MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER XVII - THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE (concluded)

9TH SEPTEMBER 1914 : THE PASSAGE OF THE MARNE AND THE RETREAT OF THE GERMANS

 

(Sketches B, 13 & 17 ; Maps 4, 25, 29 & 30)

 

The orders issued by the British Commander-in-Chief on the evening of the 8th September directed the Army to continue its advance northward at 5 A.M., attacking the enemy rear guards wherever met, the cavalry maintaining touch with the French Armies to right and left, as before. It had been expected that the Germans would offer stubborn resistance on the line of the Marne ; the great width of the river, the few bridges over it, the houses on its banks, and excellent artillery positions and observation on the high ground above presenting very favourable ground for a rearguard action. The array of troops on the British front seemed to confirm that this was their intention. On the other hand, the evening reports of the Flying Corps showed that the idea might have been abandoned. Many columns had been seen moving northward in haste, and the bridges had not been destroyed, except those of La Ferté sous Jouarre, Sammeron (2 miles west of La Ferté), and Changis (3 miles west of Sammeron). The 11th Hussars, who had reconnoitred towards the bridge at Charly and found it occupied by the enemy on the evening of the 8th, ascertained during the night that the Germans had retired leaving the passage clear, and had secured it.

 

 

Early on the 9th September therefore the 1st Cavalry Brigade was pushed forward on Nogent and Charly, and by 5.30 A.M. it was in possession of the bridge at Nogent, whilst the 4th Cavalry Brigade seized that at Azy further to the east and 3 miles below Chateau Thierry. The two brigades then moved about three miles northward from Nogent to Mont de Bonneil to cover the passage of the infantry. By 7.30 A.M. the Queen's, the leading battalion of the 3rd Brigade, the advanced guard of the 1st Division, had passed the Marne at Nogent and was crowning the heights north of the river. The 6th Brigade, with the XXXIV. Brigade R.F.A., the advanced guard of the 2nd Division, on reaching Charly, drove off a party of Germans who had evidently returned to demolish the bridge, but found a barricade on the bridge which took three-quarters of an hour to remove. By 8.15 A.M., however, the brigade had secured the high ground north of the river without fighting. By 10.15 A.M. the 3rd Brigade had pushed on to Beaurepaire Farm (2 1/2 miles north of Charly) without seeing a sign of the enemy. The 1st Cavalry Brigade had already made good the next ridge to the north, and the 3rd Brigade had advanced about another mile to Les Aulnois Bontemps, before the advanced guards received orders to stand fast. The Flying Corps had reported " large hostile forces " at 8.30 A.M., both halted and marching, north of Chateau Thierry, and the bridge there intact. A further report at 12.30 P.M., however, put the force halted about four miles north of the town at only a division, with a long column going north, and further small columns on roads to the east all going north. (According to German accounts, there were no troops near Chateau Thierry except the 5th Cavalry Division, the two portions of which joined up in the course of the day and retired on Beuvardes (7 1/2 miles north-east of Chateau Thierry). The columns seen must have been stragglers or transport, but at the time they were thought to be the III. or IX. Corps.) About 1 1/2 battalions were seen near Montreuil, where there was " artillery activity." Most of the machines were, however, employed to discover the position of the heads of the British columns, and what was happening on the British right and left. The nearest troops of the French Fifth Army were. seen at 7 A.M. near Viels Maisons (10 miles south of Chateau Thierry), moving north-east, that is away from the B.E.F. On the Ourcq, the air reports indicated that the situation was much the same as on the previous day, with the French 8th Division on the immediate left of the British moving away north-westwards.

