Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

(Sketches A & 4 ; Maps 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 13)

After a visit to the I. Corps and to General Sordet at Avesnes, Sir John French, on his return to G.H.Q. at Bavai in the afternoon of the 24th August, received further information of the retreat of the French Third and Fourth Armies and of the continuation of the retirement of the Fifth. Valabrègue's Group of two Reserve divisions, immediately to the right of the British, had fallen back south of Maubeuge. The XVIII. Corps of the Fifth Army, next on the right, had been attacked early, and had fallen back in good order to a line from Solre le Chateau (about ten miles south-east of Maubeuge) south-eastward to Clairfayte.

As to the western flank, the Field-Marshal had been informed that two French Reserve divisions, the 61st and 62nd (General Ebener's Group), had been sent from Paris to Arras to reinforce General d'Amade, who would thus have six divisions, some 80,000 men, without counting the garrison of Lille, 25,000, to hold a line, some 70 miles long, through Douai, Béthune and Aire to the sea. What enemy forces were before d'Amade was still unknown ; but German troops, presumably part of the IV . Corps had actually been seen marching south between Valenciennes and Bavai, and the Flying Corps in the evening reported that a large column of two divisions, in all probability the German II. Corps, moving west from Ath and Grammont, had wheeled southward at 10 A.M. at Lahamaide (5 miles north-west of Ath) and Ladeuze (4 miles south of Ath) ; also that at 4.40 P.M. one of these divisions had halted at Ligne (3 miles west of Ath) to allow other to pass it. Cavalry was known to be as far west as Tournai. The British Staff was informed that Cambrai had been entrenched, and would be held by the French, while to the west of Cambrai the strong line of the Sensée would be occupied. From the small numbers available and the nature of d'Amade's troops, it could not be hoped that they would keep off for very long any serious German pressure upon the British western flank.

The British Commander-in-Chief judged from the method and direction of the German attacks on the 24th that Kluck was endeavouring not only to turn the left flank of the British force, but to press it back on to the old fortress of Maubeuge (This was actually the case. Kluck's orders for the 24th ran : " The attack is to be so carried out that the enemy will be thrown back on Maubeuge and his retreat to the west cut off " (Kluck, p. 45).), which lay to its right rear, offering asylum just as Metz had presented its shelter to the French in 1870 during the battle of Gravelotte. Sir John French was not, however, inclined to be thus tempted, and, as the left of the French XVIII. Corps was already ten miles in rear of the British right, he decided to continue the retreat on the 25th some fifteen miles further, to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau.

The routes for this retirement of the British presented some difficulty. Bavai is the crossing place of two ancient highways, the Chaussée Brunehaut, running from south-east to north-west, and another, known simply as the Roman road, running from south-west to north-east ;

in the southern angle enclosed between them lies the Forest of Mormal. This was then a compact and well-cared-for block of woodland, mostly oak and beech, with an extreme length of nine miles and an average breadth of from three to four. On its western side the Roman road forms its boundary for some seven miles ; from east to west several fair roads, one main road and a railway cross it; in addition, the Bavai-Pont sur Sambre and the Englefontaine-Landrecies roads run respectively just north and south of it ; but there is no road through it from north to south : the numerous forest tracks on the map were narrow and unmetalled, or at best had only a thin layer of unrolled stones ; they had, however, proved good going for the divisional cavalry of the I. Corps in the march northwards. With the uncorrected maps then at the disposal of the British, a commander might well hesitate before involving his columns, with an enemy on their heels, in so large and blind a mass of trees. (The leading German corps avoided crossing the forest from north to south. The III. Corps sent advanced guards by two of the transverse roads from west to east to secure the eastern edge ; the IV. Corps also sent a column from west to east by the road south of the forest to Landrecies, as will be seen. .The IX. Corps crossed it with infinite precautions by the main road from Berlaimont from east to west, two days after the battle of Le Cateau. The next corps to the east, the X. Reserne (at Etreux on the 27th), with Richthofen's cavalry corps, moved well to the east of he forest.) Just east of the forest runs the Sambre, with many loops and windings, with a general course south-west to north-east, without, as might have been expected, a main road following the line of its valley . the Maubeuge-Leval-Landrecies road, the nearest to the river, was from half a mile to two miles east of it. Consequently, if the river were crossed (and circumstances dictated that it must be by the I. Corps as close to Maubeuge as possible), it must be recrossed before that corps could be re-united with the II.

