MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER XXI - LAST DAYS ON THE AISNE

 

(Sketches 19 & 20 ; Maps 2, 3, 4, 35 & 36)

 

GENERAL SITUATION

 

With the stand of the Germans on the Aisne, where they filled up the great gap which had existed in their line since the Battle of the Marne, the successful defence of the French Armies in Lorraine and the failure of the Germans by attack on the Aisne front to prevent General Joffre from shifting troops westward, an entirely new strategic situation arose. With this it now seems desirable to deal ; for it is the key to the events with which the remainder of this volume is concerned.

The front of the French Armies on the right of the British, though fighting continued sporadically, was by the middle of September practically stabilised on the ground where it was to remain so long. There was but one exception : a weak place in the line of the Third Army gave an opportunity in the latter half of September to German troops from Metz to push in and secure the St. Mihiel salient. Neither belligerent force, for the moment at least, could hope for success by frontal attack, and as their southern flanks rested on Switzerland, they could not be turned on that side. The western flank both of the Allies and the Germans, on the contrary, lay perfectly open ;it was therefore still possible to continue the enveloping movements which both sides had in turn attempted, with the result, it is true, of gain of ground and prisoners in turn, but hitherto without decisive success.

There were, however, other good and weighty reasons for pursuing operations on the western flank. In the great interval between the Oise and the Dutch frontier lay objectives of the highest importance to both sides. The Channel ports were practically defenceless ; only a few scattered French Territorial battalions about Péronne, Douai, and Lille interposed between them and the German Armies. General von Falkenhayn has said : " It still seemed possible, providing the present German front held, to bring the northern coast of France and therefore the control of the English Channel into German possession." (Falkenhayn, p. 13.) Turning to the other side, the German communications were in danger : " the only line of supply of any use to the greater part of the western half of the German Armies was the railway leading from Belgium into the St. Quentin district. This was almost wholly unprotected against enemy attacks." (Falkenhayn, p. l2.) Hence, an extension of the front to the west was imperative for each of the belligerent parties, both on offensive and defensive grounds. Further, it was of the utmost importance to the Allies to re-establish connection with the Belgian Army which was still holding out in Antwerp, to secure Lille, and to cover the Bethune coalfields.

In the latter half of September, therefore, both belligerents began to make preparations for extending their lines westwards and northwards by withdrawing troops from other parts of the front. Each cherished hopes of enveloping the open flank of the other, and of rolling up his line, and eaeh in the meantime endeavoured by attacking on the old front to hold the foe to his ground and prevent him transferring forces to the vital flank.

The failure of the French Sixth Army to turn the open right flank of the German line during the advance from the Ourcq to the Aisne and during the first days of the fighting on the Aisne had not altered General Joffre's determination to persist in operations to that end. He had already brought the XIII. Corps from the First Army to reinforce the Sixth, and other corps and all available cavalry were soon to follow. But he was careful on the 17th September, in Instruction No. 29, to point out that " it is essential to maintain an offensive attitude in order to keep the enemy under threat of attack and thus prevent him from disengaging and transferring portions of his forces from one point to another." On the l8th September he informed Sir John French that " the general offensive would be resumed as soon as a new Army that he was concentrating in the west was in a position to move forward."

To the German Supreme Command the danger to the western flank of the Armies was naturally patent, nor had the commander of the German First Army failed to bring it to notice. On the l5th September Kluck reported that his " westward communications were in danger; enemy column of all arms moving from Clermont reached Compiègne at noon." He received the instructions that in the event of the right flank of the First Army being imperilled, the Army will withdraw due north."

On the evening of the 14th September General von Falkenhayn took over the duties of the Chief of the General Staff, as already stated. He devised immediate steps to prevent the continuance of the movements of French troops round to the western flank by ordering counterattacks along the whole front, principally along the Aisne front and east and west of Reims. Many of these attacks fell, as will be seen, on the British Army. But " they did not produce the hoped-for results, and the attempt to prevent or divert the movement of enemy troops was unsuccessful." (Falkenhayn, p. 9.)

 

 

Sir John French's operation orders for the l6th September ordered the line held by the Army to be strongly entrenched. He still, however, had hopes of being able to continue the advance and added that it was his intention to assume a general offensive at the first opportunity. His orders proved to be the official notification of the commencement of trench warfare. Next day, with the same proviso as before, he ordered the line to be strengthened by every available means. Thenceforward the general situation remaining unaltered, the daily issue of operation orders ceased, and they were prepared only when some considerable change in the situation or a projected attack made them necessary. To those at the front, however, the days on the Aisne seemed a continuous battle which might at any moment develop into a decisive operation and end the war ; the apathy of trench warfare had not yet set in on either side. Artillery fire, though intermittent, never ceased for long. By day, sniping made it impossible to move about or to work except under cover ; constant vigilance was required to detect enemy infantry attacks in good time. Night was livelier even than day, and was made almost as bright at times by the enemy's flares and light - balls ; but during darkness working parties and supplies came up, patrols were continually on the move and reliefs were carried out.

There was nothing novel in two armies thus facing each other, entrenched and adding daily to their defences. After the Russo-Japanese war a few writers had forecast that the next war on the Continent would be one of " siege warfare in the field," (E.g " The Campaign of the Future," by Captain (later Lieut.-Colonel) C. E. P. Sankey, D.S.O., R.E., in the " R.E. Journal," January 1907.) and, but for the doctrine of the offensive at all costs, held by both the French and German General Staffs, and the generally accepted theory that a war must, for financial and industrial considerations, be short, they had good reason on their side. Measuring the Franco-German frontier as about one hundred and sixty miles in length, or three hundred and twenty miles with the Franco-Belgian frontier added, and counting the heads of the trained men available in the belligerent countries, there were on both sides, for the shorter distance some 30,000 men and for the longer nearly 15,000 men, per mile available, nearly twenty or ten to the yard as the case might be. These, entrenched, were ample to hold all national territory -for 2,000 to 4,000 men a mile was the usual estimate for the requirements of a modern fortress-and to provide an enormous reserve to break through at any selected spot.

