MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER 1 - THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

(Sketches 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 ; Maps 1, 2 & 5)

 

The record of the negotiations and of the diplomatic correspondence and conversations which took place after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his Consort at Sarajevo on the 28th June 1914 until the outbreak of war is available in an official publication. In this work the efforts of the British Government to bring about mediation and their determination to take no step that would contribute to precipitate war are made abundantly clear. It is therefore unnecessary here to allude to diplomatic proceedings, except to show how military preparations were affected by them.

 

On the 27th July, the British Government judged the situation to be sufficiently serious to warrant them in countermanding the dispersal, then in progress, of the Home Fleets at the end of the exercises at sea which had followed a test mobilisation. At 5 P.M. on the 28th on which day Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the First Fleet was ordered to proceed to its preliminary war station in the North ; 2 on the 29th, at 2 P.M., the Government further ordered the precautionary measures arranged by the General Staff to meet an immediate prospect of war, to be put in force. These affected the Regular troops only, and included the recall of officers and men on leave and furlough, and the manning of all coast defences.

 

The Belgian Government decided to place their Army upon its " reinforced peace footing."

 

On the same day, the 29th, the British Ambassador at Berlin was asked by the German Chancellor to give assurance of England's neutrality if Russia should attack Austria and an European conflagration were to ensue. To this significant enquiry Sir Edward Grey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, responded on the 30th by a refusal to entertain the proposal. Russia on this day issued orders for the mobilisation of her four Southern Armies; and Germany threatened that she would begin mobilisation unless Russia ceased hers. News was also received of the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade. In order to avoid the possibility of a frontier incident the French Government ordered that no individual, no patrol, should under any pretext pass a line between Hussigny (on the Luxembourg frontier, east of Longwy) and Delle (on the Swiss frontier, south-east of Belfort), described by a precise enumeration of localities. This line was on an average 10 kilometres inside the frontier.

 

At 1 P.M. on the 30th July the " Berlin Lokalanzeiger " issued a special number (Extrablatt), announcing that mobilisation had been ordered. The statement was soon contradicted, but it had been telegraphed to Petrograd and at 6 P.M. before contradiction arrived, Russia ordered general mobilisation. On the 31st Austria followed suit, and decreed the full mobilisation of her forces, whereupon Germany made a formal proclamation of " Imminent Danger of War " (drohende Kriegsgefahr), which enabled measures similar to those of the British " Precautionary Period " to be taken. At the same time Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia to the effect that, unless she ceased mobilisation within twelve hours, Germany herself would mobilise upon both frontiers. Significantly, Turkey also ordered mobilisation on the 31st July? Sir Edward Grey, on the same day, sent an identical request to Germany and France enquiring whether they would respect Belgian neutrality. France immediately answered with an unequivocal affirmative; Germany, however, sent only an evasive reply; and on the 1st August both France and Germany ordered general mobilisation.

 

The beginning of mobilisation in France raised a serious question for Great Britain. There was, it is true, no definite agreement or understanding that she should send assistance to France, and the British Government was free to decide, untrammelled, for peace or war. But a scheme had been elaborated, in the event of certain contingencies, between the General Staffs of the two countries ; and an essential point in this scheme was that the first movement of the British advanced parties, stores and so forth, should begin on the first day of mobilisation. Assuming this coincidence of movement and mobilisation, it was reckoned that six divisions-or four, if six could not be spared one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade could be transported from Great Britain to concentration areas between Avesnes and Le Cateau, and would be ready to advance thence on the fifteenth day after the order for mobilisation had been issued.

 

That the British mobilisation, if it should take place at all, would be later than the French was now obvious. The British General Staff therefore suggested that measures might be taken to ensure that, if mobilisation should come after all, movement to France of the advanced parties, which could be warned at once, should be simultaneous with the issue of the order for it. Another important measure was the guarding of the lines of railway to the ports of embarkation. This duty had been assigned to certain units of the Territorial Force ; but these were about to proceed to camp for their annual training; and, unless the orders for that training were cancelled, there might be delay in the despatch of the Expeditionary Force. The Government considered, however, that the countermanding of the orders for Territorial training would be construed as not less menacing than the order for mobilisation itself ; and they shrank from any measure which might seem to extinguish the last hope of peace.

 

At 12 noon on the 1st August, the German ultimatum to Russia expired, and a general conflagration became inevitable. The Cabinet at 2 P.M. on the 2nd cancelled the orders for Territorial training and at 6 P.M. those for the Army manoeuvres, but still issued no orders for mobilisation. The Navy was quite ready for active service, and the French Ambassador was given the assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power. Beyond this conditional promise of naval intervention the Cabinet would not go without consulting Parliament. Parliament was consulted on the following day, the 3rd August ; but in the meanwhile a most momentous event had occurred.

 

Faithful to the obligations imposed upon her by treaty, Belgium on the 1st August had ordered her forces to be mobilised, and was preparing to resist violation of her territory from any quarter whatsoever ; but at seven o'clock in the evening of the 2nd the German Minister at Brussels presented a Note to the Belgian Government, requesting a reply within twelve hours. This Note had been drawn up by the Great General Staff as early as 26th July, and despatched under seal to the German Minister at Brussels on the 29th, with orders that it was not to be opened pending further instructions. It set forth that the German Government had certain intelligence of the intention of the French forces to march on the Meuse by Givet and Namur, and, in view of this attack, requested free and unresisted ingress for the German troops into Belgian territory. The Belgian Government replied that they would repel any attempt either of France or Germany upon Belgium; and they also declined the help of France against any German encroachment until they should have made formal appeal to the Powers, Prussia among them, which had guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

 

Other important events on the 2nd August were that German troops crossed the Polish frontier, broke also into France at four different points, and entered the territory of Luxembourg.

 

Sir Edward Grey had no accurate information as to the exact nature of the German ultimatum to Belgium when he met the House of Commons on the 3rd August. He was aware, however, of the crude fact that an ultimatum had been tendered, and, whilst coming down to the House, he had been informed that King Albert had telegraphed to King George invoking England's diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. He presented, in due order, the course of action he had pursued and the motives dictating it. The House of Commons, as it followed him, applauded his decision not to commit the country to armed intervention on account of the Serbian quarrel, but approved the conditional promise of the Fleet's aid to France, and grew enthusiastic when it heard that England would be true to her engagements to uphold the integrity of Belgium.

 

No resolution followed upon the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. After the adjournment which followed it, towards 7 P.M. he was able to read to the House full information, received from the Belgian Legation, of the German Note that had been presented in Brussels. It left no doubt that a German attack was about to take place, if indeed it had not already begun.

 

The immediate measures taken were to announce that a moratorium would be proclaimed and that the Government would undertake the responsibility of maritime insurance. The Territorial Force was embodied and the Naval Reserves were called out. It was now clear that our mobilisation must take place at least three days later than the French, and that, even so, movement could not be simultaneous with it. The Government, however, reckoned that by this delay they had gained more than they had lost by securing the unanimity, or approximate unanimity, of the nation and the benevolence of neutrals.