The situation presented to the British Commander-in-Chief was, through the mere accident of topography, most embarrassing. To pass the whole of his Army to the west of the forest would mean, practically, a flank march across t the front of an enemy greatly superior in numbers already threatening his western flank; to pass entirely to the east of it was impossible owing to the proximity the French. Sir Douglas Haig was communicated with on the subject of avoiding the forest, and at 5.45 P.M. on the 24th he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief that he would be able to march at 5 A.M. on the 25th along the roads near the Sambre, and therefore could leave the Roman road to the II. Corps. He added that his march would bring the head of his corps as far as Landrecies.

The Commander-in-Chief decided therefore to divide the British Force, and send the I. Corps east and the II. Corps west of the forest, and at 8.25 P.M. he issued for the retirement, with a notification that the exact positions to be occupied at Le Cateau would be pointed out on the ground. The movement was to be commenced so that all rear guards would be clear of the Bavai-Eth road by 5.30 A.M. on the 25th. In the G.H.Q. operation orders the Roman road, Bavai-Montay (just north-west of Le Cateau) was made the boundary between the I. and II. Corps and assigned to the II. Corps; thus the I. Corps was responsible for the Forest of Mormal.

The various orders for moving the Force wards may be summarised as follows :

" I. Corps : to move in two columns, and billet in villages on the route.

1st Division : to cross the Sambre at Hautmont and proceed thence southward by Limont Fontaine, Ecuelin and Monceau to Dompierre and villages beyond.

2nd Division : to cross the Sambre at Pont sur Sambre and Berlaimont, and billet in the area from Leval south-west to Landrecies.

5th Cavalry Brigade (attached I. Corps) : to cover the above movements, follow the march of the 2nd Division and billet in the area from Leval northward to Bachant.

II. Corps : to fall back west of the Forest of Mormal to the line Le Cateau-Caudry-Haucourt, by three roads.

Cavalry Division (with 19th Brigade attached) :

Two brigades, with II. Corps divisional cavalry attached, under a special commander, to cover the retreat of the II. Corps; two brigades, with the 19th Brigade, under G.O.C. Cavalry Division, to guard the western flank. "

In the course of the 22nd/23rd the 4th Division, having been relieved of its duties on the east coast of Great Britain by Yeomanry mounted brigades, Territorial cyclists and other units, had crossed the Channel to the ports of Havre, Rouen and Boulogne, and by the 24th eleven battalions of infantry and one brigade of artillery, the bulk of the combatants, had arrived by train at Le Cateau and the neighbouring stations. They were ordered to move forward and occupy a position at Solesmes to assist the retirement of the II. Corps. Major-General T. D'O.

Snow subsequently received orders to withdraw, when the time should come, to the left of the II. Corps on the Le Cateau position.

In the right centre of the I. Corps the 5th Brigade, in the early hours of the 25th, took over the outposts of the 2nd Division from La Longueville to Bavai, which had been attacked, though not in force. A troop was sent out eastwards to gain touch with the outposts of the 1st Division, and it ascertained that the French 53rd Reserve Division was retiring upon Hautmont, the very place selected for the 1st Division to cross the Sambre. From Feignies to Hautmont the 1st Division was confined to a single, narrow, high-banked, dusty road, and when the river had been passed at the allotted bridge the French 53rd Reserve Division and part of the 69th shared with it the road from Hautmont to Dompierre and Marbaix. (General Palat, in an article entitled " Le Maréchal French et le Général Lanrezac" in the " Anglo-French Review," November 1919, stated that the mistake was the I. Corps' and that it got on the roads assigned to the Reserve division . but no allotment of roads as between the British and the French can be traced before a memorandum dated 10 A.M. on the 26th.. F.O.A. does not mention the collisions. Similar mishaps as regards allotment of roads between Armies occurred on the German side, according to General Baumgarten-Crusius in his " Marneschlacht," due to there being no intermediate commander between Supreme Headquarters and the Armies, as there was later on in the war.). The weather was extremely hot, and the march, broken as it was by constant checks owing to the number of troops on the road, w as greatly distressing to soldiers already much worn by fatigue and want of sleep. Otherwise the column was little disturbed, except by occasional bullets from German patrols, and the division reached its billets, in a line of villages west of Avesnes : the 1st (Guards) Brigade at Dompierre, the 2nd at Marbaix, which was shared with the French 53rd Reserve Division, and the 3rd at Le Grand Fayt.

