to fall fast. One of the two guns of the section of the 115th Battery was disabled, a single shell destroying the whole team. The other gun was promptly brought into action against the German artillery, but over three hundred rounds had already been fired, and ammunition was very nearly exhausted. Still undaunted, Major Charrier pushed forward two companies to clear the way through Etreux; but the Germans had installed themselves in the trenches dug during the forenoon by the Black Watch, and also occupied a house, which they had loop-holed, west of the road. A house east of the road now burst into flames, evidently giving the signal for a converging attack from all sides upon the Munsters. Major Charrier ordered the remaining gun to be brought up to demolish the loop holed house, but the range was so short that the team and detachment were instantly shot down. A third company, which was supporting the advance of the two companies, was then sent to make an attack on the railway-cutting to the east of Etreux station. In spite of enfilade fire, both of infantry and artillery, the company worked up to within seventy yards of the cutting and charged. The men were mowed down on all sides, and only one officer reached the hedge, with one man, who was then killed by his side.

Meanwhile Major Charrier had led three charges against the loop-holed house, in one of which his adjutant actually reached the building, and fired his revolver through a loop-hole, only to drop stunned by a blow from falling brickwork. These gallant efforts were all in vain. It was now 7 P.M. The Germans attacked from south, east and west, and, though temporarily driven back at one point by a bayonet charge, continued to advance. Major Charrier was shot dead alongside the deserted gun on the road, and so many officers had by this time fallen, that the command devolved upon Lieutenant E. W: Gower. Collecting such men as were left, he formed them in an orchard, facing to all points of the compass, and continued to resist. Gradually the Germans crowded in on them from three sides, bringing fresh machine guns into position, and at 9.15 P.M. they closed in also from the north, and the little band of not more than two hundred and fifty of all ranks with ammunition almost spent, was overpowered. The Munsters had been fighting against overwhelming odds for nearly twelve hours, and discovered at the end that they had been matched against at least six battalions of the 73rd and 77th Reserve Regiments, of the 19th Reserve Division, besides three of the 15th Reserve Regiment of the 2nd Guard Reserve Division, all forming part of the X. Reserve Corps. Beyond question, they had arrested the enemy's pursuit in this quarter for fully six hours, so that their sacrifice was not in vain.

The situation at midnight of the 27th/28th August was :

I. Corps (less a brigade). On the high ground southwards of Guise from Longchamps to Mont d'Origny. 5th Cavalry Brigade and 4th (Guards) Brigade : West of the river Oise about. Hauteville and Bernot.

At dawn on the 28th, although the weather was still extremely hot, the retreat of the I. Corps on La Fère was resumed under more favourable conditions ; for, although two German divisions were reported from eight to twelve miles north of St. Quentin, the rumour that they were actually in that town turned out to be false ; (On the night of the 27th/28th, the German III. IV. and IV. Reserve Corps of the First Army were 6 miles north-west of St. Quentin on a front facing south and south-west.) moreover, the French XVIII. Corps was now in touch with the British on the east. The transport had begun to move off at 2 A.M. In addition to a rear guard, a flank guard (under Br.General Horne) consisting of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, 5th Brigade and XXXVI. Brigade R.F.A., was thrown out to the west ; and the rear guard, the 2nd Brigade with a brigade of artillery and a squadron, held the heights of Mont d' Origny during the passage of the main body through Origny. Nothing was seen of the enemy until shortly after noon, when a German column of all arms appeared, working round towards the right rear of the 2nd Brigade ; about 12.30 P.M. its guns opened fire, but with little effect. (From Bülows map, the column would appear to belong to the X.Corps then, with the rest of the Second Army, moving south-westward. Later in the day, that Army turned south.) The infantry then made some semblance of attack, but was easily held at a distance, and at 2 P.M. the last of the British battalions marched off, covered by infantry of Valabregue's Reserve divisions, which occupied the position as they vacated it. The I. Corps then made its way, always by a single highroad, towards La Fère. The march was again most trying, for on the greater part of the way battalions, as well as transport, were " double-banked," and a swarm of refugees added to the congestion. Thus, choked with dust, on an airless, oppressive day the I.

Corps at last reached La Fère, crossed the Oise southwards, and, in the course of the afternoon, reached its billets :the 1st Division just south of La Fère at Fressancourt, Bertaucourt and St. Gobain; the 2nd Division further to the westward at Andelain, Servais and Amigny.