 

On the 3rd August, at 6.45 P.M., Germany declared war on France, making alleged violation of her frontier by patrols and of her territory by aviators a pretext. Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, declared that she would maintain her neutrality in the impending struggle.

 

Meanwhile Germany, unhampered by moral considerations, completed her arrangements for the invasion of Belgium. On the morning of the 4th August, she declared war on Belgium, and two of her cavalry divisions passed the frontier: in the afternoon the heads of infantry columns also entered Belgium.

 

Early in that same afternoon of the 4th August Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Berlin instructing him to ask for his passports if no satisfactory answer were given regarding the observance of Belgium's neutrality by 12 midnight (11 P.M. Greenwich mean time). At 4 P.M. the British Government gave orders for the mobilisation of the Army. At 12.15 A.M. on the morning of the 5th August, the Foreign Office issued the following statement :

 

"Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by His Majesty's Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty's Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 P.M. on the 4th August."

 

On the 5th and 6th August, two meetings, attended by the principal Ministers, including Lord Kitchener, who was at home on leave from Egypt and became Secretary of State for War on the 6th, and by the leading members of the Staffs of the Navy and Army of Britain, were assembled to consider the conduct of the war. The exact state of affairs at the moment was that Great Britain, France and Russia were at war with Germany; that Belgium had been wantonly attacked but was making a better defence than had been expected ; that Austria was at war with Serbia only; and that Italy was neutral. The' main military questions to be decided were the employment and disposition of the Expeditionary Force, questions which were complicated by the delay in mobilisation. It was determined first that the Force, less the 4th and 6th Divisions, should embark for the continent. In order to reduce the chance of a German landing in force interfering with this move, the Secretary of State decided that the 18th Brigade of the 6th Division, then at Lichfield, should move to Edinburgh, and two brigades of the 4th Division should proceed to Cromer and York, in each case accompanied by some artillery. The 11th Brigade of the 4th Division was already at Colchester. Five cyclist battalions and eventually the Yeomanry Mounted Division were also sent to the East coast. The rest of the 6th Division was to remain in Ireland.

 

Then came the final decision as to the destination of the Expeditionary Force. In view of the attack on Belgium, had the British contingent been of a size adequate for independent operations of a substantial character, there would have been much to be said in favour of making Antwerp the base of its military operations ; but as it was so small, and as Antwerp, owing to part of the Schelde being Dutch territorial waters, would have to be reached overland after disembarkation at Ostend and other ports, and as operations in the north might involve separation from the French, the suggestion was not followed. There remained the area already considered with the French, namely, that around Le Cateau and Avesnes. Certain military opinion, however, was against a concentration of the British forces in any area in advance of Amiens. Finally, after discussion as to the expansion of the army, it was agreed to leave the decision with our Allies, the French; and the council broke up after passing three resolutions, namely First, to embark ultimately five (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th), but for the present only four (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th) of the divisions and the Cavalry Division (plus the extra brigade) of the Expeditionary Force, to commence on the 9th; Secondly, to bring home the Imperial troops from South Africa; Thirdly, to transport two Indian divisions to Egypt, but no further, and to urge the Government of India to send a division to capture Dar es Salaam in German East Africa.

 

Through the efforts of Colonel Huguet, who as intermediary travelled backwards and forwards between Paris and London, it was settled that the Expeditionary Force should proceed to the zone selected in peace time by the French Staff, with some slight modification, but according to the British time table. General Joffre's request, that at least one British division should be sent over as rapidly as possible to take its place in the line, Lord Kitchener refused on the grounds that any alteration of the plan of transport would cause confusion and, in the end, delay.

 

To Field-Marshal Sir John French, who had been selected to command the Expeditionary Force, special instructions as to his co-operation with the French were issued by the Secretary of State for War.

 

Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Haig was appointed to command the I. Corps; Lieut.-General Sir James Grierson, the II. Corps; Lieut.-General W. P. Pulteney, the III. Corps ; and Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, the Cavalry Division. The six divisions were to be commanded by Major-Generals S. H. Lomax, C. C. Monro, H. I. W. Hamilton, T. D'O. Snow, Sir C. Fergusson and J. L. Keir.

 

PROGRESS OF EVENTS

 

At 4 P.M. on the 4th August, as already stated, the order for mobilisation of the Expeditionary and Territorial Forces was issued by the British Government, the 5th August being declared "the first day of mobilisation." As a matter of fact, mobilisation occurred at an extremely awkward moment, for the 3rd August had been Bank Holiday and, as usually is the case in the middle of summer, Territorial units were in the act of moving to various camps for their annual training when the orders cancelling it arrived. Hence arose the question whether the existing time-tables for concentration should stand, or whether the movements by railway should be postponed. The Cabinet decided for a short postponement, and gave orders, as already mentioned, that the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force should not begin until the 9th, although " the advanced parties" were to proceed on the 7th. Meantime the mobilisation of the various units proceeded with the smoothness which had been anticipated. In all essentials everything went " according to plan " ; and even the task of collecting 120,000 horses was accomplished within twelve days. Embarkation was conducted upon the principle that every train-load should be a complete unit or subdivision of a unit, so that upon arrival in France after its passage, it should be self-contained and in possession of enough transport to go straight into a rest-camp or into another train. The ports of embarkation were as follows:

 

Southampton all troops in Great Britain; Avonmouth motor transport and petrol ; Newhaven stores and supplies; Liverpool frozen meat and motor transport; Glasgow a few details ; and Dublin, Cork and Belfast for the 5th and 6th Divisions.

 

The ships were also divided into classes : (1) personnel ships ; (2) horse and vehicle ships ; (3) motor transport ships ; (4) store ships.

 

The ports of disembarkation in France were: Havre, Rouen and Boulogne.

 

In the five days of greatest activity 1,800 special trains were run in Great Britain and Ireland; on the busiest day of all, eighty trains, containing the equivalent of a division, were run into Southampton Docks; the daily average of ships despatched was thirteen, with an average daily tonnage of about 52,000 tons gross. At first the transports were despatched singly as they were ready, both by day and by night ; for, as yet, there was no menace by German submarines, and the measures taken by the Navy gave absolute security. Everything went regularly and smoothly, and the official programme was carried out to the letter ; but there was little margin to spare.

 

To his embarking troops, H.M. the King sent the following message :

 

" You are leaving home to fight for the safety and honour of my Empire. Belgium, whose country we are pledged to defend, has been attacked, and France is about to be invaded by the same powerful foe.

I have implicit confidence in you, my soldiers. Duty is your watchword, and I know your duty will be nobly done.

I shall follow your every movement with deepest interest and mark with eager satisfaction your daily progress ; indeed, your welfare will never be absent from my thoughts.

I pray God will bless you and guard you, and bring you back victorious."