In view of the supposed large hostile forces north of Chateau Thierry, and the absence of support on the right from the French, the whole of the I. Corps was ordered by Sir Douglas Haig to halt until the situation could be cleared up ; such of the artillery of the 2nd Division as had not crossed the Marne was directed to remain in observation on the south bank of the river, and the 5th Brigade to entrench there. The latter part of the order, sent verbally by an officer, led to a misunderstanding ; for it was taken by Major-General Monro to mean that his division was to hold a position on the south bank, and he began withdrawing the troops who had crossed and sending back his baggage. Fortunately this was discovered by General Haig, who saw the transport retiring, before much time had been lost, and he directed the columns to close up on their heads north of the river. The rest of the Cavalry Division joined the 1st Cavalry Brigade to the left front of the 3rd Brigade early in the afternoon, and a few men of the German rear parties were cut off and captured. The remainder of the 1st Division crossed the river at Nogent, and in due time the 2nd Division also, at Charly. But no further advance was made by the I. Corps until 3 P.M., after two aeroplanes sent to reconnoitre by General Haig had reported " all clear " on the I. Corps front, when, preceded by the cavalry, both divisions moved forward until their heads reached the vicinity of the Chateau Thierry-Montreuil road at Le Thiolet and Coupru respectively. Then, as no French troops had come up on the right, only a few cavalrymen had in fact crossed the Marne, and as the Sixth Army on the left was making no progress and had withdrawn the 8th Division, the connecting link, north-westwards, Sir John French, who had motored up to see General Haig, instructed him to stop the advance. The 1st and 2nd Divisions therefore halted and billeted in depth along the roads on which they were marching, with the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades in front of them, and the rest of the cavalry in rear.

 

 

The II. Corps found the Marne bridges at Nanteuil and Saacy intact ; the 3rd Division crossed by the former, the 5th Division by the latter. Before 8 A.M. the vanguard of the 3rd Division, and about an hour later that of the 5th Division, which met with strong opposition, had established themselves on the heights of the northern bank, and the 9th Brigade, which with a brigade of artillery formed the advanced guard of the 3rd Division, at once sent forward two battalions to Bezu le Guéry, two and a half miles from the river. The vanguard (the Northumberland Fusiliers), pushing on for another mile to Ventelet Farm, found the ridge near it clear of the enemy. By 10.30 A.M. Br.-General Shaw had fixed his headquarters at Bezu : all seemed to be going well. On the left of the 3rd Division also everything appeared at the outset to promise an easy advance for the 5th Division to Montreuil (2 miles north-west of Bezu, on the Chateau Thierry-La Ferté sous Jouarre main road), at which point it would cut off the Germans who were defending the passage of the Marne about La Ferté. No sooner, however, did the vanguard (2/Manchester) of the 14th Brigade show itself about La Limon (1 mile north of Saacy) than it was greeted at various points by heavy shell fire from concealed batteries. Harassed by bursting shells on front and flank, the 14th Brigade now led by the 1/Duke of Cornwall's, with the, 65th (Howitzer) and the 80th Batteries, began its advance upon Montreuil. The direct road from Saacy along the bank of the northward bend of the Marne, via Méry, being too much exposed to the German fire, the brigade moved through the woods half a mile to the east, while the batteries unlimbered south of La Limon. The growth of small trees was so dense that it was extremely difficult for the men to keep touch and maintain direction, and consequently progress was slow. In fact the 14th Brigade was swallowed up by the woods for more than an hour.

The advanced guard of the 3rd Division, to the east of this attack, had not met with opposition ; but the main body had come under persistent shrapnel fire from a German battery, (N°. 6 Battery of the 45th Field Artillery Regiment, according to its diary, which says the battery was heavily shelled. The other two batteries of the brigade had suffered so much from shell fire that they had already been withdrawn.) and Major-General Hamilton had moved it off the Nanteuil-Bezu road into the woods on its left. In order to deal with the German battery, which had been located in the Bois des Essertis west of Bezu, Br.-General Shaw sent two companies of the Lincolnshire through the woods to try and capture the guns. The men crept up unseen to within a hundred and fifty yards of them, and in a few minutes shot down the German gunners literally almost to a man. Dashing out of the thicket to secure the guns, however, they were fired upon first by the escort, that was on the opposite flank of the battery, with which they at once dealt, and then by the 65th (Howitzer) Battery. They were compelled again to seek cover, with a loss of four officers and some thirty men killed or wounded, and the guns were not captured until next morning. This unfortunate mistake arose from the 65th believing that the German battery had been silenced by some other British artillery, and that the men of the Lincolnshire were German gunners returning to their abandoned guns.