It remained to be seen whether the German cavalry would press into the gap between the I. and II. Corps, which was still some fifteen miles wide. On this day the 3rd Cavalry Brigade had been pushed eastwards by Major General Allenby to gain touch with the I. Corps. Early in the forenoon the brigade was in position six or seven miles south of St. Quentin, between Cerizy and Essigny, when at 10 A.M. firing was heard to the north, and this was followed shortly afterwards by the appearance of French (84th Division) Territorial infantrymen retiring south from St. Quentin through Essigny. ( The bulk of the division retired from Cambrai on the26th via Doullens, Amiens and Poix, where it remained until the 11th September.) Learning from them that they had been surprised by German cavalry and artillery at Bellenglise, Br.-General Gough withdrew his right, the 4th Hussars, southwards from near Essigny to Benay, to cover their retreat. After a time, his patrols reported a brigade of Uhlans to be advancing on Essigny and a second column of all arms further to the east, moving on Cerizy. About 1 P.M. an advanced party of Uhlans was caught in ambush by the 4th Hussars about Benay and dispersed with loss, their killed being identified as of the Guard Cavatry Division. The column in rear of them thereupon attempted to work round Br.-General Gough's eastern flank, but was stopped by the guns of E Battery R.H.A. Thus what seems to have been the western column of the Guard Cavalry Division was brought, with comparative ease, to a standstill.

The eastern column of the German cavalry was more enterprising, but no more successful. As commander of the left flank guard of the I. Corps, Br.-General Horne had sent the whole of the 5th Cavalry Brigade to the western bank of the Oise, and, at 10.30 A.M., Sir Philip Chetwode moved it to Moy, a village nearly abreast and 2 miles east of Cerizy, where he halted in the Oise valley. Leaving the Scots Greys on outpost, with the 20th Hussars in close support, on the high ground to the north-west by La Guinguette Farm, he rested the remainder of the brigade in Moy. About noon the enemy came into sight, advancing south along the main road from St. Quentin. Upon this a squadron of the Scots Greys, with a machine gun, was sent to occupy a copse on the eastern side of the road a little to the north of La Guinguette Farm (on the St. Quentin-La Fère road, 4 mile east of Cerizy), with one troop pushed forward to a building near the road about half a mile ahead, and a section of J Battery R.H.A. was unlimbered about half a mile to the south-east of the copse. The advanced troop of the Greys was driven back by superior numbers, but all attempts of hostile patrols to penetrate to La Guinguette were foiled by the fire of the remainder of the squadron. At length, at 2 P.M., two squadrons of the enemy advanced in close formation on the eastern side of the road, and, being fired on both by the Greys and by the two guns, there dismounted. Most of their horses, terrified by the bursting shells, galloped away, and the troopers, after discharging a few rounds, also turned tail. Br.-General Chetwode at once ordered the rest of J Battery into action and directed the 12th Lancers, with two squadrons of the Greys in support, to move round the enemy's eastern flank, and the 20th Hussars to advance along the St. Quentin road and turn him from the west. The dismounted Germans meanwhile made off in all haste, but the leading squadron, C, and the machine-gun section of the 12th Lancers, hurrying northward, caught sight of a body mounted about eight hundred yards away moving in close formation towards Moy. Attacking it with fire, the 12th Lancers compelled the Germans to dismount, and then stampeded their horses. The two other squadrons and J Battery now coming into action, C squadron mounted and led by Lieut.-Colonel F. Wormald, approaching over dead ground, got within fifty yards of the enemy and charged. Some seventy or eighty of the Germans, who proved to be of the 2nd Guard Dragoon Regiment, were speared. The 12th Lancers lost one officer and four men killed, and their lieutenant-colonel and four men wounded. Further pursuit would obviously have been imprudent, but Br.-General Chetwode remained on the ground long enough to collect all his wounded, his casualties did not exceed thirty, and to ascertain that his guns had played such havoc with the German reserves that their total losses might fairly bereckoned at three hundred killed and wounded. Finally towards evening, he and Br.-General Gough fell back independently, the former to the left of the I. Corps, to Sinceny and Autreville, the latter to rejoin the Cavalry Division, west of the Oise canal at Frieres (6 miles W N.W. of La Fère) and Jussy (just north of Frieres). Though the action of Cerizy had been comparatively insignificant, it very effectually damped the ardour of the German cavalry. ( The Chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, Dr. Vogel, gives the following account of this action. After relating the march of the division on the 28th August from La Groise via Wassigny and Bohain to Homblieres (3 miles east of St. Quentin), which it reached at 1 P.M., and a fight around St. Quentin with two battalions of the French 10th Territorial Infantry Regiment (Kluck says that his III. Corps was also engaged there) which lasted until 7 P.M., he states that ," a report came from the Dragoon , Brigade that it was in a severe action east of Urvillers [4 miles north" west of Moy whence the British 5th Cavalry Brigade had moved]. It had stumbled on what appeared to be weak enemy infantry in the wood south-west of the village, and had attacked with three squadrons dismounted, intending to charge with the other three. It turned out, however, that the brigade had to deal, not with disorganised fugitives, but with a strong detachment of the intact Franco-British Army which had advanced from La Fère. This was evident from the lively infantry fusillade which they received as they approached mounted. It was not easy to get clear, but with the assistance of, battery, the brigade succeeded in withdrawing behind the hill north of the wood, which was held by the Guard Schützenbataillon. Some British squadrons also which had deployed to charge were driven back by our guns, which opened at just the right moment. The 3rd Guard Uhlans now reinforced the troops holding the hill. A troop of the Dragoons, under Lieutenant Graf Schwerin, was ridden over by British Hussars. The wounded, amongst whom were men with six or seven lance wounds, and several bullet wounds, were taken prisoner by the enemy.")