The 2nd Division, moving to Noyelles-Maroilles-Landrecies, south of the Forest of Mormal, on the west of the 1st, had a better road from La Longueville to its bridges at Berlaimont and Pont sur Sambre; the rear guard, supplied by the 6th Brigade, was only followed by dismounted cavalry and but little pressed, although it also encountered trouble, for Maroilles was the supply re-filling point of the French 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions; and no one could tell the British Staff which roads the supply columns would use after re-filling. Moreover, the tail of General Sordet's cavalry corps was using the road from Maroilles to Landrecies on its way to Le Cateau, and this meant further congestion. However, the 4th (Guards) Brigade duly reached Landrecies about 4 P.M., and the 6th Brigade reached Maroilles about 6 P.M. ; the 5Th was detained till evening to guard the passages of the Sambre from Pont sur Sambre to Sassegnies (west of Leval) until it could be relieved by French troops, and did not reach Noyelles till midnight.

Sir Douglas Haig soon after 2 P.M had established his headquarters at Landrecies, where a message despatched from G.H.Q. soon after 3 P.M. reached him with the information that the II. Corps was occupying the Le Cateau position from Caudry to Inchy, including, temporarily, the I. Corps' part of Inchy, and asking him when he would be able to take his place in a defensive line, which had been prepared by civil labour, from Inchy south-eastward to St. Benin (1 3/4 miles south of Le Cateau). (Thus ran the message to the I. Corps. The front allotted to the II. Corps seems very narrow. But some other message must have been sent to the II. Corps : for the diary of the latter for the 25th reads, 4.30 P.M., " Halt orders issued [they are attached to the diary] for the occupation of the portion of the defensive position allotted to the II. Corps : "5th Division, Montay-Ruemont road (inc.) [this is the Roman road, west of Le Cateau, the road which was the II. Corps boundary on the 25th] to Troisvilles (inc.). 3rd Division, Troisvilles-Audencourt-Caudry (inc.)." It was a wider and more suitable front than that mentioned in the G.H.Q. message to the I. Corps.) His answer was urgently requested, since the orders for the 26th depended upon it.

General Haig realised that the situation was serious, for, about noon, the Flying Corps had reported German columns to be closing on Bavai. Meantime, his chief General Staff officer, Br.-General J. E. Gough, had gone to G.H.Q. and returned with instructions, in accordance with which he ordered the march of the I. Corps to be resumed south-westwards at 2 A.M. on the 26th : that of the 1st Division to St. Martin (5 miles south of Le Cateau), the 2nd to Bazuel (2 miles south-east of Le Cateau), the whole movement to be covered by the 5th Cavalry Brigade.

Orders, issued at 7.80 P.M. by G.H.Q., were, however, received subsequently, and they directed that the retirement was to be continued a little further and that the I. Corps was to go on to Busigny (7 miles south-west of Le Cateau). The II. Corps (with the 19th Brigade), moving in echelon, was to fall back in the general direction of La Sablière (a wood just south of Busigny)-Prémont-Beaurevois (3 miles east of Le Catelet). The 4th Division on the left was to reach the area Beaurevoir-Le Catelet. The reason of the change was that, in view of the reports received of the further retirement of the French on his right and of the strength of the enemy on his own immediate front, Sir John French had decided that he could not stand on the Le Cateau position, but must continue the retreat on St. Quentin and Noyon.