Just about this time, 11.30 A.M., the Duke of Cornwall's at the head of the l4th Brigade at last emerged from the woods, and were fired upon by German infantry in position to the south of Montreuil. Thereupon, the brigade was ordered to attack towards the north, on a front of two battalions, with the left flank on the road from Méry to Montreuil ; while the l5th Brigade was directed by 5th Division headquarters to move round further to the east, by Bezu and Bois des Essertis, and attack Hill 189 (immediately to south-east of Montreuil) from the flank. The 14th Brigade, with the 2/Manchester now on the right of the Duke of Cornwall's, meanwhile continued its advance always slowly, owing to the density of the woods ; and, the Manchesters drifting to the right, the East Surrey were brought up to fill the gap. The leading companies of the D.C.L.I. now came under heavy fire from infantry entrenched on Hill 189, and from two batteries, which were still unsilenced, at La Sablonnière and Chamoust (south-west and north of Montreuil, respectively). Under this cross-fire of artillery, the Cornishmen, after struggling for a time to work forward, were counter-attacked and compelled to fall back, leaving a few prisoners behind them and the 14th Brigade came to a dead stop. The Germans at 2 P.M. even launched a counter-attack against the left of its line, but the effort was at once smothered by British shrapnel. After more than an hour of deadlock, the Norfolk and Dorsetshire of the l5th Brigade between 3 and 4 P.M. came up to the western edge of the Bois des Essertis, on the flank of Hill 189, where they were abruptly checked by a violent fire from rifles and machine guns and from the battery at La Sablonnière. Unable to make progress, they stood fast, and engaged in a short-range fight with the German infantry, which was entrenched within a hundred and twenty yards of them. Forty-seven dead Germans were found next day in the trenches opposite to the Dorsetshire ; but the l5th Brigade needed the support of artillery and the British batteries could find no positions from which to give it. Some time before, about 3 P.M., two battalions of the 13th Infantry Brigade had been ordered to the left via Moitiébard (2 miles south of Montreuil) to discover and, if possible, destroy the battery at Chamoust ; but it was not until 6 P.M. that an officer of artillery, by a personal reconnaissance, at last found the exact position of the German guns. They were silenced within ten minutes by the 37th (Howitzer) Battery ; but by that time the light was waning, and the best of the day was gone. (The enemy at Montreuil was at first Kraewel's Composite Brigade, hastily formed on the 8th of two infantry regiments and six batteries of artillery from the two divisions of the IX. Corps. General Kraewel's instructions were to hold the line of the Marne from Nogent to La Ferté (actually the British front) and destroy the bridges (which he did not do), whilst the three cavalry divisions held the Petit Morin (which they had already abandoned). He slipped away at 8 P.M. on the 9th, leaving the guns of one battery behind him (" Militär Wochenblatt, Nos. 73 and 74 of 1920). In the course of the fight Kraewel's brigade " was supported by the " 9th Cavalry Division, which attacked towards Montbertoin, and by the leading troops of the Prussian 5th Division which had been sent by [First] Army Headquarters to reinforce it, and had marched via Cocherel. "(Lieut.-Colonel Müller Loebnitz, formerly of the Great General Staff, in Der Wendepunkt des Weltkrieges," p. 35.) Four Jäger battalions and " a detachment of the 3rd Division from Mary " (6 miles to the west of Montreuil) were also present, according to Kuhl's " Marne," p. 207.)

The 3rd Division, when it found that neither the I. Corps on its right nor the 5th Division on its left, was coming up in line with it, after helping the 5th Division as already related, remained from the morning onwards with its head at Ventelet Farm on the Chateau Thierry-Montreuil road, which thus marked the limit of British progress in this quarter.

Further to the west, the III. Corps was delayed by a most effective barrier. The enemy was holding the right bank of the Marne at all likely points of passage, with artillery near Caumont at the top of the big loop of the river enfilading the western reach of it nearly as far as La Ferté sous Jouarre, and with other guns north-west of the town. The only intact bridge was the railway viaduct halfway down the above-mentioned enfiladed reach of the river. The four service pontoons of the field companies of the one division at the disposal of the corps could only bridge 75 feet, and were obviously insufficient for crossing the Marne at any point in this section, for it was from 70 to 90 yards wide and very deep, without the help of additional material, and there was none to be found ready for use except at La Ferté sous Jouarre.