 

Meanwhile the situation in Belgium and the French frontier was developing rapidly. When during the night 4 of the 3rd/4th August, it became clear that the Germans intended to advance through Belgium, with or without permission, the Belgian Staff at once took the measures necessary for the defence of their country's neutrality against Germany. The 3rd Division, supported by the fortifications of Liège, was to cheek the German advance ; and, under cover of the 3rd Division, the 1st, 2nd, 5th and 6th Divisions were to move to the line of the river Gette, the Cavalry Division and detachments from Liège and Namur screening the movement. This position covered a considerable part of Belgium, Brussels and the communications with Antwerp. The concentration began on the 4th August, and by the morning of the 6th the Belgian Army was in position two marches west of Liège, in the area Tirlemont (1st Division), Perwez (5th Division), Louvain (2nd Division) and Wavre (6th Division).

 

On the morning of the 4th, when German cavalry crossed the Belgian frontier and moved upon Visé, north of Liège, it found the bridge over the Meuse broken, and the western bank held by Belgian troops. Two regiments were then pushed northward to Lixhe (3 miles north of Visé), where they crossed the river by a ford. The Belgians, finding their left threatened, thereupon fell back on Liège. By evening the heads of six small German columns of all arms which had crossed the frontier were nearly two miles into Belgium. Further concentrations were also reported to the south ; and it became evident that a very large army threatened invasion along the lines of advance guarded by the fortress of Liège and by the 3rd Division.

 

Liège

 

On the 5th August, the Germans, having bridged the Meuse at Lixhe, pushed forward patrols to Tongres (about ten miles N.N.W. of Liège), and the commander-in-chief of the invading troops, General von Emmich (X. Corps), demanded free passage through Liège. This being at once refused, he attempted to seize the place by a coup de main. His troops consisted of six infantry brigades (at frontier peace strength) ,provided by the III. IV., VII., IX., X. and XI. Corps, each with a squadron of cavalry, a battery of artillery, a battalion of Jäger (Rifles), and cyclists attached to it.

 

 

Two of the six batteries had field guns, and the other four, field howitzers. Besides this force, General von Emmich had at his disposal two heavy mortar batteries and General von der Marwitz's cavalry corps, comprising the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.

 

After an unsuccessful attempt had been made to kidnap the commandant of Liège, General von Emmich gave orders for a night attack. His general plan was to make a demonstration against the forts with a few companies, and to send the six brigades through the intervals between the forts to secure the town and citadel, and then to fall upon the forts from the rear. This attack was delivered soon after nightfall in five columns; one from the north; one from the north-east (two brigades which took different routes); one, the central column, from the east ; and two from the south. The first two columns, for the most part, lost their way, and fell back after suffering heavy losses, though one battalion penetrated into Liège and was there captured. Of the two southern columns, one halted, having casualties so severe as to forbid further progress, and the other was seized with panic, the men firing upon each other. The central column met with serious resistance, the brigadier and the commander of the leading regiment being killed, It was on the point of falling back when Major-General Ludendorff, who, as Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Second Army, was with General von Emmich watching the operations, came up and, taking command, pushed on. He was specially interested, for he had planned these very operations in peace when Chief of the Operations Section of the Great General Staff. After giving his men a rest, he renewed the attack in the forenoon of the 6th, and advanced until his leading troops were within a mile of Liège. Though unsupported by the other columns, he decided to make a dash for the citadel, and on advancing found practically no opposition. The Belgian Staff, anticipating that the 3rd Division might be surrounded, had withdrawn it to the Gette ; so the Germans found themselves in possession of the town of Liège.

 

The true siege of the fortress then began. Marwitz's cavalry corps worked round to the western side of the defences, and the German artillery shelled the forts. On the 12th, 42 cm. howitzers were brought up, and the last of the forts fell at 8.30 A.M. on the 16th. General Leman, the commandant, was taken unconscious from under a heap of wreckage and made prisoner. Liège was lost, but by delaying the German advance it had rendered transcendent service to the cause of Belgium's Allies. (The time gained to the Allies would appear to have been about four or five days. According to Kluck (pp. 10-19), his three leading corps were on the line Kermpt-Stevort-Gorssurn, forty miles (say three marches) west of Aix la Chapelle, on the night of the 17th. They had begun to arrive in the concentration area north-east of Aix on the 7th. Had Liège offered no opposition and had they at once marched off into Belgium, there seems no reason why the II., III. and IV. Corps should not have reached the above line on the 10th, and completed concentration there on the 12th or 13th four or five days earlier than was the case. The six composite brigades and cavalry corps which attacked Liège were available to cover the concentration. Even on the 10th August the German Supreme Command hoped to commence the advance on the 13th, five days earlier than was possible (Bülow, pp. 11, 12). According to post-war German publications however, e.g. " Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg " by Foerster, the German time-table made the armies reach the line Thionville-Sedan-Mons, on the 22nd day of mobilisation (23rd August), and they were actually slightly ahead of it ; but this is accounted for by the hasty retreat of the French Armies after the first contact. Belgian opinion is that at least four days were gained (" Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires," Sept. 1921). )

 

Whilst the siege was in progress, on the 10th, German cavalry and Jäger (It must be borne in mind that a German cavalry division was a mixed force of all arms, with two or more Jäger (Rifle) battalions included. (See Plate L)) appeared before the line of the Gette, and gradually extended their front northwards as far as Hasselt (18 miles north-east of Tirlemont) and Diest (12 miles north of Tirlemont). On the 12th six German cavalry regiments, with three horse-batteries and two Jäger battalions attacked the line of the Gette at Haelen, a little to the south-east of Diest, and made some progress, but were ultimately driven back by the Belgians, with appreciable loss, after ten hours of sharp fighting.

 

German troops, however, continued to pour into Belgium, and by the 17th the space between the Meuse, the Demer and the Gette was occupied by them in strength, in spite of the fact that the Belgian Army, assisted by the Garde Civique, had systematically obstructed the roads and destroyed the bridges. The right flank of the line of the Gette was already threatened, and columns to support the turning movement were passing the Meuse at Huy, where the bridge, blown up by the Belgians, had been repaired. On the 18th, the Germans again attacked and carried Haelen, and also entered Tirlemont. They then fell upon the front and left flank of the Belgian 1st Division, and only by hard fighting were held at bay. The Gette position was now evidently in imminent danger. It was certain that the German II., IV. and IX. Corps, covered by the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions were opposite the Belgian left between Diest and Tirlemont; whilst the Guard, X. and VII. Corps were marching against the Belgian right on a front from Jodoigne (7 miles S.S.W. of Tirlemont) to Namur. It was also known that the Active corps were being followed by Reserve formations, namely, in the First Army by the III. , IV. and IX. Reserve Corps; in the Second Army by the Guard, VII. and X. Reserve Corps ; and in the Third Army by the XII. Reserve Corps. The French and the British, as will be seen, were neither of them yet at hand to render assistance; and it was hopeless for the Belgians to think of contending against odds of four or five to one. Accordingly, on the evening of the 18th, the five Belgian divisions were skilfully drawn off from the Gette north-westward to Antwerp, and on the 20th entered the lines of that fortress without being seriously molested. There, on the flank of the Germans if they advanced westward, and in their rear if they should turn southward, the Belgian Army remained an effective menace to the enemy. (According to Hausen, the commander of the Third Army (" Marneschlacht," p. 244, f.n.), the III. Reserve Corps and IX. Reserve Corps were originally detailed to push forward to the coast " direction Calais," but this order was cancelled when the Belgian Army went into Antwerp, and both corps were sent to watch the fortress. Later, in early September, the XV. Corps was detained near Brussels on account of a sortie being expected from Antwerp. These three corps were absent from the Battle of the Marne, though the IX. Reserve and XV. Corps reached the Aisne in time to oppose the Allied advance. There were further employed at Antwerp : the 4th Ersatz Division (sent from the Sixth Army), the 1st Ersatz Reserve Division, a Matrosen division, the 26th and 37th Landwehr Brigades, besides heavy artillery and engineers.)