The II. Corps had made every preparation for early start on the 25th in its retirement Bavai to the Le Cateau position; but owing to the of General Sordet's cavalry corps from east to west across its line of retreat, the roads to the south were blocked, and there was much difficulty in getting the whole of the transport into motion by midnight, the hour fixed in orders. The process was not, in fact, accomplished without the delay of a full hour, with the result that the fighting troops were also that much behind their time. The 5th Division was allotted the Roman road, immediately west of the Forest of Mormal; the 14th Brigade formed its rear guard. The 3rd Division was to march west of the 5th Division on two roads as follows :

9th Brigade via Gommegnies (three miles north-east of Le Quesnoy)-Salesches-Vendegies au Bois;

8th Brigade via Wargnies le Petit-Le Quesnoy-Salesches-Viesly .

The 19th Brigade and the Cavalry Division were to move still further west by Villers Pol, Ruesnes, Vertain, Romeries and Solesmes, thus passing a couple of miles west of Le Quesnoy ; their function was to cover the rear and protect the western flank of the II. Corps.

It will be remembered that the 4th Division had been ordered to occupy a position in the vicinity of Solesmes to assist the retirement of the II. Corps, though not actually under its orders. The infantry and such of the artillery of the division as had arrived accordingly marched northward from their detraining stations at 1 A.M. to carry out the role assigned to them.

The main body of the 5th Division moved off at 3 A.M., but the rear guard was obliged to push some way northward towards Bellignies (3 miles north-west of Bavai), to cover the withdrawal of its guns from St. Waast through Bavai : a flank march, though short, across the enemy's front, which the nature of the country made inevitable.

There was a brush with German troops about Breaugies (just south of Bellignies) and a second encounter near Bavai, where the guns of the XV. Brigade R.F.A. came into action with good effect. By 6.30 A.M., just one hour late, the bulk of the rear guard had crossed the road Bavai-Eth, when, dropping into the Roman road, it was no further troubled ; the Germans followed it up at no great distance, but never pressed the pursuit.

Further to the west, the main bodies of the 3rd Division moved off at 5 A.M., the rear guard taking up a line from the Roman road westward through Bermeries to Wargnies le Petit, where its left was in touch with General Allenby's command. The ground on the west flank of the British, over which the Cavalry Division was working, is cut into a series of ridges by four streams, which flow in a north-westerly direction into the Upper Schelde between Bouchain and Cambrai. Across this ground from north-east to south-west runs the straight line of the Bavai-Cambrai road, and from north to south the Valenciennes-Solesmes-Le Cateau road. The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades were extended from Wargnies beyond Jenlain, with the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades to their left rear between Maresches and Préseau, all on the first ridge ; and the 19th Brigade, again to the left rear, on the next ridge between Sepmeries and Quérénaing.

The operations which now ensued on the west flank may be summarised as a running fight during which the Germans closed in, following the II. Corps and Cavalry Division, so that at night their advanced troops were practically in contact with the British.

The 7th Brigade, the rear guard of the 3rd Division, began its retirement upon Le Quesnoy without seeing any sign of the enemy except a few horsemen ; a reconnaissance pushed north-west to Famars, on the outskirts of Valenciennes, could also find nothing of him. On the other hand, bodies of French Territorial troops, belonging to General d'Amade's 84th Territorial Division, originally at Condé, were met retreating southward from Valenciennes, which indicated the evacuation of that town, and the prospect of increasing pressure from the enemy on the west.

Reports from the Flying Corps pointed to the same conclusion : the head of a very large column, apparently a corps (the IV.), had been seen at Quiévrechain (5 miles north-east of Valenciennes) at 7.30 A.M. Another column of cavalry and guns, three miles in length (evidently two regiments, part of the II. Corps), was moving south from Somain (12 miles west of Valenciennes), and its head had reached Bouchain (11 miles south-west of Valenciennes) at 6 A.M. Lastly, between 9 and 10 A.M. the divisional cavalry reported that parties of the enemy, presumably cavalry, were on the road between Haspres and Saulzoir (9 miles south by west of Valenciennes), and that they had passed along the main road from Valenciennes to Cambrai and struck south from the neighbourhood of Denain. The British cavalry was in position, well covered, and just keeping contact with the enemy . but the menace to the western flank of the force and to the retreating French Territorials caused the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades to be sent westwards to Quérénaing and beyond it to Verchain, thus covering the second ridge already referred to. The 1st Cavalry Brigade also moved north of them in the same direction, through Artres (4 miles south of Valenciennes) where it was heavily, though ineffectively, shelled.