Pursuant to General Pulteney's orders, the 11th and l2th Brigades advanced at 4.45 A.M. in two columns, with the intention of repairing the bridges in front of them, and if possible of crossing the river and establishing a bridgehead north of La Ferté. They seized the high ground at Tarterel, immediately to the east of La Ferté, so that artillery could be brought up to deal with the German guns and the portion of the town south of the river. The broken bridges at La Ferté were, however, found by the 11th Brigade to be unapproachable, the buildings adjacent to them on the northern bank of the river being full of German snipers and machine guns. Attempts to cross by boat further down were also unsuccessful. It was extremely difficult to tell which houses were occupied, and impossible to deal effectively with them, except by howitzer fire ; the greater part of the forenoon was occupied with dropping shells on the most likely ones from Tarterel, and from Jouarre, south of La Ferté. The l2th Infantry Brigade, however, pushed two battalions up the left bank of the river into the loop between Chamigny and Luzancy, as there was a weir (actually a lock, barrage and weir nearly a hundred yards in total length) marked on the map near the former place. They found it, and succeeded by fire in silencing the defenders. Then the 2/Essex, led by Major F. W. Moffitt and followed by the 2/Lancashire Fusiliers, crossed by the weir, along which was a broken plank footway, in single file, only two men of the Essex being wounded by machine-gun fire during the passage. The Germans did not wait, and although the two battalions climbed up the slopes of the valley to the road which leads from La Ferté to Montreuil , the line of the enemy retreat, they reached it too late to intercept any German troops. Officers who took part in this extraordinary passage of a wide river in broad daylight in the face of an enemy can only explain it by the supposition that the Jäger defending the weir were too tired or dispirited to have heart to fight. The British were equally weary, and it was only that they were on the move forward which kept many of them from falling asleep. (It may, however, be mentioned that Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, the representative of O.H.L., who passed behind the front during the morning, found trains and wounded going back " in wild haste " fearing to be cut off by English cavalry, and in one place "complete panic." (Hentsch's report to the C.G.S., p. 3.))

During this movement, shortly before noon, the British infantry was withdrawn from the southern half of La Ferté and the town was heavily bombarded, with the result that the Germans about 2.30 P.M. abandoned the direct defence of the bridges, which Royal Engineer officers were then able to reconnoitre. But it was 4 P.M. or later before any effectual repair work could be begun. However, the 1/Itifle Brigade followed the two battalions of the l2th Brigade across the weir, and the 2/Inniskilling Fusiliers crossed the river higher up by the railway viaduct which was still intact. They were shelled as they did so, but suffered no loss. The 1/East Lancashire and the 1/Hampshire were ferried across in boats below La Ferté, and this tedious operation on a broad and rapid river was not completed until 9 P.M., by which time the Engineers had collected sufficient barrel piers, boats and planks to supplement the pontoons and begin the construction of a floating bridge. (It was formed of 2 trestles, 4 pontoons, 4 barrel piers, 1 barge and 2 boats, and completed at 7 A.M. on the 10th.) When darkness fell on the 9th, six of the twelve battalions of the 4th Division were still on the south side of the river : the 10th Brigade at Grand Mont Ménard (2 miles east of La Ferté), the King's Own (l2th Brigade) at Luzancy, the Somerset Light Infantry (11th Brigade) at Les Abymes (just south of La Ferté). The 19th Brigade was between Jouarre and Signy Signets.

The other divisions and the cavalry (less a brigade) were across the Marne. The positions of the Army at the end of the day were as follows, extending from Chateau Thierry (exclusive) through Bezu and La Ferté sous Jouarre to beyond Jouarre :

Cavalry Division

Lucy le Bocage, Domptin.

5th Cavalry Brigade

La Baudière (half a mile west of Domptin).

I. Corps

Le Thiolet, Mont de Bonneil, Domptin, Coupru.

II. Corps

Bezu, Crouttes, Caumont.

3rd Cavalry Brigade

Grand Mont Ménard (south of the Marne)

III. Corps

Luzancy, Grand Mont Ménard, Jouarre, Chamigny.

 

At 1 P.M., on behalf of the British Commander-in-Chief, the French Mission at G.H.Q. had telephoned to General Joffre : " Our III. Corps is stopped in the environs of La " Ferté as the bridges are broken. The enemy is in force on the line Chateau Thierry-Marigny. It is of the utmost importance that the XVIII. Corps should come to the help of our I. Corps in the environs of Chateau Thierry.

This message G.Q.G. at once telephoned on to General Franchet d'Espérey, but the only result was that, towards 5 P.M., the French 4th Cavalry Division arrived on the right of the I. Corps, and later an infantry brigade crossed at Azy, and formed an outpost line behind the cavalry, whilst Chateau Thierry was occupied about 5 P.M. by the 10th Cavalry Division, subsequently joined by two infantry battalions.