 

Namur

(See " La Défense de la Position Fortifiée de Namur " (Belgian official work), and " Lüttich-Namur.")

 

Further to the south, about Namur, where the Belgian 4th Division was stationed, German cavalry patrols were in touch with the Belgian cavalry to the north of the fortress on the 5th August, and to the south-east of it on the 7th. But it was not until nearly a fortnight later that the main bodies of the enemy approached; meanwhile, on the 19th, the garrison had been joined by the Belgian 8th Brigade which, finding itself completely isolated at Huy, had blown up the bridge over the Meuse there and fallen back on Namur. On that day the Guard Reserve Corps of the German Second Army appeared on the north of the fortress, and the X. Corps, consisting of the 22nd and 38th Divisions, of the Third Army, on the south-east, the whole under the command of General von Gallwitz. With these troops was a large proportion of heavy artillery, including four batteries of Austrian 30.5 cm. mortars and one battery of Krupp's 42 cm. howitzers.

 

On the 20th August, the Germans drove in the Belgian outposts, but this time instead of attempting a coup de main, waited for their heavy guns which on the 21st opened fire on the eastern and south-eastern forts. The Belgian commandant was powerless either to keep these monster howitzers at a distance or to silence them by counter-batteries. Before evening two of the principal forts had been very seriously damaged ; within another twenty-four hours both were practically destroyed. Two Belgian counter-attacks on the 22nd August failed; and by the evening of the 23rd the northern and eastern fronts had been laid bare, and five out of the whole circle of nine forts were in ruins. At midnight the 4th Division and the mobile garrison withdrew southwards, losing 5,500 men but just escaping the clutches of the enemy who was closing round the fortress; so they made good their escape into France, whence later they rejoined the main Belgian Army at Antwerp.

 

Thus for eighteen days the Belgians had faced the German invasion, delaying the hostile advance during a most critical period, and gaining time which was of priceless value to the Allies. In addition to this great strategic advantage, the fact that the first German operations against fortresses, conducted under the conditions obtaining in modern warfare, were so rapidly successful gave warning to the French to readjust their conceptions of the defensive value of their fortified front, and reorganise it on lines calculated to counter the effect of bombardment by heavy howitzers.

 

The Operations of the French

 

(Sketch 2 ; Maps 1, 2 & 5)

 

On the 2nd August, the day of the presentation to Belgium of the German ultimatum, the French Commander- in-Chief decided to use "the alternative concentration " areas " for the Fourth and Fifth Armies, so as to interpolate the former in the general line, and extend the left wing further towards the north.

 

On the 3rd, in view of the German violation of Luxembourg territory, General Joffre ordered Sordet's cavalry corps to push forward next day to the east of Mezières, but telephoned to its commander and to the Army commanders insisting " on the imperious obligation " not to cross the frontier; " if there are incidents," he said, " they must " only arise and develop on French territory." On the evening of the 4th, twenty-four hours after the German declaration of war and twelve hours after German cavalry had advanced into Belgium, King Albert authorized the French to enter his territory for the purpose of ascertaining the direction of advance of the Germans and of delaying their columns. General Sordet crossed the frontier on the 6th and moved first towards Neufchateau (36 miles east of Mezières). Then, striking north, he eventually arrived within nine miles of Liège ; but, finding that the Belgian field troops had been withdrawn from the area of the fortress, he retired on the 10th in the direction of the Meuse. Valuable information was obtained by him as to the enemy's movements from an officer who was captured on the 9th, but otherwise the intelligence gained in the strategic reconnaissance was negative; neither did the latter achieve its secondary object of delaying the enemy's advance ; for, owing to the resistance of Liège, no important columns of German troops had at the time entered the area explored.

 

To fill the gap between the French Fifth Army and the Belgian troops defending Namur, a French infantry regiment was sent on the 8th to occupy all the bridges on the Meuse north of Dinant and gain touch with the Belgians; and the I. Corps extended its protective troops along the Meuse from Mézières to Givet. On the 13th the whole I. Corps was sent northwards " to oppose any attempts of " the enemy to cross the Meuse between Givet and Namur." On the 15th, in conjunction with General Mangin's 8th Brigade (specially detailed to support the cavalry corps), it repulsed an attempt of Richthofen's cavalry corps (Guard and 5th Cavalry Divisions) to cross near Dinant.

 

Between the 6th and 8th August, it became certain that an enemy force containing units belonging to five different army corps was operating against Liège; but the main group of the German Armies appeared to the French General Staff to be around Metz, in front of Thionville and in Luxembourg. The enemy was thus, it was thought, in a position either to advance westwards if Liège fell, or if Liège held out to wheel southwards, pivoting on Metz. A decision was therefore made by General Joffre, and communicated to the French Armies on the 8th August, (In Instruction No. 1, dated 8th August 1914, 7 A.M. F.O.A., i. Annexe No. 103.) to the effect that his intention was to bring the Germans to battle with all his forces united, as in the original plan, with his right extended to the Rhine. If necessary, the left of the line would be held back, so as to avoid the premature engagement of one of the Armies before the others could come to its assistance. If, however, the enemy's right were delayed in front of Liège, or turned southwards, the left would be advanced. General directions were issued as to the objectives and zones of action for the Armies, the Fifth being ordered to remain concentrated so as to be in a position either to prevent an enemy passage of the Meuse between Mouzon (20 miles above Mezières) and Mezières, or to cross itself between those two places. The instructions ended with an order to make all preparations so that the movement could be carried out on receipt of a telegram, and to render the offensive crushing (foudroyante).

 

On the 13th General Joffre came to the conclusion that the enemy was wheeling south towards the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies on the Upper Meuse, and it was too late for them to seek battle beyond that river " under good "conditions." He directed them to be prepared to counterattack. He paid no heed to the view of General Lanrezac (Fifth Army), that the enemy wheel was of a much wider nature.