At the same time, the 19th Brigade was moved by General Allenby south-west over the third ridge to Haussy in the valley south of it. At Quérénaing French gendarmes reported the information that large German forces were moving south-east from Bouchain, and this news was confirmed by the sound of heavy firing about Avesnes le Sec (8 miles south-east of the last-named village), and only four miles from the 19th Brigade. The 16th Lancers were therefore sent, about noon, to Haspres and Saulzoir to help the French Territorials ; but from Saulzoir they were driven back by artillery fire and withdrew south-eastwards to rejoin the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. Meanwhile, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, left alone in the north, had fallen back southward, not very hard pressed, first to a line between Villers Pol and Le Quesnoy, and then, in succession, to Ruesnes, Capelle sur Ecaillon and Vertain, east of the 19th Brigade.

The troops of the 4th Division had been in position since 5 A.M. immediately to the south of Solesmes : the 11th Brigade on the right, on the spur to the south-east of the town ; the 10th Brigade on the left, near the farm of Fontaine au Tertre (two miles south-west of Solesmes) ; and the 12th Brigade, in reserve, in rear at Viesly. It was of the utmost importance that Solesmes should be strongly held, for upon it the principal highways from the north-east, north and north-west, all converged ; the more so as, soon after noon, a huge mass of British transport was struggling to pass through it by roads which were already seriously congested by crowds of refugees. These, with every kind of vehicle from six-horse farm wagons to perambulators, everywhere delayed the marching troops, and made it impossible for motor cars carrying staff officers to pass the columns.

The further operations of the cavalry had all the characteristics of a prolonged rear-guard action. (General Allenby's opponents on this day, Marwitz's cavalry corps, spent the night of the 24^th/25th :-2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions at Marchiennes (16 miles north of Cambrai and about the same distance from the British flank), and the 4th Cavalry Division at Orchies (4 miles north of Marchiennes). The corps orders for the 25th were for "" an "" overtaking pursuit," and the divisions were given as their respective objectives the three towns lying to the south-west, one behind the other : Le Cateau, Solesmes and Haspres. This line of march brought them in on the flank of the British, but too late to be effective. It is claimed that charges were made against the French Territorials ; but, except for " a street fight " in Haspres, about 3 P.M., "after which the 9th Cavalry Division spent the night there,"' the II. Cavalry Corps, according to the German records, employed only artillery fire against the British. (Poseck, pp.51-55)) Eventually the 1st, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades under increasing shell fire from the enemy, fell back along the third of the ridges between the Selle and the Harpies. The French 84th Territorial Division was found retreating southward across this ridge, and liaison was arranged with it; but at one time the pressure upon the British cavalry seemed so heavy that the 19th Brigade was brought up on to the ridge from Haussy and deployed, in order to relieve it. The Germans, however, were checked with no great difficulty ; the 19th Brigade, between 2 and 3 P.M., then resumed its way southward to Solesmes, while the bulk of the cavalry and horse artillery, having for the time-being shaken off the enemy, was collected and massed to the east of Vertain (3 miles north-east of Solesmes). Here, between 3 and 4 P.M., they were suddenly assailed by a storm of German shells from the north-east as well as from the north ; whereupon the Cavalry Division, being cramped for space, moved across country by brigades and still smaller bodies, after detailing rear guards to cover the passage of the infantry through Vertain and Solesmes. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade drew off south-east, leaving behind the greater part of the 4th Hussars with instructions to gain touch with the I. Corps ; part of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, including its headquarters, took the same route ; the 1st Cavalry Brigade fell back to the high ground immediately south-east of Solesmes; the 4th, with other portions of the Cavalry Division, remained in the vicinity of that town.