It is unnecessary to recall the fortified lines of ancient campaigns, when lack of communications made the possession of certain routes indispensable and caused turning movements to be slow and difficult. Operations of those days, if only from lack of railway and other means of rapid transport, have nothing in common with those of modern warfare. In the American Civil War, 1861-65, entrenchments were extensively used by both sides, and after the failure of Grant to force Lee's breastworks in the Wilderness campaign there had been the long period-nine and a half months, l6th June 1864 to 2nd April 1865-of deadlock in the trenches of the Petersburg lines. This genuine trench warfare ended only because the gradual extension of the lines westwards made it impossible for the Confederates to man the trenches in sufficient strength, and Grant was then able at once to outflank them and to break through their front.

Passing over the extraordinary results obtained by entrenched troops at Plevna in 1877-78, we find that in the Russo-Japanese war, twenty-six years later, both sides took to the spade, and in the four months on the Sha Ho (l5th October 1904 to 27th February 1905), assisted by experiences gained at Port Arthur, developed trench warfare to a very high degree.

In the Balkan war the victorious Bulgarians were stopped before the Tchataldja Lines, which they could not turn ; the lines it is true had been magnificently sited in the leisure of peace, but were little better than earthworks.

It is remarkable, therefore, that none of the belligerents entered the war prepared for trench warfare on a large scale. Digging had been encouraged by precept in the British Army, but, owing to the rapidity of the course of peace manoeuvres, was seldom possible in practice, except on the oft-dug-over soil of the tiny portion of the training ground allotted for the purpose. General Lanrezac has written that so opposed to entrenching was French doctrine in 1914, that when he ordered his corps to dig in before the battle of Charleroi, some evaded the order, and others, to satisfy the written word, threw up just a bourrelet of earth : a parapet about the size of a window sand-bag, as an Englishman might say.

The Germans naturally had not trained their troops for, and did not expect, position warfare, because, as has been already pointed out, their General Staff believed that the decision in France would be reached in 36 to 40 days. They had however prepared for and held exercises in the accelerated attack of fortifications, (E.g. at Coblenz in 1908.) with a view to dealing quickly with those of Eastern France, or at any rate pretending that they were in a position to do so. They had very carefully studied the Russo-Japanese war from this point of view; and September 1914 found them in possession of heavy guns, (Each corps took into the field two batteries of four 5-9-inch howitzere. 21-cm. (8-inch) howitzers reached the Aisne on the 14th September (Zwehl, p. 74.) The siege train went to Liége, Namur and Antwerp, and was not available in the field until the fall of the last named fortress, when most of it was moved to the Ypres area.) trench mortars, rifle-grenades, handgrenades, searchlights, illuminating pistols, and periscopes, designed for the attack of fortresses, but practically comprising all the apparatus of trench warfare. Though, as the German record states, (" Die Technik im Weltkriege," by Generalleutnant Schwarte.) these instruments " in their present form are warchildren grown large and perfected in the storms and troubles of the times, yet they had been so far developed in peace that the German Army in August 1914 achieved great success with them against the Belgian fortresses." As the Germans relied on the suddenness of the attack and never contemplated lengthy operations, such matters as sound ranging, flash spotting and camouflage (Generalmajor von Gleich in " Die alte Armee," p. 19, says, " as regards concealment from aeroplanes, we had learnt as good as nothing (in peace). Even in the war we followed halting and hesitating behind our adversaries. 'Camouflage' we actually only learnt from the English after our losses had made us wise.") were absent from their original conception. Of the desirability of scattering batteries, magazines, observation stations, strong points and keeps, and interspersing them with dummies, so as to offer a multiplicity of small targets, the Germans were fully cognizant ; they had for many years avoided building concrete shelltraps like the self-contained detached forts designed after the war of 1870-71 by the Belgian general, Brialmont, and the French engineer, General Séré de Riviére. The precise nature of shelter necessary to resist heavy artillery had also been decided on. (The ferro-concrete shellproofs at Tsingtau " which resisted perfectly all calibres up to and including the 28 cm. howitzers " were 1.5 metres (5 feet) thick : that is to say, the thickness of the pill boxes and other concrete shelters used in France (see " Der Kampf um Tsingtau," pp. 57 and 194).) Such matters had been exhaustively studied in the design and lay-out of the German Feste, the super-fortresses of Metz, Thionville, Strasbourg, etc. The arrangement of these permanently fortified areas was, as far as the means available permitted, imitated in field warfare at the front ; thus in the course of time the German field defences were developed on a definite plan into broad fortified zones.

At the beginning therefore the enemy was at a great advantage in his knowledge of trench warfare ; and he had the material required for its practice, even if his men had not been generally trained in its use. (The first German train-load of engineer stores for siege warfare arrived on the Aisne on l4th September. ( Vogel, p. 111 ).) The improvisation by the British Army of trench warfare implements whilst waiting for them to be manufactured and supplied from home will be told in a later volume of this history ; the only engineer stores which reached it on the Aisne, beyond what the engineer companies and bridging trains carried, were small quantities of barbed wire and sandbags, and the only heavy artillery which arrived (apart from the 60-pdrs. which formed part of the divisional artillery) were four batteries of old pattern 6-inch howitzers.

The British could at first do little more than dig cover.

Fortunately for them the soil on the slopes of the Aisne valley and on the plateau was easy-though near the river there was hard rock a foot below the surface-and as long as they were in the Aisne district-that is to say, before the first frosts-the sides of the trenches, except in one sector of the II. Corps area, stood vertical without revetment ; in fact they stood so well that it was even possible to obtain additional cover by undercutting the sides in the South African fashion, thus forming the first " funk holes." The trenches dug at this period were rarely continuous, usually a succession of pits capable of holding a few men. Generally, they were of the narrow type, eighteen inches to two feet wide, with tiny traverses, three to six feet wide. These days were afterward spoken of in jest as the " Augustan Period " (August 1914) of field fortification. The narrow trenches, though giving good cover, were easily knocked in by high-explosive shell, and proved the graves of some of the defenders, for men were occasionally buried alive in them. In siting fire trenches, when a choice was possible, concealment from the direct observation of hostile artillery became the most important factor ; on the slopes of the Aisne valley an extensive field of fire was out of the question, and it soon became evident that a short one, flanked by machine guns, was in reality more effective.