The 9th September, though we now know that the advance of the B.E.F. was the decisive factor in influencing the Germans to abandon the field of battle, seemed at the time a disappointing day for the British, despite their passage of the Marne. The more so since General Maunoury, having been hard pressed on his left and left flank throughout the 8th, had asked for a brisk attack against the left flank and rear of Kluck. Had the entire British line been able to come up level with the 9th Brigade when it reached the road from Chateau Thierry through Montreuil to Lizy sur Ourcq at 9 A.M., great results might have followed ; for Kluck's left was then well to the south of Lizy, and by a general advance Kraewel's force at Montreuil would have been swept away or surrounded. But the I. Corps, on the right, was halted for several hours on account of a misleading air report that there were large enemy forces north of Chateau Thierry, and the French on its right were too far in rear to give assistance in case of counter-attack ; the III. Corps, on the left, was held up by the destruction of the bridges at La Ferté sous Jouarre.

That the German First and Second Armies were abandoning the field of battle did not become apparent until about 5.30 P.M. The British air reports of the earlier part of the day, consolidated on a map at 3 P.M., showed no sign of retrograde movements except north of Chateau Thierry. Observations made from the air from 3.55 P.M. onwards, however, discovered first a long column (3rd Division) marching northwards from Lizy at the back of the Ourcq battlefield, and then other columns of transport and troops retiring north-north-eastwards on Neuilly and La Ferté Milon. The ground on the left flank of the B.E.F in the angle between the Marne and the Ourcq, was reported quite clear ; but it had been noticed that two columns marching eastwards had halted on the British front at Dhuisy (6 miles N.N.E. of La Ferté Jouarre). (Now known to be part of the 5th Division and II. Cavalry Corps sent to stop the British advance.) The R.F.C. general report, timed 5.20 P.M., which reached G.H.Q. soon after, ended with the words, " General retirement N.N.E. on Soissons," which turned out to be correct; but the situation map on information derived from the French still showed incorrectly the German III. Corps opposite the French north-east of Chateau Thierry, and the VII. Corps behind it.

Information that the French were approaching Chateau Thierry, and that there appeared to be a German rear guard five miles north of that town, arrived at G.H.Q. very soon after this air report ; also news from the other flank, from General Maunoury, that Kluck was retiring north-eastwards covering his retreat by his heavy artillery. But it was too late to order a general and combined advance; in fact, both men and horses of both French and British were, after the continuous operations since the 20th August, too worn out for further effort without some rest and refreshment. It was the physical exhaustion of the belligerents which prevented the local tactical advantages gained by both sides on certain parts of the field from being developed into decisive successes. As, however, the line of retreat of the First Army appeared to lie more or less across the British front, Sir John French still had some hopes of intercepting the Germans. Acting in anticipation of General Joffre's instructions, which did not arrive until next day, at 8.15 P.M. he ordered his troops to continue the pursuit northwards at 5 A.M. next morning.

The gigantic struggle of the 6th to the 9th September, known as the battle of the Marne, in which, between Verdun and Paris, so far as can be ascertained, 49 Allied divisions, with eight cavalry divisions, contended against 46 German divisions, with seven cavalry divisions, (As evidence of the failure of the German strategy, C.O.A. (iv. pp. 524-5) states that on the vital western wing, the Allies (Ninth, Fifth and Sixth Armies and the B.E.F.) had a superiority of roughly 200 battalions and 190 batteries over the Germans (First, ,Second and half the Third Armies), whereas at Namur-Mons the Germans (First, Second and Third Armies) had a superiority over the French Fifth Army and B.E.F. of more than one hundred battalions and 175 batteries. In the centre there were 321 German battalions opposed to 277 French, and on the eastern wing 329 Germans opposed to 316 French, whilst 44 battalions and 53 batteries were on the move from Alsace to Belgium.) was over, and with it all the hopes of the rapid knock-out blow on which Germany had counted for winning the war against her unprepared opponents. Tactically it was not fought to a finish, but strategically its results were far-reaching, so that it must be regarded as one of the decisive battles of the world. (Falkenhayn (p. 1) tells us that the removal of Moltke from the post of Chief of the General Staff which followed was concealed so that the change of leadership should not give the enemy propaganda " further ostensible proof of the completeness of the victory obtained on the Marne.") Its general result is well summarised in a proclamation issued by General Franchet d'Espèrey on the evening of the 9th September to the Fifth Army :

" Held on his flanks, his centre broken, the enemy is now retreating towards the east and north by forced marches."