Meanwhile, the rear guard of the 3rd Division (7th Brigade) was gradually coming in from Le Quesnoy to Solesmes, and by 5.45 P.M. its head had reached the point where the roads from Romeries, Vertain and Vendegies meet immediately to the north of Solesmes. There the l/Wiltshire and 2/South Lancashire halted and deployed, whilst the 3/Worcestershire occupied a covering position to the south of Solesmes between the10th and 11thBrigades. The 2/Irish Rifles and a section of the 41st Battery, the rear party of the rear guard, having been warned of strong German forces moving on Le Quesnoy, were following the rest of the 7th Brigade slowly on account of the units in front taking every precaution and continually halting ; they were at this time at Pont à Pierres, on the main road, a couple of miles to the north-east of Romeries. The 19th Brigade about the same time was passing west of Solesmes, through St. Python, and beginning to make its way up the Selle valley by Briastre and Neuvilly towards Le Cateau. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, together with the detachments of other mounted troops near Solesmes which had joined it, fell back by St. Python south-west upon Viesly, soon after the Wiltshire and South Lancashire (7th Brigade) had been deployed. By 6 P.M., or soon after, these two battalions were the only troops covering Solesmes, whilst the 4th Division still held its original position on the high ground to the south of that town, with orders from G.H.Q. to cover the retirement of the 3rd Division, Cavalry Division and 19th Brigade.

The stifling heat of the day had about 5 P.M. given place to a thunderstorm; the light therefore began to fail very early and the rain streamed down in torrents. Through this downpour, between 6 and 7 P.M., the remainder of the 3rd Division, drenched to the skin, hungry and weary, marched into their billets on the Le Cateau position : the 8th Brigade to Audencourt and the 9th to Inchy.

The main body of the 5th Division came in earlier, between 3 and 5 P.M., on the right of the 3rd : the 13th Brigade between Le Cateau and Troisvilles, and the 15th, west of it, to Troisvilles. The march along the Roman road had been most trying, for the sun beat fiercely upon the interminable length of the straight, white, dusty road, and under the tall trees of the Forest of Mormal there was not a breath of air to relieve the stifling heat. The 13th Brigade was delayed for some time just outside Le Cateau to allow six regiments and a cyclist battalion of General Sordet' s cavalry corps to pass under the railway bridge on their way westward. As soon as the rear guard, the 14th Brigade, which had been little troubled, came in between 5.30 and 6.30p.M., the D.C.L.I. and half of the East Surrev (The two remaining companies under Major H. S. Tew had been misdirected on the evening of the 24th, and had spent the night at Eth, from which place they marched by Ruesnes, Vertain and Solesmes to Viesly, where they arrived between 5 and 6 P.M.) were sent to the east of Le Cateau to establish connection with the I. Corps, while the Suffolk and the Manchester were diverted a little westward to the other side of the Selle valley astride the Roman road just south of Montay. Here, with two batteries of the XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A., they entrenched in order to keep the Germans at a distance upon that side.

As darkness began to close in, the 7th Brigade, the 4th Division, and half of the Cavalry Division were still engaged, or in position to engage, with the enemy near Solesmes ; the 19th Brigade and the remainder of the Cavalry Division were still far from their halting places for the night ; the 5th Division and part of the 3rd Division had, however, reached their destinations on the Le Cateau position. From front and left flank, the Germans appeared to be closing in, but at a respectful distance without affording the British the satisfaction of seeing the results of their good shooting. It would indeed have alleviated the fatigue of the men, tired out as they were with deployments upon rear-guard positions which were never attacked, had they had more fighting. but the Germans never really came within rifle shot and rarely gave even the guns a target.

The air reports which arrived at G.H.Q. during the day and were summarised in the afternoon gave, correctly, German columns near Bavai and Le Quesnoy, with a third between them (6th, 7th and 5th Divisions), and one entering Valenciennes (8th Division). This information was passed to the two corps and the Cavalry Division. A later summary made up at night showed the first three columns further advanced-the head of one column being half-way between Le Quesnoy and Landrecies, a great collection of troops near Valenciennes (IV. Reserve Corps and 3rd Division) and a western flanking column (cavalry) moving through Orchies, with numerous advanced parties to the south. Some infantry was moving on Solesmes. This very accurate picture does not seem to have been communicated to the corps or divisions, or to the cavalry.