The enemy on the Aisne seemed by his shooting to have such accurate information as to movements of troops and positions of batteries, that it was for some time suspected that he was being assisted by spies ; but experience went to show that the results were due rather to the enterprise of his artillery observers. In one case a German disguised as a farmer was found with a telephone in a house between the lines in direct communication with his commander. Several others were caught actually inside the British lines connected by the field telegraph wire to their batteries. One with a week's supply of food was found inside a haystack ; another concealed in a tree, on being detected by an oflicer who looked up, promptly dropped upon him and, stunning him, escaped.

As regards our own artillery, the difficulties of employing the batteries effectively on the plateau south of the Aisne were at first almost insuperable. In order that they might be defiladed from direct view they were necessarily placed well back from the edge of the heights, where they stood four thousand yards or even further from the trenches of the British infantry. In the case of the 3rd Division, however, it was impossible tofind positions on the north side of the river. Guns which were visible to ground observation were at once silenced by the German heavy howitzers, and the positions of those which could be approximately identified by their flashes or by aerial observation were often subjected to a fire which compelled the withdrawal of the detachments. The British field howitzers were occasionally able to reach the German guns, but for the most part only the 60-pdr. batteries were of sufficient power and range to deal with them.

On the l8th September, however, the redistribution of the British aeroplanes and their equipment with wireless enabled the British batteries to reply more effectively to the German. The system of maintaining forward observers was also extended, though the distance of the heavy guns to the rear, the interposition of a river and the incessant fire of the enemy made the laying and maintenance of telephone cables a difficult and dangerous matter ; they were continually cut and the labour of repairing them never ceased. Communication was hampered also by the casualties among trained men and by the instruments getting out of order.

As the final weeks on the Aisne witnessed mainly artillery combats and no definite battle, some description of the normal conditions of such fighting as did take place may be given here.

In every division an aeroplane with an artillery officer as an observer went up early each day. (The first occasion on which British batteries worked. with aeroplanes in war appears to have been the 13th Sehtember 1914.) The observer noted down the positions of German batteries on a squared map, and sent this map to the divisional artillery commander, who settled which objectives his batteries could best engage. When any part of our infantry line was shelled, the batteries most capable of bringing fire to bear on the hostile guns were immediately ordered to search their position. Each " group " of guns and howitzers was under an artillery lieutenant-colonel who was responsible for supporting a portion of the infantry line in case of attach, and was in touch with the infantry brigadier concerned. At certain preconcerted times, a general bombardment by all our batteries was carried out over the whole position of the Germans ; our aeroplanes observed this fire, and sent corrections to each group.

Throughout the long series of encounters on the Aisne, the British had the greatest difficulty in finding observation stations, and in maintaining communication between them and the batteries. The Chemin des Dames, being the highest ridge in the neighbourhood, completely defiladed the German gun positions ; for after the first two days, no British soldier overlooked the valley behind it, and it made direct observation impossible, except on a few German infantry trenches ; these were dealt with by batteries near the front line. Practically all shooting was done by the map, and ranges, switches and angles of sight were calculated from measurements taken from maps.

Attempts were at first made to observe from buildings and sheds, but these were usually knocked down very quickly or set on fire. There remained haystacks and " dug-outs " in the open. These gave cover from view, and deep trenches made near them on the side away from the enemy provided shelter from shrapnel and from machine-gun and rifle fire, but not from heavy shell, which either destroyed them or blew them in. A party of observers did remain nine days in a haystack near the Tour de Paissy, and this only once received a direct hit, though many heavy shells burst close to it. Every precaution had to be taken to prevent any movement being visible from the front, such as making all orderlies and messengers stop and wait, if possible, one hundred yards short of observation posts, and insisting on absolute immobility when aeroplanes were near.

All batteries were carefully entrenched, covered from view by bushes and straw ; dummy batteries were made, and teams sent back, as a rule, at least a mile to cover. " Funk holes " were generally to be found ready made in the numerous caves, to which detachments ran when serving their guns became impossible owing to hostile fire. Replacement of ammunition was generally carried out by hand.

Any change of position found desirable was made during darkness, after reconnaissance had been previously carried out during daylight. Dummy guns made with hop-poles, branches, etc., were left in the old positions when they were vacated.

The deep mud made " switching " for change of target a matter of much labour, and any change of over 15° was impossible. The guns were left at night under a guard, with sufficient men and officers within call to work them in case of attack. Night lines were carefully marked before dark ; lamps were used as aiming points, and electric torches employed to read range dials when the batteries were actually firing.

A great many different kinds of shell were fired by the German heavy howitzers. The high-explosive shell on bursting caused a tremendous concussion, and made craters 15-20 feet across and 10 feet deep. The high-explosive shrapnel, however, though it made a terrific noise, and produced much green and white smoke, was comparatively harmless. Ordinary shrapnel was generally burst too high to be dangerous. A small high-velocity shell (" whizz-bang ") was very accurate, the burst and report of discharge being practically simultaneous.

Besides using forward observers inside our lines, as already mentioned, the Germans observed artillery fire by means of :

l. Captive sausage-shaped balloons. These were generally kept low and well out of range.

2. Observation posts very near our trenches, such as the " Chimney " at the sugar factory on the Chemin des Dames, 1/2 mile north-west of Troyon. This erection, though continually fired on and suffering many direct hits, was never actually demolished.

3. Aeroplanes which continually flew over the whole battle front. If any of our troops moved or any guns fired when these were overhead and able to observe, an accurate heavy cross-fire was usually opened by the German artillery very soon afterwards.

The canal, villages, bridges, and all railways and routes behind our positions were methodically searched by shell each day. Headquarters and roads on which it was known that supplies and ammunition must move received special attention from the enemy.

Nevertheless, the British gunners made their presence felt ; and the second week of the new warfare saw them competing on less uneven terms with the Germans. The arrival on the 23rd September of the brigade of old pattern 6-inch howitzers tended to reduce the disparity between them, but only to a small degree, for these weapons were far inferior even to the enemy's 5.9-inch howitzers. In the matter of anti-aircraft guns, the British ordnance also fell far behind the German. For this service, light quick-firing guns known as pom-poms were sent out from England early in September. It is sufficient to say that they fired a percussion shell, which, as not one in several hundred ever hit its aerial target, fell to earth, frequently at some point in the British lines, and there burst. Not a single enemy aeroplane was brought down at this period, either by these guns or by rifle fire. Such a state of things, it is needless to say, was neither reassuring nor comfortable.