In the area between Verdun and Paris the Armies of Generals Sarrail and de Langle de Cary on the right had more or less held their ground against the German Fifth, Fourth and part of the Third Armies, just as Maunoury had against the First Army. In the centre, the right and centre of General Foch's Army had been driven back by the left of the German Second Army and the right of the Third ; he was about to attempt to restore the situation by the counter-attack of a division transferred from his left to his right, when the Germans retreated. General Franchet d'Espèrey, too, had contributed little towards the victory : he had lent his X. Corps to General Foch to succour the latter's right ; his I. and III. Corps had wheeled to the right, following cautiously, but not catching up, the right of Bülow's Army, which had swung back eastwards ; and his XVIII. Corps and Conneau's cavalry corps, with little or no opposition in front of them after the 6th September, had lost touch with the enemy and fallen gradually behind the British, the heads of their columns not coming up until the general retirement of the Germans was well under way.

On Franchet d'Espèrey's left, the B.E.F. had driven back a strong screen under Generals von Richthofen and von der Marwitz, formed of four cavalry divisions (including one infantry and eight Jäger battalions), a composite brigade of the IX. Corps, rear guards of the II. and IV. Corps, and a detachment of the III. Corps. (All these formations are definitely mentioned in different German accounts.) On ground eminently advantageous to the defence, it had forced the passage of the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin and the Marne, and had not only interposed itself between the German First and Second Armies, but whilst the former was fully engaged in front with Maunoury's Army, had turned its left flank. The Germans had no choice, as Kluck's Chief of Staff admits, except between complete disaster to their right wing. and retreat in order to make good the 25 miles' gap in their line of battle. This gap was certainly created by their own action ; and unfortunately it was exploited only by the B.E.F.

The advance of the British has been adversely commented upon as slow and hesitating by several French writers. (E.g. General Palat. He adds, however, " It seems likely that their confidence in themselves and particularly in us, had suffered in the first encounters, which were so little encouraging " (vi. p. 248).) It has been pointed out that owing to the delay in General Joffre's order reaching Sir John French, the B.E.F. retired on the 5th, instead of advancing, and therefore started two marches behind where the French expected it to be on the morning of the 6th. For the same reason, also, the left of General Franchet d'Espèrey's Army was to the south of where it should have been, to the right rear of the British ; and it remained behind them practically throughout the battle, and was behind them at the end. The average advance on the 6th was eleven miles ; on the 7th under eight, with the passage of the Grand Morin ; on the 8th, ten, with the forcing of the Petit Morin ; and on the 9th, seven, with the crossing of the Marne. In view of the previous labours of the B.E.F., the difficulties of the ground, and the opposition of the enemy, little more could be expected.

A greater effort might possibly have been made on the 9th, but no demand for it came from General Joffre, who alone knew the situation as a whole. The French on either flank of the B.E.F. were not making definite progress, it is now known that Foch's right and Maunoury's left were actually falling back, and until 5.30 P.M., for all the British commander knew, if he pushed forward wildly north of the Marne he might be thrusting his troops into a trap prepared for them : a fear urged as excuse for the smaller progress of the French Fifth Army.

 

THE FRENCH ON THE 9TH SEPTEMBER

(Summarised from the French Official Account.)

General Joffre had now no hope of the Sixth Army enveloping the German right, and required no more of General Maunoury than that he should hold fast the enemy opposite to him. " He even directed him to avoid all decisive action, withdrawing his left in the direction of the entrenched camp of Paris until the arrival of reinforcements enabled him to resume the offensive." As it happened, reinforcements for the Germans arrived first and advanced to attack the left of the Sixth Army ; and, on their appearance, it was swung back. On the other flank on the Ourcq, opposite Maunoury's right wing, the enemy withdrew, and thus by night all touch with the Germans had been lost. The French troops were very tired, but General Maunoury proposed to resume the offensive next day, as soon as he had been reinforced by the 8th Division.

In the Fifth Army sector the Germans seemed to have disappeared. " The Fifth Army marched towards the Marne and the Surmelin " [a tributary of the Marne on its southern side, running N.N.W.] without encountering, as a whole, any resistance."