 

Meantime in Alsace, " to facilitate the attack of the "main Armies," the small offensive (outlined in the original plan) was commenced on the extreme right by a detachment of the First Army, consisting of the VII. Corps and 8th Cavalry Division. This detachment crossed the frontier on the 6th August. After its advanced guard had reached Mülhausen (Mulhouse), it found itself in the presence of superior forces, and was withdrawn. On the 14th the offensive was renewed with a stronger force, called the Army of Alsace, consisting of the VII. Corps, and the Alpine and three Reserve divisions, under General Pau. On the same date the First and Second Armies began their forward movement across the frontier. For the Armies on the left only certain precautions were ordered. But during the afternoon of the 15th, news came from the Belgian Army that 200,000 Germans were crossing the Meuse below Visé, and from the I. Corps of the attack at Dinant ; the Grand Quartier General (G.Q.G.) in consequence ordered the Fifth Army to hand over to the Fourth Army its right corps (II.) and Group of Reserve divisions, which were guarding the Meuse in touch with the I. Corps, and take the rest of its forces northwards across the Belgian frontier into the angle of the Meuse and the Sambre to the region of Mariembourg (24 miles north by west of Mézières) or Philippeville (33 miles north of Mézières), " to act in concert " with the British Army and the Belgian forces against the "enemy forces in the north." G.Q.G. placed Sordet's cavalry corps and Valabrègue's Group of Reserve divisions , then at Vervins (36 miles west of Mézières), under the Fifth Army, and also ordered to it two recently arrived African divisions and the XVIII. Corps, originally in the Second Army, from the general reserve.

 

In order to leave the Third Army entirely free to concentrate its attention on offensive operations the duty of masking Metz was given to a new force, the Army of Lorraine, composed of three Reserve divisions from the Third Army and three others sent up for the purpose. General Maunoury, who had originally been on the Italian frontier, was given command of it. There was thus a general taking of ground to the left.

 

The French general plan of operations now began to take definite shape as cumulative evidence showed that the main German advance was in progress through Belgium.

 

The situation as it presented itself to G.Q.G. on the 16th August was as follows :

 

In the north, seven or eight German army corps and four cavalry divisions are endeavouring to pass westwards between Givet and Brussels, and even beyond these points.

 

In the centre between Bastogne and Thionville there were thought to be six or seven army corps, and two or three cavalry divisions,

 

South of Metz, the Germans appeared to be on the defensive.

 

General Joffre's intention now was to make the principal attack with the Third and Fourth Armies through Luxembourg and Belgian Luxembourg, so as to strike at the flank and communications of the enemy forces which had crossed the Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier, and if possible attack them before they could deploy for battle by wheeling south. To support this offensive the First and Second Armies were to make only a secondary attack between Metz and the Vosges, for the purpose of holding the enemy, who seemed to be gradually shifting westwards and might otherwise be able to take in flank the French Armies attacking in Luxembourg. Lastly, the left wing, consisting of the Fifth Army, the British Army when it should arrive, and the Belgian Army, was to move up so as to hold in cheek any German forces which might advance from the Meuse, and so gain sufficient time to allow the attack of the Third and Fourth Armies to become effective. In order to give weight to the attack, the Third and Fourth Armies were somewhat strengthened.

 

In brief, General Joffre's first object was to break the enemy's centre ; that done he intended to fall with all available forces on the right or western wing of the German Armies.

 

The instructions which he sent out on the 20th were as follow :

 

To General Ruffey :

 

"The Third Army will begin its offensive movement to-morrow in the general direction of Arlon . . . The mission of the Third Army is to counter-attack any enemy force which may try to gain the right flank of the Fourth Army."

 

To General de Langle of the Fourth Army, he telegraphed :

 

" I authorise you to send strong advanced guards of all arms to-night to the general line Bertrix-Tintigny to secure the debouchment of your Army beyond the Semoy. . . . The general direction of the movement will be Neufchateau."

 

The positions on the morning of the 20th indicate the preliminary movements which had been made for the purpose. They were :

 

The Army of Alsace had reached Mülhausen.

The First and Second Armies were across the frontier in front of Lunéville and Nancy, from near Sarrebourg to Delme, about thirty-six miles north-west of Sarrebourg.

The Army of Lorraine was observing Metz.

The Third and Fourth Armies were close up to the Belgian frontier, astride the river Chiers, from near Longwy to Sedan, ready to cross the river Semoy.

The Fifth Army was disposed:

The I. Corps and 8th Infantry Brigade on the Meuse, near Dinant, facing east, with

The 51st Reserve Division marching up from the south to act as a link between the French Fourth and Fifth Armies.

The X. and III. Corps, each with an African division attached to it, lay in depth close up to the Sambre near Charleroi, facing north.

The XVIII. Corps was echeloned to the left rear on the line Gozée-Thuin (6 miles and 9 miles south-west of Charleroi).

General Valabrègue's two remaining Reserve divisions were on the left of the XVIII. Corps and north-east of Maubeuge, on the east of the gap into which General Joffre intended the British Army should move.

Further to the west and beyond the space to be occupied by the British, were three Territorial divisions under General d'Amade sent up on the 14th, the 84th near Douai, the 82nd near Arras, and the 81st between Hazebrouck and St. Omer.

 

It will be observed that the front of the Fifth Army under General Lanrezac along the Meuse and Sambre formed a salient, with its apex just short of the Belgian fortress of Namur, on which by the evening of the 20th the Germans were closing. Consequently, any failure of his right to hold its ground on the Meuse would place his centre and left in a very dangerous situation, and render them liable to be cut off.

 

On the 20th, however, before the general advance had begun, misfortunes had already overtaken the French. According to the bulletins originally issued : " The First and Second Armies, tired by several days of marching and fighting, came up against strongly organised positions, armed with powerful artillery, whose fire was admirably prepared and corrected by aeroplanes." This, however, was not quite the case. The Germans (Sixth Army) had at first withdrawn before the Second Army, and the latter, with the XX. Corps under General Foch on the left, had on the 18th followed in pursuit. Early in the morning of the 20th the enemy had come forward again and attacked the Second Army in front and left flank ; it had been compelled to retire and the First Army had to conform to its movements. The actions in which the First and Second Armies were engaged are known as the battles of Sarrebourg and Morhange (25 miles north-west of Sarrebourg).( It may be added here that an attempted pursuit of the Second Army by the Germans received a serious cheek on the 25th ; for, in spite of the reverse, the French First Army returned to the offensive and struck them in flank. After some indecisive fighting, the situation of the French First and Second Armies became stabilised on a line in France, just inside the frontier.)

 

On the 21st August, in spite of this reverse to the French right wing, the Third and Fourth Armies crossed the frontier and advanced from ten to fifteen miles into the difficult Ardennes country, an area of rough hills and deep river valleys, covered by forests broken only by narrow belts of pasture land. Aeroplanes could see nothing, the cavalry could not get forward, and in the defiles, which the roads through the villages and forests constitute, the French columns ran literally at right angles into German columns belonging to the Armies of the German Crown Prince and Duke Albert of Württemberg, numerically slightly superior to them,

French.