It remains before proceeding to the narrative of the operations to survey the all-important work accomplished in bridging the Aisne. On the 13th and 14th five pontoon bridges in all were built by the engineers : at Bourg, Pont Arcy, Vailly, Venizel, and a mile above Venizel, those at Vailly and Venizel being of mixed construction, partly pontoon and partly barrel piers. In addition to these, the damaged aqueduct at Bourg and the road bridge at Venizel were repaired. On the l5th a barge bridge and a trestle bridge were completed over the canal near Bourg, and on the 17th a new pontoon bridge was laid at Bourg, the repair of the permanent bridge being simultaneously taken in hand. By the 20th two more bridges at Moulin des Roches and Missy, respectively, and a foot-bridge below Venizel had been constructed ; a damaged German trestle bridge at Chavonne had also been restored. On the 21st, the river being at the moment two feet above its level of the l5th, the aqueduct at Bourg was wrecked by a German shell, and for the time rendered useless. The enemy's observation must have been excellent, for he ceased firing directly after this shell had burst. A semi-permanent bridge was therefore begun at Bourg, which was supplemented by another at Soupir, of which the construction commenced on the 28th.

A wooden girder bridge to replace the broken span of the existing bridge was begun at Soissons on the 1st October and completed on the 9th. It was then handed over to the French, as the British were leaving the locality ; it was known hereafter as the " Pont des Anglais," (The permanent bridge built after the war perpetuates the name.) and was in use continuously until destroyed in the German offensive in 1918. In addition to all these bridges, barges equipped with roadway were prepared, ready to be swung instantly across the river to form additional bridges if required.

This bald enumeration, however, gives but a slight idea of the strain borne by the engineers during the weeks that the Army was on the Aisne. Nearly all of the bridges were within known range of the German guns ; most of them were constructed, and at different times all of them repaired, under fire. At Vailly, where a permanent bridge was much needed, the German shells prevented even attempts to build one. The rise of the water necessitated frequent changes and modifieations of level ; and the incessant rain made the task of keeping the approaches in order most difficult and trying. Yet the engineers contrived not only to maintain the bridges, but to make bridgebeads and to entrench positions a.gainst the possibility of a retreat. In the course of the operations on the Aisne, the divisional Field Companies R.E. which had done the work were reinforced by the 1st and 2nd Bridging Trains, and by the 20th and 42nd Fortress Companics from the Line of Communications ; but even with this assistance the burden of work thrown upon them was very heavy.

With these preliminary observations we may pass on to recount rapidly the operations on the British front, mentioning chiefly the events of the days on which infantry attacks took place, although on every day there was an intermittent duel of artillery. The chief centre of interest, be it remembered, was now shifting from the Aisne to the north-west, where, in the endeavour to out-flank each other, the French and Germans were continually extending their sphere of operatians northwards in the so-called " Race to the Sea." Of these operations an outline will be given in another chapter.

 

OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE

 

 

The general characteristics of the week which saw the beginning of trench warfare were continued wet weather, intermittent bombardment by both sides, steady advance of the German trenches to closer quarters with the British, and almost daily German attacks of a more or less serious nature. These were made, as already explained, to hold the Allied forces on the Aisne whilst troops were being shifted to the western flank. The losses from the heavy German shells were at the outset considerable, for the British trenches were as yet so incomplete as to afford only indifferent shelter. Thus on the l5th September the Highland Light Infantry had sixty, and on the following day the 2/Grenadier Guards seventy casualties from German shell fire. On the l6th the Oxfordshire L.I. lost twenty-two killed and wounded and the 1/K.R.R.C. sixty-eight ; whilst on the 17th the artillery had forty horses killed at Bucy le Long. On the right of the I. Corps front the trenches (held by the 2nd Brigade) just south of the Chemin des Dames were subjected to a galling enfilade fire both from rifles and guns. The plateau of Paissy again was swept by artillery fire from east, north and west. German snipers were both active and troublesome against the front of the 8rd and 5th Divisions, where their possession of commanding ground combined with the proximity of the trenches gave them decided advantages. At Missy the British position seemed tactically hopeless, for it was immediately dominated by the promontory at Chivres, and had but a limited field of fire in any direction. Just east of Ste. Marguerite (1 1/4 miles W.N.W. of Missy) the trenches were in places only twelve yards from those of the enemy ; and nowhere in the Chivres valley were they more than two hundred yards distant. Altogether during the first few days of the new warfare the situation of the British seemed anything but good.

Nevertheless the leaders and troops never for a moment lost confidence ; and every day saw the situation improve. On the l6th September the 6th Division, delayed in transport by the shifting of the British base from Havre to St. Nazaire, arrived in rear of the III. Corps. It was temporarily broken up in order to provide relief to the warworn troops of the first five divisions. The 17th and 18th Brigades were attached to the I. Corps, and the l6th to the II. Corps. The l7th Brigade became corps reserve, releasing the 1st Cavalry Division, which from the l9th September onward furnished five hundred rifles for the trenches about Chavonne. On the 17th a supply of entrenching tools reached the II. Corps, and from that date its casualties sensibly diminished. On the 19th arrived the first 18-pdrs. to make good part of the losses of the II. Corps at Le Cateau ; and from that day forward a stream of drafts poured in to fill the gaps in the battalions.

It is significant of the heavy and unexpected wastage that within a month of the firing of the first shot, the supply of Regular reservists for many regiments had been exhausted, and that men of the Special Reserve-the Militia of old days-were beginning to take their place. Many stragglers, however, who had lost their regiments in the retreat, now returned to them fresh and re-equipped, including several of the Dublin Fusiliers who had got through the German lines to Boulogne after the Battle of Le Cateau. Transport wagons, which had long been given up for lost, also reappeared from time to time ; one such wagon, which had been missing since the 24th of August, rejoining the 3rd Cavalry Brigade on the 2lst September. The reinforcements together with the improvement of the defences rendered two brigades sufficient to defend a sector for which three had hitherto been necessary ; as a result, on the 19th September the 1st (Guards) and 2nd Brigades were withdrawn from the trenches for a few days' rest ; and the line, which had hitherto absorbed the whole of the 1st Division, was defended by the 3rd and 18th Brigades alone. Altogether as the month of September wore on, the strain on the men was slowly but sensibly relaxed. Considering that the weather was abominable and the loss of greatcoats and waterproof sheets during the retreat was not made good for some time, the health of the troops suffered marvellously little. There was, it is true, already trouble with their feet, many of the trenches being deep in mud during the rains, and in the flat ground about Chivres two feet deep in water. But constant digging kept the men in good condition ; and, as soon as a regular system of reliefs became possible, a course of route-marching was introduced for the companies off duty to fit them for the work of an ordinary campaign.