The Fifth Army orders for the 9th, issued at 8.15 P.M. on the previous evening, directed the corps to advance in echelon during the morning towards the Marne (further orders would be issued for the afternoon), the left leading, pushing on advanced guards to hold the passages of the Surmelin. Thus placed, the Army would be ready to engage either towards the north or north-east-but not north-west to help the B.E.F.

Half an hour after these orders had been issued, General Franchet d'Espèrey received General Joffre's Instruction No. 19, in which the Commander-in-Chief announced that the German right wing now formed two distant groups, and laid down that the " rôle of the Fifth Army was to cover the right flank of the British Army by directing a strong detachment on Chateau Thierry-Azy. Conneau's cavalry corps, crossing the Marne, if necessary behind this detachment or behind the British columns, was to ensure effective liaison between the British Army and the Fifth Army."

" General Franchet d'Espèrey did not in any way alter the orders which he had just given ; " but at 9 P.M. he issued an addition to them " informing his corps that the enemy was in full retreat, and directing that they should not let themselves be stopped by the resistance of rear guards : these should be crushed by violent artillery fire, turned by infantry and pursued by cavalry. Only a vigorous pursuit, he added, will permit us to gather the full fruits of the present situation." In spite of these most appropriate instructions nothing of the nature of a pursuit took place.

As the Fifth Army became in the course of the day divided into three portions : the right (I. and III. Corps) which, with the X. Corps, went to General Foch's assistance ; the left, Conneau's cavalry corps, which came up on the right of the B.E.F. ; and the centre (XVIII. Corps and Group of Reserve Divisions), which hung back in reserve, its operations will be summarised in that order.

The III. Corps had passed the night in front of Montmirail in contact with the enemy. General Hache, therefore, ordered his 9 divisions on the 9th to pass right and left of the town. But no enemy was encountered ; only about noon did the corps cavalry regiment receive a few rifle shots, probably from a party of cyclists, and parties of German cavalry were seen retiring. Less the 37th Division, ordered at 9.15 A.M. to be transferred to the Sixth Army, the corps (5th and 6th Divisions) went forward about six miles north-eastward, and at 1 P.M., just as the right had come under artillery fire, it received Army orders to halt, practically where it was, and protect itself from the direction of the Surmelin, 2 1/2 miles to the front. The reason given for this order was that Foch's Army had been violently attacked, and the X. Corps had gone to its assistance, and the I. Corps was preparing to do so. The III. Corps subsequently moved up towards the Surmelin and went into bivouac. The whole right wing (3 corps) of the Fifth Army had swung practically eastward. The I. Corps advanced half-deployed in order to deal with enemy rear guards. At 8 A.M. it reached its first objective, Vauchamps, without seeing anything of the enemy, although the l9th Division on its right (the third division of the X. Corps, not handed on to Foch and now attached to the I. Corps) was fired on. Continuing on, at 10.45 A.M. the corps was ordered to halt and be ready to face east or north-east, as the Ninth Army was being violently attacked. Soon after 1 P.M. General Franchet d'Espèrey arrived at corps headquarters, and announcing that he had halted the III. Corps, ordered the I. " to throw the maximum of force " towards Champaubert to disengage the left of the Ninth Army." General Deligny detailed the l9th Division and half the 2nd, with all the corps artillery, but at 3.10 P.M., before any offensive action had been taken, new instructions were received from the Fifth Army, ordering the I. Corps, whilst protecting itself from the north, to turn back south-east (sic) to disengage the X. Corps by an immediate attack " à fond." To array the formations of the corps on the new alignment " required nearly three hours," and the attack was about to be launched when information was received from General Foch that he was going to resume the general offensive. Direction was therefore again altered to north-east, and the corps progressed without difficulty, " for the enemy was retiring rapidly." The total day's advance north-eastwards was six miles by the 1st Division on the left, and five miles by the l9th Division on the right. The 1st and 2nd Divisions throughout the day never had contact with the enemy, but the advance eastward of the 19th Division had been stopped by fire.

Turning to the left of the Fifth Army, General Conneau sent forward only the 4th and 10th Cavalry Divisions from the Petit Morin, leaving the 8th resting. The 4th began to cross the Marne at Azy (7 1/2 miles from its starting place) at 1 P.M., " behind the British cavalry," completing the passage at 2.30 P.M. ; the 10th went forward a short distance, and then " made a long halt, sending reconnoitring parties towards Chateau Thierry."

