MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER XI - THE RETREAT (continued) - 29TH-31ST AUGUST

 

(Sketches A, 8, 9, 10 & 11 ; Maps 3, 4, 14, 16, 17 & 18)

 

 

29TH AUGUST

 

Except for some minor adjustments to secure the best ground possible, in the course of which the 4th Division had moved back a little to the area Bussy-Sermaize-Chevilly, the morning of the 29th August found the B.E.F. halted in its over-night positions on the Oise. To the right front of the British was the French Fifth Army, and to their left front the newly-formed French Sixth Army, General Maunoury's headquarters being at Montdidier. (At this time, General Maunoury's Army consisted of the VII. Corps (14th Division and 63rd Reserve Division), 55th Reserve Division (just arrived from the Army of Lorraine), the 61st and 62nd Reserve Divisions, " Moroccan infantry brigade, two battalions of Chasseurs Alpins and a Provisional Cavalry Division (General Cornulier-Luciniere) formed from Sordet's cavalry corps, the rest of this corps having gone back to Versailles to refit. The 56th Reserve Division arrived during the evening of the 29th August.) In pursuance of General Joffre's directions, the Fifth Army began the battle of Guise by attacking towards St. Quentin against the German Second Army. (See Note " The Battle of Guise," at end of Chapter.) at the same time the outer wing of the German First Army, swinging south-westwards, was engaged with General Maunoury's Army, and there was fighting at Proyart (10 miles south-west of Péronne) and Rosières (6 miles south of Proyart).

For the British, except the cavalry, much of the 29th was a day of rest, devoted to repairing the wear and tear of the strenuous days through which they had passed.

The enemy was by no means wholly inactive on the British front. At 5 A.M. the 16th Lancers were driven out of Jussy (10 miles south of St. Quentin) on the Crozat canal Jäger and machine guns, (The 5th Cavalry Division is said to have driven off a British brigade supported by artillery (Poseck, p. 74).) but they held their own until the bridge over the canal had been destroyed, when they and the rest of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade fell back slowly to Chauny (6 1/2 miles W S.W. of La Fère). Before 8 A.M. reports came in that German infantry and guns were crossing the Somme at Pargny and Bethencourt well away to the north, (The 18th Division according to Klucks map.) and soon after the 2nd Cavalry Brigade lying north of Smith-Dorrien's divisions was engaged with a force of all arms (This according to Vogel was part of the Guard Cavalry Division of the I. Cavalry Corps which was filling the gap between the First and Second Armies.) advancing from the direction of Ham. The brigade retired with deliberation to Guiscard, which it reached at 11 A.M., and thence went southward. To support it, the 9th Brigade of the 3rd Division took position at Crissolles (3 miles north of Noyon), and the 4th Division sent a battalion to Muirancourt (2 miles north of Crissolles). By 1 P.M. it was apparent that nothing serious was going forward : the general trend of Kluck's Army was still decidedly to the west of south, clear of the British, and Bülow's was engaged with the French. At 4.15 P.M., in accordance with G.H.Q. instructions, General Smith-Dorrien issued orders for a short withdrawal of his force, to bring the whole of it south of the Oise and nearer to the I. Corps. At 6 P.M. the troops began their march : the 3rd Division to Cuts, the 5th to Carlepont, and the 4th to the north of Carlepont, leaving a rear guard of the 10th Brigade north of the Oise. The main bodies of all three divisions reached their destinations between 9 P.M. and midnight. The 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades followed them. Thus by midnight practically the whole of General Smith-Dorrien's force, except the rear guard, had crossed to the south of the Oise, and during the night the engineers of the 5th Division blew up behind it the bridges over the Oise and Oise canal. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, on its right front, billeted for the night at Chauny, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade five miles west of Noyon, at Dives. This south-eastward movement of the II. Corps reduced the gap between it and the I. Corps to seven miles.

Throughout this day the I. Corps enjoyed undisturbed repose. During the afternoon General Joffre visited Sir John French at Compiègne, whither G.H.Q. had moved from Noyon on the 28th. In view of the general situation, he was most anxious that the B.E.F. should remain in line with the French Armies on either flank, so that he could hold the Reims-Amiens line, which passed through La Fère, and attack from it.

Sir John French, however, in view of the exertions of the British Army, and its losses in officers and men, and even more in material, was equally anxious to withdraw and rest it for a few days, in order to make good defects.