German.

Third Army

Fourth Army

168,000

193,000

Fith Army

Fourth Army

200,000

180,000

 

361,000

 

380,000

which were crossing their front. After fighting the actions known as the battles of Virton and of the Semoy, (There are vivid accounts of these actions in Commandant Grasset's Ethe,'' " Virton " and " Neufchateau.") having suffered heavy losses, particularly in officers, the Third and Fourth Armies were compelled to fall back towards the Meuse. The attempt to break in the German centre before the right wing could deliver its blow against the Allied left wing had thus failed, owing to the French having neglected to adapt their method of advance to the nature of the ground (an advance by bounds from the edge of one open belt to another does not appear to have been considered) ; to their having been caught in column in narrow defiles and thus unable to use their artillery with effect ; and to their line of advance having brought them head-on to the broadside of the German columns. Thanks however to a premature enveloping attack attempted by the German Crown Prince the reverse was less serious than it might otherwise have been.

 

As regards the French Fifth Army, General Lanrezac had considered it inadvisable to advance simultaneously with the Armies on his right. He preferred to wait until his reinforcements should have arrived, which would not be until the 23rd; until the Fourth Army should have cleared the gorges of the Semoy and shortened by its advance the eastern face of the salient which the front of the Fifth Army presented to the enemy; and until the British Army should similarly have come up on his left. As will presently be seen, Sir John French's force on the 21st was approaching the line of the Mons-Condé canal. The general situation in which it was about to play its part may be thus summarised :

 

The French First and Second Armies were retiring after the battles of Sarrebourg and Morhange ;

The Third and Fourth " had failed, and the reverse seemed serious " ;

the Fifth Army was in a salient about to be attacked by two German Armies;

Namur was on the point of falling (the last fort surrendered on the 25th) ; and

The Belgian Army had been driven into Antwerp. (The French tactical doctrine-infantry attack head down, regardless of fire and of artillery support had proved so totally unsuited to modern warfare that on 24th August the following note was issued to all the French Armies over General Joffre's signature :

" It has been noticed in the information collected with regard to the actions which have so far taken place that attacks have not been carried out with close co-operation between the infantry and the artillery.

Every combined operation includes a series of detailed actions aiming at the capture of the points d'appui.

Each time that it is necessary to capture a point d'appui the attack must be prepared with artillery, the infantry must be held back and not launched to the assault until the distance to be covered is so short that it is certain the objective will be reached. Every time that the infantry has been launched to the attack from too great a distance before the artillery has made its effect felt, the infantry has fallen under tile fire of machine guns and suffered losses which might have been avoided.

When a point d'appui has been captured, it must be organised immediately, the troops must entrench, and artillery must be brought up.")

 

Operations of the Germans

(See G.O.A., i., and Note 11. at end of Chapter.)

 

Leaving only three Active corps and three Reserve divisions, assisted by a cavalry division, one Ersatz division and Landwehr formations, some 250,000 men in all, on her Eastern frontier, where she had the co-operation of the Austro-Hungarian Army, and the IX. Reserve Corps (until the 23rd August) and Landwehr formations in Schleswig to guard against a possible landing, Germany had assembled the rest of her available mobile troops on her Western frontier in seven Armies, (For Order of Battle, see Appendices 6 and 7. In round numbers (G.O.A. i. p. 69), 1,600,000 ; excluding 4 cavalry corps and the covering troops in Upper Alsace

First Army

320,000 men

Second Army

260,000

Third Army

180,000

Fourth Army

180,000

Fifth Army

200,000

Sixth Army

220,000

Seventh Army

125,000

 

1,485,000

In addition 61/2 mobile Ersatz divisions (say another 100,000 men), which would be ready on the 12th day of mobilisation.) with Generaloberst von Moltke as Chief of the General Staff and practically in command.

 

By the evening of the 17th August these Armies were concentrated, ready to move, on a long front extending from the fortress of Strasbourg to the Dutch frontier north of Liège. This front ran through Sarrebourg, Metz and Thionville; (The continuous fortifications round and connecting these two latter places formed the so-called Moselle Position.) up the centre of the Duchy of Luxembourg (the neutrality of which had been violated on the 2nd August), to Liège ; and then to the north-west of this fortress, where the northernmost German Army, Kluck's, was deployed facing the Belgians on the Gette. In order to reach the far side of the neutral barrier formed by the projecting peninsula of Dutch Limbourg, behind which it had been assembled, Kluck's Army had defiled in three columns through Aix la Chapelle. The Supreme Command (O.H.L.) orders directed the Armies of Kluck (First) and Bülow (Second), acting together under the latter general,( The order of the 17th August which placed Kluck under Bülow was cancelled on the 27th, but reissued on the 10th Sept.) to deal with the Belgian Army, to force it away from Antwerp and to reach the line Namur-Brussels. The First Army was to detail a detachment to mask Antwerp, and by holding back its right provide against a British landing on the coast. Hausen's (Third) Army was to gain the line of the Meuse from Givet to Namur. Namur was to be attacked and taken as soon as possible by the left of the Second and the right of the Third Army. Meanwhile, the Fourth and Fifth Armies were to conform so that the whole five Armies on the right might carry out a gigantic wheel, first to the line Thionville-Brussels, and then in a south-westerly direction, Thionville still remaining the pivot.

 

The Sixth and Seventh Armies, under the senior Army commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, were given as their principal task the protection of the left flank of the five wheeling Armies. How they could do so, said the instructions, depended on the action of the enemy. If the French, based on their fortress line, remained on the strategic defensive, Crown Prince Rupprecht was to take the offensive, " advance against the Moselle below " Frouard (5 miles below Nancy) and the Meurthe, hold fast the French troops [First and Second Armies] assembled there and hinder their transfer to the French left wing." If, on the other hand, the French moved against his front in superior numbers, and he had to give ground, he was to retire to a prepared position on the Nied, which was flanked by Strasbourg and Metz. If the left flank of the wheeling Armies did not seem to be threatened, part of the Sixth and Seventh Armies might be withdrawn via Metz to take part in the fighting on the left bank of the Moselle.(Crown Prince Rupprecht had begun a retirement on 14th August, under the second case, keeping in touch with the outer defences of Metz ; but by the evening of the 17th the French Second Army in its advance had exposed " a long-spread and visibly thin flank towards Metz, which invited a blow," and the mass of that Army was crowded together between Morhange and Sarrebourg. Rupprecht therefore issued orders, although Moltke was in favour of letting the French come further, for a " lightning and surprise attack," with the result already recorded. (Bavarian Official Account, " Die Schlacht in Lothringen."))