The 16th September was regarded by the British as an uneventful day without change in the situation. It dawned with heavy rain and mist, but as soon as the weather cleared about 8 A.M. artillery fire was opened by both sides and continued with quiet intervals until the evening. It appears, however, that the XII., XV. and VII. Reserve Corps, forming the German Seventh Army, and the III. Corps, were ordered to renew the attack. (Zwehl, pp. 84, 85.) They attempted to do so, but " the XII. and XV. Corps made no actual progress, the III. Corps declared it could not advance until the VII. Reserve attacked and in both divisions of the latter corps (opposite General Haig) the day passed in stationary fire fight." This result, it is stated, was due to " an overpowering artillery fire."

After a quiet night, at dawn on the 17th there were feeble attacks, all of them easily repulsed, upon the 2nd Brigade on the right of the British line. Between 11 A.M. and noon a more serious onslaught was made upon the extreme right of the British and the left of the French next to them, which was held by Moroccan battalions. (This attack was made by the 28th Brigade (the " active " brigade of the VII. Reserve Corps), and a composite force from the XII. Corps : 63rd Brigade, 3 field batteries, and a heavy howitzer battery. (Zwehl, p.86.)) These troops, having lost practically all their officers, gave way for the moment, and the two reserve companies of the 2nd Brigade were moved up to fill the gap and came under artillery fire which cost them fifty casualties. For the next three hours the Germans kept up a heavy bombardment, after which about a company of German infantry stole forward, under cover of mist and rain, to a previously abandoned trench, whence they could enfilade the British line. The Northamptonshire and the Queen's, supported by the 2/K.R.R.C., were ordered to turn the enemy out ; and the Northamptonshire, creeping up unperceived, with a singlr rush recaptured the trench.

Shortly afterwards a party of Germans, headed by two officers, advanced towards the 2/K.R.R.C. with their rifles slung and their hands up. An officer went out to meet them and the men stood up in their trenches, whereupon the Germans opened fire from the hip, wounding several. The trick was not forgotten by the 2/K.R.R.C. Almost immediately after this incident another body of three or four hundred Germans repeated the same stratagem against the Northamptonshire, actually driving them back a few yards in the first surprise. But the machine-gun officer of the 2/K.R.R.C. who had a gun trained on this second body, mowed them down almost, if not absolutely, to a man. (General von Zwehl, on behalf of the German 16th Reserve Regiment (VII. Reserve Corps), makes on this very day similar charges against the British of pretending to surrender and then firing (p. 73). There was no doubt a misunderstanding, begun by the men of one side or the other making signs of surrender, not noticed, or resented, by their commanders or neighbouring units.) Both sides then made efforts to advance ; first the British, who were checked by the German guns, and then in turn the Germans, who were stopped by the rifles and machine guns of the Queen's and the 2/K.R.R.C. Finally the enemy fell back, leaving behind him forty prisoners and a large number of dead. The loss in the affair was about two hundred of all ranks.

On the British left the only noteworthy occurrence was a heavy bombardment of Bucy le Long which for a time drove the 10th Brigadc from its trenches.

To the right and left of the British the French persisted steadily in their offensive. On the right Craonne and Corbeny (1 1/2 miles north-east of Craonne) were constantly changing hands, though on the evening of the 17th they were finally left in possession of the enemy. The arrival of the German XII. Corps in that quarter checked any further progress on the part of the French XVIII. Corps.

On the left, the chief effort of the French Sixth Army had been made on the extreme flank at Noyon ; but there had also been hard fighting north of Soissons, and by the evening of the 17th the French 45th Division had gained at least a footing on the plateau of Cuffies (1 1/2 miles north of Soissons). But on that same evening the point of application of the outflanking movement was reported to have shifted from Noyon, westward and slightly north-ward, to Lagny and Lassigny. As two fresh German corps were known to be moving in that direction from Belgium, General Joffre was preparing to meet them by forming a new Army on the left, to be known as the Second Army, under General de Castelnau. It was to consist of the XIII. and IV. Corps of the Sixth Army, the XIV. (from the First Army) and the XX. (from the old Second Army), with the 1st, 5th, 8th and 10th Cavalry Divisions under General Conneau. Meanwhile the left of the reduced French Sixth Army was entrenching strongly about Nampcel. General Joffre hoped to resume the offensive directly the Second Army was ready to move forward. (The story of the French outflanking operations is given in Chapter XXII.)

The German report for this day-and also for the 18th -as regards the British front is, that except for the action of the 28th Brigade, already narrated, " the attacks ordered did not take place." (Zwehl, p. 85.)

On the 18th the French Fifth Army on the British right was driven back a little by a German counter-attack which gave the enemy possession of Brimont (5 miles north of Reims).

On the British front the Germans tried to reoccupy the trenches near the Chemin des Dames from which they had been expelled by the Northamptonshire on the 17th. They were, however, easily dealt with by the l/Gloucestershire of the 3rd Brigade, which brought away four machine guns as trophies.

To the west, General Maunoury's extreme right gained a little ground near Perrière Farm north-east of Crouy, but achieved nothing of great importance. The need for a decisive movement on the western flank as a solution of the deadlock was becoming more and more evident.

The 19th September brought some relief to the right of the British line, for, though the 3rd Brigade remained in position, the 1st (Guards) and 2nd Brigades, as has been mentioned, were replaced after dark by the 18th, which was quite strong enough to hold the ground occupied by both. After heavy shelling, there were one or two trifling attacks on the 2nd Division, and at dusk a rather more serious one against the 3rd Division, all of which were beaten off with considerable loss to the enemy. The German report for this day is that " there was no progress worth mentioning as the enemy was in possession of good observation posts on the Chemin des Dames and could direct his field and heavy artillery fire where he desired," (Zwehl. p.86.) a situation not realized by the British.