When all movements had been completed on the night s of the 28th/29th August, the I. Corps was south of the Oise and of La Fère ; the II. Corps, with the 4th Division, was north and east of Noyon, with one division south of the Oise. Thus, the two wings of the Army were still 11 miles apart, the gap between them being more or less covered by cavalry on a curve from the left of the I. Corps to the northern end of the II. Corps. On the right, the British were 6 miles in rear of the left of the French Fifth Army, but on the left in touch with Sordet's cavalry.

In detail, the positions of the British were :

I. Corps :

On the northern edge of the Forest of St. Gobain and Coucy, from Fressancourt to Amigny.

5th Cavalry Brigade : Sinceny.

II. Corps (including 4th Division, 19th Brigade and Cavalry Division) :

1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades : At Berlancourt, Flavy le Meldeux-Plessis, and Jussy, respectively.

3rd, 4th (with 19th Brigade) and 5th Divisions : From Freniches, south and east, through Genvry to Pontoise.

4th Cavalry Brigade : Cressy (3 miles south of Nesle) north-west of the 4th Division.

From the 28th onward every day was to bring the two wings closer to each other. Sir John French, after meeting some of the 5th Division on the march, as has already been told, had motored on to La Fère to see the I. Corps, and had satisfied himself as to the good spirit of the troops.

He had also received the promise of the 6th Division from England about the middle of September and of a complete corps from India at a later date. Other important intelligence also reached him. The troops of General d'Amade, together with General Sordet's cavalry corps, had been seen in action between Péronne and Bray sur Somme, but by evening it appeared that they had been pressed back. There was good reason to believe that the German Supreme Command judged the British Army to be beaten beyond hope of speedy recovery, and were intent upon extending their enveloping movement westwards until they could sweep all opposing forces into their net.

On the 28th at 7.55 A.M., G.H.Q. asked for air reconnaissance of the area Péronne-Montdidier-Compiègne " to locate hostile cavalry, possibly believed to be about " Péronne to-night," and of the area La Fère-Péronne-Guise, to locate hostile columns. The first named area actually contained only a few French troops, and nothing was seen of the German II. Cavalry Corps which, late in the day, reached an area just north-west of Péronne. In the second area a number of columns (now known to be the 6th and 7th Divisions of the First Army and the VII. and X. Reserve Corps of the Second Army) were seen and all reported moving west between St. Quentin and Le Catelet. The positions of the I. and II. Corps were also discovered and reported.

General Joffre, during his visit to Sir John French on the 27th, had mentioned the preparation of a counter-stroke and the formation of a new Army on his left. The first sign of it was seen on this day in the arrival of units between Amiens and Ham. This Army, the Sixth, under General Maunoury, was to be formed between the British and General d'Amade. As a beginning, the VII. Corps, (14th Division and 63rd Reserve Division. The 13th Division remained in Alsace.) brought from Belfort, was detraining at Villers Bretonneux, to the east of Amiens, and a Moroccan brigade was already assembled further to the east. (According to Kluck, Marwitz's cavalry corps " was surprised in its billets [near Péronne] by the French 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions " (of d Amade's force) on the morning of the 28th. The French, however, were driven from the field at Manancourt (7 miles S.W. of Bapaume) , by parts of the II. Corps and IV. Reserve Corps. This was the action of Mesnil.) On the same day General Joffre, his Western Armies being on the general line Reims-Amiens ordered the French Fifth Army to take the offensive towards St. Quentin along a line parallel to the Oise from Guise to La Fère, hoping at best to strike an effective blow which might check the German advance, and at least relieve the British Army from all further pressure.