 

The strategic objective was to outflank the French by a the west and drive them eastwards against the Swiss frontier. To give sufficient weight to the blow which was to crush the Allies'left, roll up the line from the westward and, in conjunction with the advance of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies, push the entire line of battle south-east towards neutral territory, five of the ten cavalry divisions and twenty-six out of the total of the whole seventy-two divisions on the Western Front were allotted to the two Armies under General von Bülow.( The density of the different German Armies on the original front on the 17th August is of interest :

First Army front

18 miles

about 18,000 men per mile

Second

20

13,000

Third

15

12,000

Fourth

30

6,000

Fifth

40

5,000

Sixth

70

3,100

Seventh

35

3,500

)

To summarise the initial movements of the two belligerents, we find that the French offensive carried out by the Armies of Dubail and de Castelnau. on the 14th August south of Metz " was counter-attacked by the " German Sixth and Seventh Armies and failed tactically " : the general strategic advantage too remained with the Germans ; for their 345,000 men, including the detachments in Upper Alsace, contained about 456,000 French. The offensive of the Armies of Ruffey and de Langle de Cary north of Thionville, commencing on the 21st August, encountered the German Fourth and Fifth Armies, which had begun on the 17th to wheel forward to the line Thionville-Givet, so that two Armies met two Armies of about equal strength ; yet the French suffered a number of small disasters.

 

The result of the above operations was distinctly, but not decisively, in favour of the Germans. This however was not all. Their dispositions left three Armies, Hausen's, Bülow's and Kluck's, comprising in all thirty-four divisions, free to deal with Lanrezac's Army of ten divisions, the tiny British Army of four divisions, and the almost equally small Belgian Army of six divisions, thirty-four divisions against twenty, covering a frontier destitute of natural obstacles, guarded only by obsolete fortresses, and with the shortest and most direct route to Paris behind it.

 

The first step in the German plan had therefore been successful, as regards its objectives ; the line laid down for the first stage of the wheel on Thionville had been reached, and Liege and Namur had been taken; it was unsuccessful only in that the Belgian Army had not been forced away from Antwerp, which it entered, after rear-guard fighting, on the 20th. Surprise has sometimes been expressed that the Germans did not push at least detachments to the Channel ports in August 1914, when there was no force available to oppose them except some French Territorial units. It would appear that they had intended to do so, but the necessity of investing the Belgian Army in Antwerp absorbed the two corps, III. Reserve and IX. Reserve, which had been selected for that purpose. Besides, when the opening phase of the campaign was going so nearly according to plan, and there seemed a certainty of winning the war in a few days by a defeat of the French in a super-Sedan in the open field, it would have been strategically unjustifiable to divert a single man to seize a section of coast, which, like Italy after the battle of Austerlitz, must have fallen to the invaders without serious conflict directly the main decision had been gained.

 

THE BRITISH ENTRY INTO FRANCE

 

On the 12th August, the Commander-in-Chief, retaining only a small party of his immediate staff with him, despatched General Headquarters (GHQ.) from London to Southampton. They crossed to Havre on the 14th, and proceeded by rail early on the 16th, reaching Le Cateau late that night.

 

On the 14th August, Sir John French himself, with his party, left London. He arrived at Amiens soon after 9 P.M. An hour later, General Valabrègue's chief staff officer came to report that his group, the 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions, was entrenching south of the Oise between Vervins and Hirson, as a second line to the French left.

 

On the following days, 15th, 16th and 17th August, the Commander-in-Chief proceeded to visit, in succession, the French Minister of War at Paris, General Joffre at the Grand Quartier General (G.Q.G.) at Vitry le François, and General Lanrezac at Fifth Army Headquarters at Rethel.

 

From them he learned in some detail the disposition of the French forces in the angle formed by the Sambre and the Meuse, south-west of Namur. (As neither General Lanrezac nor Sir John French could speak or fully understand the other's language, a good personal accord was not, unfortunately, established between them at their meeting. See Lanrezac's "Le Plan de Campagne français," pp. 91-2 ; French's "1914," pp. 36-7.) General Lanrezac's Army was then rapidly concentrating in the area south of Charleroi, the I. Corps, on the right, being already massed between Namur and Givet; the head of the III. Corps was at Philippeville, and that of the X. Corps at Bohain, midway between St. Quentin and Le Cateau. The XVIII. Corps was expected to begin arriving in the area between Bohain and Avesnes on the 18th and 19th. General Valabrègue's divisions were in position, as already stated above, south of Avesnes. General Sordet's cavalry corps was advancing again, this time north-east, from Charleroi and, if driven back, would pass to the left of the British Army. The task of that Army was to move northward and form the extreme left of the French advance.

 

Throughout this period, that is to say between the 12th and 17th August, the British troops had been passing across the Channel and disembarking on French soil. All was ready for their reception, and the welcome given to them by the inhabitants was enthusiastic. On the 14th and following days the corps and divisions began to move up by train to the areas of concentration, which were arranged so that the army was assembled in a pear-shaped area between Maubeuge and Le Cateau, about twenty-five miles long from north-east to south-west, and averaging ten miles wide. The cavalry was at the north-eastern end, ready to join hands with the French Fifth Army.

 

In detail, the areas were :

Cavalry: East of Maubeuge, Jeumont, Damousies, Cousolre. Divisional Headquarters, Aibes.

II. Corps : East of Landrecies. Headquarters, Landrecies.

3rd Division : Marbaix, Taisnières, Noyelles.

5th Division: Maroilles, Landrecies, Ors.

I. Corps : East of Bohain. Headquarters, Wassigny.

1st Division : Boué, Esqueheries, Leschelles.

2nd Division: Grougis, Mennevret, Hannappes.

The Royal Flying Corps, taking the field in war for the first time, assembled four squadrons, with 105 officers, 755 other ranks, and 63 aeroplanes at the aerodrome of Maubeuge ; it also formed an aircraft park at Amiens.

 

The concentration was virtually complete on the 20th, that is six days late according to French reckoning, owing to the various delays which have been enumerated. One sad incident marred the progress to the scene of action, namely the death of Lieutenant-General Sir James Grierson, commanding the II. Corps, who expired suddenly in the train on the morning of the 17th. Sir John French asked that Sir Herbert Plumer might take General Grierson's place ; but the Secretary of State for War decided to send Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.

 

On the 19th August, GHQ. was informed that the 4th Division would be despatched from England immediately; and it was settled that the 2/Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1/Scottish Rifles, 1/Middlesex and 2/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which had been employed on the Lines of Communication, should be formed into the 19th Brigade, under Major-General L. G. Drummond. On the same day the Flying Corps carried out its first reconnaissances from Maubeuge northward towards Brussels, and north-west over Tournai and Courtrai. No large bodies of troops were seen. On the 20th the cavalry was pushed forward as far as Binche on the north without encountering any enemy. But an aerial reconnaissance that day observed a column of troops stretching through Louvain as far as the eye could reach. This was a column of the German First Army. Diverting one of his corps, the III. Reserve, followed later by the IX. Reserve Corps and the equivalent of five divisions, to follow the Belgian forces towards Antwerp, Kluck was pressing westward. On this day, the 20th, his troops entered Brussels. It was a fateful day in many respects, for during its course the main Belgian Army retired into Antwerp, the Germans approached within decisive range of Namur, and General Joffre gave his orders for the general advance.