Henceforward, as will be seen, such efforts as the enemy infantry made were directed against the right of the British line. On the left Vailly, Missy and Bucy le Long were heavily shelled almost daily, particularly Missy ; and Ste. Marguerite was under continuous rifle and machine-gun fire, but no infantry attacks were made on the II. and III. Corps sectors, except on that of the 3rd Division around Vailly. Opposite the 4th Division, the enemy showed great activity in putting up wire. There were, indeed, many signs of the reduction of the infantry in the front line, but none that his heavy guns were being removed, or that he was at all inclined to retire.

The front, over eight miles, held by the 3rd, 5th and 4th Divisions, was too long in proportion to their reduced numbers, and the enemy's position too strong for any hope of progress to be made without an important diversion elsewhere. The 4th Division was able to assist the attacks of the French on its left with gun and rifie fire, but had orders not to take part in a general attack. Nevertheless, the divisions were ordered to keep the possibility of advance before them. At the same time, as a measure of precaution in the event of the II. and III. Corps being driven back, entrenchments were taken in hand on the heights on the southern side of the Aisne. The 19th Brigade and some units of the 6th Division, with the assistance of inhabitants, were employed on their construction. Later the I. Corps undertook defences on the south bank of the Aisne, so that on the 30th September Sir John French was able to inform General Joffre that there was an alternative position there, entrenched from end to end and ready for occupation.

On the 20th September, General von Heeringen, commanding the German Seventh Army, ordered a general attack by the whole of the VII. Reserve Corps. The day was cold and at times there were heavy showers of hail.

Soon after dawn the Germans attacked the Moroccans immediately on the right of the British line and drove them back. Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Towsey commanding the 1/West Yorkshire Regiment, which was the right battalion of the British Army, thereupon sent out a company to cover his exposed flank. The Moroccans soon rallied and came forward again, when, not knowing what had happened, they fired into this company, inflictmg some thirty casualties. The line then settled down again under a heavy fire from German artillery and rifles. A second German attack made between 10 and 11 A.M. was effectively checked by the West Yorkshire. Between noon and 1 P.M. the enemy delivered a third attack under cover of a heavy storm of rain, and once again the Moroceans fell back. Once again Lieut.-Colonel Towsey threw out a company eastward to protect his right, at the same time asking help from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at Paissy. But before this could come, the enemy, having advanced into the gap left by the Moroccans, enfiladed and, after inflicting heavy casualties, charged and captured the remnants of the right company of the West Yorkshire. Within half an hour, working down the line, the Germans were in occupation of the entire front trenches of the battalion and had swept what remained of two more companies into captivity. The officer commanding led forward his one remaining company to retrieve the situation, but being met by heavy fire on front and right flank, whereby he himself was wounded, the survivors fell back on the cavalry at Paissy.

The disaster to the West Yorkshire laid open the flank of the Durham L.I. who were next on their left, and exposed them to so destructive an enfilade fire that the East Yorkshire, on the left of the D.L.I., were sent to relieve them by a counter-attack. No sooner, however, did they leave their trenches than they were beaten back to them by overwhelming shrapnel and machine-gun fire. Meanwhile B Squadron of the l8th Hussars sent up by the G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, in consequence of a report of the attack despatched from the West Yorkshire at 7 A.M., rode to the head of the valley north of Paissy. Leaving their horses there, forty men climbed the slope to the plateau ; then learning the situation from the officer commanding the Sherwood Foresters, who were in brigade reserve at Troyon, and seeing a few infantry coming back, they went forward to what must have been the support trenches of the West Yorkshire. The news of the arrival of the cavalry ran lihe wildfire along the line and had the greatest possible moral effect ; as a result, the enemy's attempts to press on were foiled and the situation was saved.

A call for support had also been received by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade from the French ; but on the officer commanding the 18th Hussars riding forward to learn how he could best assist, he was informed by a French general that French reinforcements were arriving and British help was no longer required. A squadron of the 9th Lancers, however, was sent to entrench in echelon in rear of the West Yorkshire trenches in case the Africans should again give way.

About 1 P.M. a second appeal for help from the West Yorkshire reached the headquarters of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. Br.-General de Lisle at once set his whole brigade in motion. It was followed by the 2/Royal Sussex (2nd Brigade) which was still at Paissy. The 2/Sherwood Foresters (18th Brigade reserve) had previously gone forward under Br.-General Congreve.

The 4th Dragoon Guards rallied the remnant of the West Yorkshire, and, together with the 18th Hussars, occupied the supporting trenches in rear of the captured first line. These they held successfully against heavy pressure from the enemy until the arrival of the Sussex made the position secure. The lost trenches were finally regained by a dashing counter-attack of the Sherwood Foresters, but at a cost of two hundred casualties, mostly from machine-gun fire. It was 4.30 P.M. when the situation was thus restored. The day had cost the 2nd Cavalry and 18th Brigades nearly 400 killed and wounded and 500 missing.

The onslaughts of the enemy were, however, by no means confined to the extreme right of the British line. At dawn an attack was made on the King's of the 6th Brigade and was pressed to within eighty yards of their trenches, immediately east of the Oise and Aisne canal, when the Germans finally broke and retired, having suffered heavily. At about 9 A.M. they made a second onset, bringing up two machine guns to the right of the King's, near the crest of the western slope of Beaulne spur, and advancing both through the woods and across the open. Two platoons of the 2/Highland L.I. and six of the 2/Worcestershire were thereupon sent to counterattack through the wood and to clear the ridge beyond it. With great difficulty they made their way through the thicket under heavy fire, and charged and carried a German trench beyond it ; they were still advancing when they fell into an ambush. Being enfiladed by machine guns from their left and having lost every one of their officers, they were driven back in disorder on to a company of the King's. Some of these men they carried away with them in their retreat ; but the rest stood firm. The situation was becoming serious ; for the Connaught Rangers on the ridge further east had been driven out of their trenches by a heavy bombardment, and the right flank of the King's was thus exposed. However, the flank company threw back its right, and the other, above mentioned, quickly rallied and re-formed. The deadly fire of these two companies was too much for the Germans, who retired, severely punished. Seventy of their dead and many wounded were found next day by a patrol of the King's in a single abandoned trench ; and as the casualties of the battalion did not exceed fifty, the honours of the day were decidedly with it.