He did not consider that it was in condition to attack; but it was not until 9 P.M., when it became known that the left of the French Fifth Army was unable to make progress against the Germans, that he issued orders for further retreat to the line Soissons-Compiegne, behind the Aisne. He also warned Major-General F. S. Robb, the Inspector General of Communications, that he had decided to make " a definite and prolonged retreat due south, passing Paris to the east or west." Air reconnaissances made during the day showed German columns sweeping southwards over the Somme between Ham and Péronne, coming down on the French Sixth Army, and between the Oise and Somme west of Guise; the airmen reported many villages behind the German front in flames. From the French came the information that the forces engaged with the right of the Fifth Army were the Guard, X. and X. Reserve Corps (The German situation at that time was roughly as follows. The Second and First Armies formed a gigantic wedge, of which the apex lay south of Ham : the Second Army, under General von Bülow, extending from Etreaupont on the Oise nearly to Ham, with its front towards south and south-east . the First Army, under General von Kluck. from Ham to Albert, with its front to the south-west. Both of these Armies were already weaker than the German Supreme Command had originally intended. The First Army had been obliged to leave the III. Reserve and IX. Reserve Corps to invest Antwerp ; and upon this day the Guard Reserve Corps of the Second Army, as well as the XI. Corps of the Third Army (relieved by the fall of Namur), after marching back to Aix la Chapelle, began to move by rail to the Russian front. Further, the Second Army had to leave the VII. Reserve Corps and part of the VII.

Corps to invest Maubeuge.) and that the rest of Bülow's Army and part of Kluck's were closing on its left. Without the B.E.F. to fill the gap between his Fifth and Sixth Armies, even if their initial operations had been successful, General Joffre felt that he could not, in view of the general situation, risk fighting on the Reims-Amiens line. His orders for the retirement of the Fifth Army were issued during the night of the 29th/30th, but " owing to an error in transmission," they did not reach General Lanrezac until 6 A.M. on the 30th, and did not begin to take effect until about 8.30 A.M., when, without let or hindrance, the French I. and X. Corps began to withdraw.

 

30TH AUGUST

 

Sir John French had left the time of starting to be settled by his corps commanders. The I. Corps began its march southwards at 3 A.M., covered on the eastern flank by the 5th Cavalry Brigade, and on the western by the 3rd. The day was intensely hot, and in the Forest of St. Gobain the air was stifling. Since crossing the Somme, the British had passed into a rugged country of deep woodlands, steep hills, narrow valleys and dusty roads. Severe gradients and crowds of refugees multiplied checks on the way. Such was the exhaustion of the men that it was necessary to curtail the march, and the 1st Division was halted for the night some eight miles north of Soissons, with its head at Allemant, with the 2nd Division a little to the south-west of it about Pasly. In the evening alarming reports were received by General Haig from the French Fifth Army, by telephone from Laon, stating that a large force of German cavalry was advancing in the direction of Noyon towards the south-west of Laon, that is, between Laon and Soissons. General Lanrezac made repeated appeals to the I. Corps to move out north-eastwards from Soissons to fill the gap and protect the left of his Army. As neither the Cavalry Division nor the I. Corps rear guards had seen or heard of any enemy cavalry in the area mentioned, or east of the Oise, until the evening, when enemy parties were seen on the heights west of Soissons, no attention was paid to the appeals. (" Poseck" shows that the German I. Cavalry Corps reached Noyon on the night of the 30th ; the bridges were down and its two divisions did no more than secure a bridgehead. The II. Cavalry Corps was well west of the I.) There was practically no interference from the enemy on this day. The rear guard of the Cavalry Division was slightly engaged by Uhlans at 8 A.M., and two parties of engineers were fired on whilst engaged in destroying the bridges over the Oise, with the result that the bridge at Bailly was left undemolished. (A second attempt was made to destroy this bridge after dark ; but Major J. B. Barstow and the men of his party were killed by a volley at about fifteen yards' range, fired, according to Vogel, by the cyclists of the Guard Jäger The suspension bridge over the Oise at Pontoise (3 miles south-east of Noyon) in the II. Corps area was not rendered unserviceable at the first attempt to destroy it. About 8 A.M. on the 30th a motor cyclist, Lieut. R. R. F West (Intelligence Corps), brought the officer commanding 59th Field Company R.E. (5th Division) a private note from Major M. P. Buckle, D.S.O., second in command of l/R. West Kent (13th Brigade)-killed in action 27th Oct. 1914-informing him that the bridge was still passable, and asking if anything could be done. Lieut. J. A. C. Pennycuick, R.E., immediately volunteered to return with Lieut. West. The motor bicycle was loaded up with a box of 14 guncotton slabs, and Lieut. Pennycuick sat on top, his pockets filled with fuze, detonators and primers. The two officers then rode back the eight miles, passing first infantry and then through the cavalry rear guard. They c1imbed up, one of the suspension-cables and placed 13 slabs on the cables on top of the pier, the fourteenth falling into the river. The first detonator failed, only powdering the primer ; a second attempt was made and was successful : the top of the pier was blown off and the cables cut, and the bridge crashed down into the river. No enemy appeared during the operation, and the two officers returned safely, after breakfasting at a farm en route. They both received the Distinguished Service Order. Throughout the retreat there was considerable confusion with regard to the responsibility for the demolition of bridges, the full story of which will be found in Major-General Sir R. U. H. Buckland's articles in the " Royal Engineers Journal "1932, " Demolitions at Mons and during the Retreat 1914." Thus, near Guise a French officer had orders to destroy all the bridges, whilst the 3rd Brigade was instructed to allow no one to touch them; near St. Simon the divisional field engineers prepared the bridges for demolition, handed them over to the cavalry, who transferred them to the French. See Chapter XIII with regard to difficulties at Lagny. So far as British responsibility was concerned, each sector of river was divided between the two, and later three, corps. In addition to damaging bridges the R.E. made blocks across the roads at suitable places.)