On the evening of the 28th August, two corps (XVIII. and III.) of the French Fifth Army proceeding westwards were halted, in echelon, south of the Oise, east of Guise, under cover of the X. Corps, the 1. Corps being in reserve to the south-east. General Lanrezac's troops were thus in touch with, but in advance of, the British Army. During the day, General Valabregue's Reserve divisions, which since the night of the 25th/26th, as already described, had marched so close to the I. Corps as sometimes to share its roads, had had hard fighting at the Oise bridges near Guise, had lost the bridges and withdrawn at nightfall to the left of the line of the Fifth Army.

Sir John French issued orders at 11.30 P.M. for the British to halt and rest on the 29th, but with the condition that all formations should be withdrawn to the south of a line practically east and west through Nesle and Ham, connecting with the French at Vendeuil. During the evening of the 28th, Sir Douglas Haig was asked by General Lanrezac to co-operate in his coming offensive. He agreed to do so, but, on informing G.H.Q. of the request, he received instructions that he was not to take part. The Field-Marshal, who seems to have continued to take a gloomy view of the state of his troops, was anxious to withdraw them from the line of battle for eight or ten days to some locality where they might rest and be re-equipped, and he accordingly arranged with General Joffre that they should fall back to a line a little to the south of the Aisne between Soissons and Compiègne. The situation was complicated by the fact that Kluck's sweep westwards had compelled the evacuation of the British advanced base at Amiens. On this day the suggestion was first made that St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, should take the place of Havre as the principal sea base of the British force in France.

It may be mentioned here that, with the view of creating a diversion on the western flank to assist the British Expeditionary Force and of supporting the Belgians, one battalion of R. Marine Artillery and three battalions of R. Marine Light Infantry, under command of Br.-General Sir George Aston, were landed at Ostend on the 27th and 28th August. They were re-embarked on the 31st. (For details see Sir Julian Corbett's " Naval Operations" pp,. 92-4 and 123-4. The so-called brigade was without a signal section or office staff ; the battalions were in blue serge, had no horses, no transport, not even 1st-line ; no machine guns ; and the rifle ammunition was not charger-loaded.) News of this landing appears to have reached the German Supreme Command on the 30th. (With regard to it the head of the Operations Branch of the German General Staff has written :" At this time there was, as may be imagined, no lack of alarming, reports at General Headquarters. Ostend and Antwerp took a prominent part in them. One day countless British troops were said to have landed at Ostend and to be marching on Antwerp ; on another that there were about to be great sorties from Antwerp. Even landings of Russian troops, 80,000 men, at Ostend were mentioned.)

The general line of retirement of the French Fifth Army after Charleroi was south-westwards, its orders being to reach the line Laon-La Fère. The movements of General Valabregue's two Reserve divisions in contact with the British I. Corps have been mentioned. The XVIII. Corps (35th, 36th and 38th (African) Divisions), on their right, retired via Avesnes, and crossed the Oise at Romery (4 miles east of Guise). The III. Corps, next on the right (5th, 6th and 37th (African) Divisions), followed in echelon behind the XVIII. ; it passed the French frontier on the 25th and marched through Fourmies (10 miles south-east of Avesnes), and crossed the Oise between Etreaupont and Ohis. The X. Corps marched via La Capelle to Hirson first south and then south-east, to keep in touch with the Fourth Army, and thence to Vervins. The I. Corps, from the right of the Army, after reaching Tavaux (7 miles south of Vervins), was brought north-west into second line between the III. and X. Corps.

Thus, by the evening of the 28th August, the Fifth Army was drawn up facing north and north-west behind the Oise front Vervins practically to La Fère, in the following order : 4th Cavalry Division, 51st Reserve Division, X. Corps, III. Corps, XVIII. Corps, Valabrègue's Reserve divisions, with the I. Corps coming up into second line. The German Second Army was in contact with the whole front of the Fifth Army, and had secured a bridgehead at Guise.

The British losses at Waterloo were 8558 (Wellington Despatches, vol. xii.)