With the 4th (Guards) Brigade of the 2nd Division, about Soupir, the enemy interfered little except by heavy shelling and occasional feint attacks.

Before dawn also the Germans opened a violent bombardment on the 9th Brigade on the line south-west of Rouge Maison (1 mile north-east of Vailly) ; later they brought forward first a machine gun and afterwards a field gun to enfilade the trenches of the Royal Fusiliers. They had already stolen forward during the night and entrenched themselves within four hundred yards of the Fifth Fusiliers, who were on the left of the Royal Fusiliers. It seemed evident that an attack was in prospect. At 9 A.M., however, two howitzers of the XXX. Brigade R.F.A. forced the Germans to withdraw their guns from the neighbourhood of Rouge Maison, and the pressure on the right flank of the 9th Brigade disappeared. The Fifth then counter-attacked, driving the German snipers from the wood in their front ; and at 1 P.M. the engagement died down. The casualties of the brigade were trifling ; those of the enemy probably considerable.

The above movements, however, were but a diversion in favour of a more serious attack upon the 7th Brigade holding the eastern face of the salient of Vailly from Chavonne north-westwards, where an entirely unsuccessful attempt had been made on the previous day. Between 8 and 9 A.M. after a heavy bombardment the front held by the Wiltshire, in the centre of the brigade line, was engaged by the enemy's infantry ; and a couple of hours later a party of some two hundred Germans with two machine guns contrived to push through some dense undergrowth between the right flank of the battalion and the left flank of the 3/Worcestershire, which was immediately on its right. Having thus pierced the line, thanks to the excellent cover afforded by the wooded valley, the Germans came suddenly on the reserve of the Wiltshire and carried off a few prisoners. They also fired on the 2/South Lancashire, which was coming forward from the rear to reinforce the Wiltshire ; there was much confused fighting at close quarters whilst the enemy strove to make good his advantage and envelop the right of the British line. Meanwhile the Irish Rifles on the left of the Wiltshire were suffering severely from shelling ; and shortly after noon the brigadier was obliged to ask assistance both from his divisional commander and from the 4th (Guards) Brigade on his right at Chavonne.

Throughout this time the three companies of the Wiltshire steadily continued to hold the enemy at bay on their front. The call for assistance had first reached the Queen's Bays at Chavonne, and they, being unable to leave their position, passed it on to the nearest battery. After a time the 2/South Staffordshire of the 6th Brigade from 2nd Division reserve were sent mid-way between Chavonne and Vailly and began to work northward up the valley against the enemy's left flank. A gun of the XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. also came into action with great effect ; and shortly before 2 P.M. the hostile advance was brought to a standstill. The Germans, falling back a little, then tried to entrench themselves upon two bare knolls but were driven off them by shrapnel ; and about 4 P.M. about two hundred men of the Wiltshire, Worcestershire and South Lancashire advanced, and after sharp fighting drove the enemy back to his own lines, leaving the ground behind littered with his killed and wounded. These were found to belong to the 56th Regiment of the VII. Reserve and 64th of the III. Corps. The struggle in fact was sharp ; it cost the 7th Brigade some four hundred casualties, nearly half of which fell upon the South Lancashire. The 6th Brigade and the 2nd Cavalry Division were during the afternoon placed by G.H.Q. at the disposal of the II. Corps to assist the 3rd Division, but it was not found necessary to employ them.

Altogether the 20th September was a successful day for the British, though it cost the B.E.F. nearly twenty-two hundred killed, wounded and missing. The Germans had delivered four serious attacks at four different points and had, after first gaining some little advantage, been everywhere repulsed. The French immediately to the right and left of the British were subjected to similar onslaughts with much the same result. The Fifth and Sixth Armies were both forced back a little at certain points ; but the lost ground was recovered by the latter before nightfall and by the former within twenty-four hours. (G.O.A. (v. pp. 70-1) makes no claim of any success on the Aisne front on the 20th. The XV. Corps failed to storm Hurtehise Farm (west of Craonne) ; the XII. Corps (part of which attacked the West Yorkshire), in a fight of varying fortune, managed to hold its ground ; the VII. Reserve Corps reported that its troops were so exhausted that, at best, it could only hold the line ; the III. Corps had some local fighting without result.) The Germans were evidently most anxious to hold the Allies to their ground and prevent them from shifting troops to their western flank ; for already there were indications of a general movement of German units from east to west.

On the 20th the rain, which had been nearly continuous since the 12th and had made life in the trenches miserable, came to an end, and a period of fine autumn weather ensued.

On the night of the 20th/21st the posts of the South Wales Borderers and Welch Regiment of the 3rd Brigade were withdrawn from their advanced position at the head of the Chivy valley to a less exposed one on the spur south of the village, with the result that free access to the valley was now yielded to the enemy. But, if this ground was henceforward a source of some anxiety to the I. Corps, it became a trap for the Germans. They were under constant temptation to collect men there for attack ; but each advance was the offering up of more troops as a sacrifice to the British batteries which were able to search every square-foot of the valley.

The 21st and 22nd were days unmarked by any event of importance on the British front. The French Fifth and Sixth Armies kept the enemy on those fronts well occupied and both made a little progress, the left of the Fifth Army recapturing trenches near Hurtebise and Vauclerc on the Chemin des Dames immediately to the right of the British.

On the 23rd and 24th nothing of importance took place on the Aisne, although there were the usual desultory attacks and the usual bombardment. Opportunity was taken to carry out reliefs. For instance, the 17th Brigade took the place of the 5th, whose brigadier, General Haking, had been wounded, and the latter brigade was withdrawn into corps reserve. The 2nd Brigade resumed its old place as the right of the 1st Division. (As regards the German side : the commander of the Seventh Army again ordered a general attack for the 21st, being promised support from the neighbouring corps. This, however, led to the commander of the VII. Reserve Corps making a personal protest that " the daily repetition of attack orders could not obtain any success. For this the preliminary conditions were at least a fresh division with strong artillery, if possible a whole corps." One brigade could only put 200 rifles with nine or ten officers into the fight out of its six battalions. No success could be expected from partial attacks, the enemy was too stubborn and used his artillery too skilfully." " On the front of the other corps the situation was similar." (Zwehl, pp. 87, 88.))