 

 

In this great movement, the outline of which has already been given, the British were to advance on the left of the Fifth Army north-east, by way of Soignies, in the general direction of Nivelles. If Kluck wheeled southward from Brussels, it was not anticipated that his right would extend much beyond Mons. If, therefore, the British were in line about this place, they would be ready, when once General Lanrezac had passed the Sambre, to wheel eastward and envelop the right of the Germans. To make this envelopment the more certain, General Sordet's cavalry corps, which had on this day fallen back across the Sambre to Fontaine l'Evêque (midway between Charleroi and Binche), was directed to take position beyond the left of the British. Still further to the west, the three French Territorial divisions, under the command of General d'Amade, were to push gradually forward.

 

The initiative seemed to be passing into the hands of the Germans, and it was urgent to ascertain by aerial and other reconnaissance what use, if any, they were making g of it. Meanwhile, in pursuance of General Joffre's plan, GHQ. on the evening of the 20th issued orders for a movement northward during the three ensuing days. An attached march table gave the approximate positions to be reached each day. The general effect of these orders when executed would be that the 23rd August would find the Army aligned on a front, roughly facing north-east, from Estinne au Mont (near Binche) on the south-east, to Lens, eight miles north of Mons, on the north-west, with the Cavalry Division (Major-General E. H. H. Allenby) on the left, while the 5th Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode), having covered the right flank during the movement, would find itself finally in advance of the right front. The daily moves were to be as follows :

 

The 5th Cavalry Brigade was to proceed on the 21st to the neighbourhood of Binche, the right of the line, and there remain ; the Cavalry Division, moving on the left of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, was to march level with it on the 21st, and on the 22nd proceed to Lens, the left of the line, where it would halt astride the road that connects Mons and Ath. Covered by the cavalry, the rest of the Army was to advance. (The positions of troops are always given from right to left, unless otherwise stated.)

 

On the 21st the II. Corps to the line Goegnies-Bavai; the I. Corps to the line Avesnes-Landrecies.

 

On the 22nd the II. Corps north-westward to the line from Mons westward to Thulin; the I. Corps north-eastward to the line Hautmont-Hargnies.

 

On the 23rd the II. Corps was to wheel eastwards, so that one division would be in rear of the other, with the front east of Mons between Spiennes and St. Denis; the I. Corps was to incline north-eastward and come up on the right of the II., on a line from Estinne au Mont westward to Harmignies (immediately south-east of Spiennes).

 

The morning of the 21st broke thick and misty, rendering aerial reconnaissance impossible until the afternoon. The cavalry moved northwards early, and after reaching Villers St. Ghislain (six miles south-east of Mons) heard that German cavalry was in force five miles to the northward. A patrol which entered Mons found a similar report current there. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General H. de B. de Lisle), after crossing the Condé canal east of Mons, occupied a line on both banks from Maurage to Obourg. Patrols of the 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards sighted German patrols in the vicinity of the two bridges east of Mons, those of Nimy and Obourg; but contact was not established. Information from peasants, however, pointed to the movement of considerable forces southward from Soignies (10 miles north-east of Mons).

 

The II. Corps followed the cavalry to a line level with and west of Maubeuge, the 3rd Division, on the right, to the line Bettignies-Feignies-La Longueville, and the 5th Division, on the left, to the line Houdain-St. Waast-Gommegnies. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reached Bavai from England at 4 P.M. and took over command of the corps. The outposts of the 9th Brigade on this evening overlooked the old battlefield of Malplaquet, and were found by the Lincolnshire Regiment which, together with the Royal Scots Fusiliers, had fought in the action, two hundred years before.

 

The I. Corps simultaneously moved up to the line from Avesnes to Landrecies, about ten miles behind the front of the II., the 1st Division on the right, and the 2nd on the left. The day was sultry and many of the reservists suffered in consequence ; a considerable number of men were still feeling the effects of inoculation, and all found the hard irregular surface of the cobbled roads extremely trying for marching. In the afternoon the weather cleared and the Flying Corps was able to carry out reconnaissances.

 

It reported a large body of cavalry with some infantry and guns south-east of Nivelles. This intelligence was confirmed, and the formation identified as the German 9th Cavalry Division, by a British intelligence officer who was in Nivelles when the division entered, but escaped by motor. The presence of two more cavalry divisions was ascertained ; one of them, the 2nd, had pushed parties far to the westward, which had reached the line Ghent - Audenarde, being evidently intended to explore the area as far as the sea. The other division, supposed to be the 4th, was between Charleroi and Seneffe. (The 4th Cavalry Division was on the line mentioned about midday on the 20th, and on the 21st was moving westwards from Soignies towards Ath ; otherwise identifications were quite correct. Poseck, Map.) These three cavalry divisions formed the German II. Cavalry Corps under General von der Marwitz. (The corps, after concentrating near Ath, was sent north-westwards towards the coast, in front of the right flank of the First Army, to look for the British army. Poseck, p. 35.) The main German line was reported as extending south-east from Grammont, through Enghien, Nivelles, Genappes and Sombreffe to Charleroi. It is now known that from right to left, that is to say from north-west to south-east, the order of the German corps was IV. (with II. echeloned behind it), III. IX., VII., X. and Guard Corps, with four Reserve corps in rear of them. The Allied High Command was correctly informed as to the actual number of German corps in Belgium; but it could do no more than forecast the scope of the movement in progress. Part of Kluck's cavalry at least, and possibly some of his infantry had begun a wheel south-westwards from Brussels. Whether he intended to continue in that direction or sweep further westwards, it was as yet impossible to judge on the available information. On the British right, General Lanrezac's Army was in contact with infantry of the German Second Army along the whole line of the Sambre on either side of Charleroi, from Tamines to Pont it Celles, so that hard fighting in that quarter on the morrow was almost certain. There seemed every chance that it might spread further to the west.

 

At 2.45 P.M. GHQ. ordered the cavalry to close the line between the French left and Mons: the 5th Cavalry Brigade to take up a line from the left of General Sordet's cavalry corps at Fontaine l'Evêque to Péronnes, in front of Binche, and the Cavalry Division to prolong that line to the canal at Boussoit (five miles east of Mons) with another brigade, the 3rd (Br.-General H. de la P. Gough). Thence patrols were to be pushed out north and north-east. Operation orders, issued from GHQ. shortly before midnight, directed that the march table issued on the 20th would hold good for the 22nd, with two modifications : the outposts of the II. Corps, instead of having their right on Mons, were now to hold an angle with Mons in the apex-that is from Givry north-westward to Nimy and thence westward along the canal to Pommeroeul ; and as soon as they had relieved the Cavalry Division, the latter was to move westward to a position in echelon behind the left, in the area comprised within the triangle Thulin - Quidvrain - Baisieux, with outposts along the line of the canal from the left of the II. Corps to Condé. It was still the intention that the British Army should take the offensive.

 

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