At 1 P.M. the Cavalry Corps received General Franchet d'Espèrey's orders to cross the Marne at Azy " during the day," supported by a mixed brigade of the XVIII. Corps. (The 72nd Brigade, 3 batteries of artillery, some engineers and half a troop of cavalry were detailed, and arrived at Azy about 5 P.M.) General Conneau's task was " to act against the German columns in retreat north of the Marne, cover the right flank of the British, and assure the debouching of the XVIII. Corps on the right bank of the Marne."

The 4th Cavalry Division, on going forward, passed the rearmost British cavalry brigade, the 4th, in bivouac. Its reconnoitring parties reported the enemy " three to five miles ahead. At the end of the clay the 4th Division billeted two miles south-west of Chateau Thierry," on the right of the British I. Corps.

'The 10th Cavalry Division, after its long halt, continued on towards Chateau Thierry at 2 P.M. Hearing that the town was occupied, two squadrons were sent east and west to turn it. " At 4.30 P.M., the enemy, a few cavalry patrols it would appear, retired. The 10th Division entered the town and sent reconnoitring parties north and north-east. The halt order left the division in the town and its western suburbs." In the evening, two infantry battalions attached to the division arrived to hold a bridgehead, and the 10th Dragoon Brigade was sent on outpost ahead of them.

The 8th Cavalry Division was moved from its overnight billets at 2 P.M. and brought up south of the river, south-west of Chateau Thierry.

The XVIII. Corps (of Franchet d'Espèrey's centre) advanced in two columns, preceded by the corps cavalry regiment, with the intention of halting at Viffort, about six miles north of the Petit Morin. The cavalry soon learnt from the inhabitants that the enemy had gone, leaving only a few cavalry patrols, and the corps reached its destination without difficulty, " at the end of the morning." At 12.30 P.M., in consequence of G.Q.G. instructions, General Franchet d'Espèrey ordered the XVIII. Corps to send a mixed brigade, as already mentioned, to support the cavalry corps ; but it was not until 4.15 P.M. that he passed on the further G.Q.G. instructions, telephoned at 2.10 P.M., that " the XVIII. Corps should try to pass the Marne this evening at Chateau Thierry in order to support effectively the right of the British Army [already over the Marne], which is marching from Charly on Domptin and the north."

The XVIII. Corps then got on the march again, and at 5.20 P.M. General Maud'huy ordered his two leading divisions to halt for the night on the south bank of the Marne, with the third division behind them at Viffort. They were to be covered on the left by the mixed brigade with the cavalry, and on the right by four battalions of Zouaves. One of the latter crossed the river at 7 P.M. and bivouacked with the outposts.

The Group of Reserve Divisions marched up one division behind the other, and at night filled the gap between the XVIII. Corps and the III.

Thus the five divisions of the centre gave assistance neither to the main body of the Fifth Army on the right nor to the British on the left, neither did they encounter any enemy, and no advantage was taken of the complete gap in front of them.

On this, the last day of the battle, Foch suffered a greater setback than on the previous day. The Germans, having driven the defenders from the southern exits of the Marshes of St. Gond on the 8th, " attacked the whole front of the Ninth Army except that of the [attached] X. Corps. On the left (the Moroccan Division) resistance was offered not without difficulty ; on the right (IX. and XI. Corps) a retirement of three or four miles was made. At noon Foch issued a supreme appeal to his troops:" Then came a pause and the beginning of a gradual German retirement. The 42nd Division had marched at 7 A.M. from the left of the Army, where it was relieved by the X. Corps, towards the centre to form a reserve. At 1.45 P.M. Foch gave its commander, General Grossetti, orders to counter-attack at 4 P.M. from Pleurs north-eastward. Its advance was to be the signal for all the other divisions to go forward. " But it was 6 P.M. when it reached the road Linthes-Pleurs [its starting base] and already [growing] dark, so General Grossetti decided to suspend the attack and let his troops bivouac on the positions they had reached."

Of the other troops of the Ninth Army, only one brigade of the XI. Corps, finding nothing in front of it, went forward, and continued onwards till 11 P.M., when it was ordered back to its starting place. Its sister brigade of the 22nd Division entrenched. The 9th Cavalry Division, guarding the right of the Army, came up abreast of the infantry, its cyclist point reaching Mailly at 8 P.M., to learn that the Germans had left two hours earlier. " Night alone prevented a pursuit."

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