Throughout the 25th September, the Germans showed activity in the Chivy valley-they were apparently collecting troops there-and early on the morning of the 26th, between 3.40 and 4 A.M., they made an attack against the right of the 2nd Brigade, the right of the British line, combined with a more serious effort against the left of the French XVIII. Corps, next to it. The attack was not well carried out, the enemy advanced in heavy columns which gave a splendid target to the British machine guns, so it was easily repulsed.

At the same moment as this attack was beaten back, another began to develop against the front of the 3rd Brigade on the left of the 2nd, which continued nearly until noon. First, in the early light of the morning, about a thousand men in close formation advanced against-it can hardly be called attacked-the Queen's at the head of the Moulins valley. This again gave a superb opportunity to the British machine guns, and the column was repulsed with heavy loss. Nothing was attempted against the Gloucestershire on the left of the Queen's ; but against the South Wales Borderers, next to them on the spur of Mont Faucon, a force of about 1,200 Germans issued from the woods and broken ground on their front, and moved forward apparently in platoon columns covered by skirmishers.

A fire fight ensued, which lasted nearly two hours before superiority over the Germans was obtained. Towards 8 A.M. a further effort was made by the Germans with increased numbers, and at one point they succeeded in penetrating the line of the Borderers. The reserve company went forward without a moment's hesitation, and, with the assistance of two companies of the Welch which were sent by the brigadier to the right round the slopes of Mont Faucon, succeeded in retaking the trenches after a hot fight. Meanwhile, the rest of the South Wales Borderers were for a time held to their trenches by heavy shrapnel fire. The East Yorkshire and Durham L.I. of the 18th Brigade were warned by the divisional staff to reinforce them, but their services were not required. The 3rd Brigade succeeded in clearing the woods on its immediate front, although the Germans did not finally withdraw until about 11.30 A.M., still covered by a heavy fire from their batteries on the heights above, which made communication with the British forward trenches impossible. The retirement of the enemy infantry up the Chivy valley, however, found the British artillery ready for it : thirty-three guns and howitzers of the 1st and 2nd Divisions concentrated their fire on the valley, and the Cameron Highlanders of the 1st (Guards) Brigade on the left of the 3rd were able to enfilade the retreating parties, who were in close formation. They were seen to suffer heavily. The total losses must have been severe : dead were lying thick before the trench the Germans had carried, and, considering the havoc wrought by the British artillery, the number of enemy killed alone must have exceeded the total casualties of the British. These were just under two hundred and fifty, four-fifths of which fell upon the South Wales Borderers. Bad luck befell the Cameron Highlanders, for a cave in which their headquarters were installed was wrecked by a highexplosive shell, which killed and buried the acting commanding officer, Captain D. N. C. C. Miers, four other officers and twenty-three other ranks.

It was found on investigation that some of the German dead and of the prisoners taken this day belonged to the 21st and 25th Divisions, both of the XVIII. Corps, parts of which, and of the XV. Corps, it is now known, were brought up as fresh troops to drive back the British. (The 50th Brigade of the 25th Division and four battalions of the XV. Corps were brought up to reinforce the VII. Reserve Corps. (Zwehl, PP. 88, 89.))

But, except for a momentary penetration at one place in the line, they achieved nothing ; as ever, the shooting of the battalions and batteries of the B.E.F. was too effective even for the German Army of 1914. (The German offensive on the 26th September was carried out by the whole of the Seventh Army. The III. Corps of the First Army should have taken part, but reported that " it could not attack, but would support the offensive with its heavy artillery." The attack on the right of the British line was made by the reinforced 28th Brigade, the 63rd Brigade, and battalions of the 132nd and 171st Regiments of the XV. Corps. The troops " became engaged in a stationary fire fight without actual progress." The attack near the Chivy valley was carried out by the 13th Reserve Division and 50th Brigade. " Chivy fell into the hands of the Westphalians [above-mentioned division], and some ground beyond it was won " ; but later " Chivy had to be evacuated, and in general the troops had to go back to their starting places." Mention is also made of an attack by the 14th Reserve Division (less 28th Brigade), between the two above mentioned, towards Troyon. The left (east) portion of the division " struck a wire entanglement of the enemy, certainly a poor one, but it was not expected and could not be surmounted. The whole front of the division came to a standstill under heavy hostile artillery fire." The account ends with the words :-" This attempt at attack had also been shattered." (Zwehl, pp. 88-90.))

On the 27th the Germans confined themselves to artillery fire until dusk, when somewhat feeble attacks upon the 2nd and 3rd Brigades were renewed and easily repulsed. Lower down the river the valley of the Aisne was alive with bursting shells ; two to three hundred fell upon Missy alone, but they did little military damage.

On this day, hand-grenades, whose revival dates from the siege of Port Arthur, were for the first time during the war thrown into the British trenches ; and, since the Expeditionary Force in France had none, the Royal Engineers were called upon to improvise, with gun-cotton, a missile with which to reply to this latest device of the Germans, until a supply of service grenades should arrive from home.

From this day forth offensive operations on the British front ceased, and the 1st October found the positions practically the same as on the 14th September. The activities of the infantry were henceforward confined to sniping, digging new trenches, and patrolling No Man's Land during the hours of darkness. (On 4th October the first operation in the nature of a raid took place. On the front of the 1/Coldstream, just east of the Troyon factory road, the Germans had run out a sap, and it was decided to fill it in. At 8 P.M. a platoon of the battalion, led by 2/Lieut. M. Beckwith Smith (who was wounded and subsequently received the D.S.O.), crossing the hundred yards of No Man's Land, rushed the trench with the bayonet) Artillery activity continued on both sides : the Germans occasionally managed by lucky shots to burst shells in the billets of British units well south of the river ; the 9th Lancers in this way lost over forty officers and men at Longueval (2 1/2 miles south of Bourg) on the 29th. No further serious attacks by infantry took place and there were signs of cessation of artillery action also. The expenditure of gun ammunition had been so enormous, and had so far exceeded the calculations of the most far-seeing, that the British Commander-in-Chief had been for some days anxious as to the supply of shells for his heavy artillery. However, on the 28th it was noticed that twelve German shells which fell among the 9th Brigade failed to burst ; and by the 6th October the proportion of " blinds " fired by the German batteries had risen to one in two. Evidently the enemy on this part of the line was also in difficulties for ammunition and using old stock. But the time was now coming for the British to leave the Aisne.

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