The II. Corps, together with the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade, the two latter from this day constituted the III. Corps under Lieut.-General W. P.. Pulteney, after a few hours' rest on conclusion of its night march, continued its movement south-east, and halted on the Aisne about Attichy, the 10th Brigade having been skilfully withdrawn without mishap by Br General Haldane from its rear-guard position beyond the Oise. The 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades lay for the night at Vauxaillon, between the 1st and 2nd Divisions, and at Fontenoy on the Aisne, between the I. and II. Corps, respectively . the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were reunited under the hand of the divisional commander, on the left of the Army, round Compiègne. The gap between the two wings of the B.E.F. was now reduced to six miles.

General Lanrezac had little difficulty in carrying out his retirement, though the Germans, apparently emboldened by news from their aviators that the French were withdrawing, looked for a time as if they meant to continue the attack, particularly on his left wing ; but by noon the movement was well under way, and the Germans seemed content to let him go. (The Second Army was given a rest day on the 31st (Bülow, p. 44, Kluck, p. 76).)

General Maunoury's Army had also received orders to retire, and had fallen back, after sharp fighting, from the Avre south-westward to a line from Estrées St. Denis (where his right was within five miles of the British at Compiègne) to Quiry. Kluck had shown signs of a change of direction, for his left or inner wing had wheeled nearly due south, though his right was still, for the present, moving south-west upon Amiens. From the air nothing could be seen of the VII. Corps to the south of Ham, where it was expected (it is now known it was near St. Quentin, the 14th Division having been sent back to help the X. Reserve Corps), and it was surmised that it was concealed ; but the columns of the 6th and 5th Divisions marching south on Roye, and the 7th on Rozières, were observed and reported.

This seemed to indicate, though as yet the movement was too imperfectly developed to make it certain, that Kluck either considered Maunoury's force to be for the moment powerless for any offensive action, or that he believed himself to have gained the position that he desired for the envelopment of the western flank of the Allied Army The British Army he reckoned, as the German official bulletins testify, to have been thoroughly beaten on the 26th and following days ; and, as from a captured letter he heard of Sir John French's anxiety to give it rest, (Kluck, p.81.) his appreciation in this respect was less faulty than it may since have seemed. If Maunoury's force could also be dismissed as negligible, there was nothing to hinder Kluck from wheeling south-east against the open left flank of the French Fifth Army, annihilating it in conjunction with Bülow, and then rolling up the French line from west to east. (Bülow had called upon Kluck for this very purpose. See page) On the morning of the 30th General Joffre, considering that the defence of Amiens and the line of the Somme had ceased to be of any utility in view of the retirement of the left wing, ordered General d'Amade to withdraw his Territorial divisions on Rouen and reconstitute them on the left bank of the Seine. To General Maunoury's enquiry, what would now be his mission and the direction of his retreat, the French Commander-in-Chief replied : " Your general direction of retreat is on Paris. Do not let yourself be caught and held. Take as your first position of retirement the one which you propose," which was Compiègne-St. Just. He placed Sordet's cavalry corps under the Sixth Army. Later in the day General Maunoury reported that on the 31st he proposed to fall back to the line Verberie (on the Oise)-Clermont-Beauvais (35 miles west of Compiègne), which was approved of by G.Q.G..

On a telephone request from General Joffre, conveyed to him before 7 A.M. on the 30th by the French Mission, Sir John French agreed to stay the retreat of his troops and continue to fill the gap between the Fifth and Sixth Armies, of which the B.E.F. was a day's march ahead. In thanking the British Commander-in-Chief for this assistance, General Joffre informed him of the order for retirement behind the Serre (which flows into the Oise at La Fère) which he had given to the Fifth Army, and told him of his further intentions in these terms :

" I have in view the general retirement of the forces, avoiding any decisive action, so as to hold out (durer) as long as possible. But in the course of these movements, it will be of the greatest importance that the British Army keeps in constant liaison with the Fifth Army, so as to be able to profit by favourable opportunities and administer to the enemy another severe lesson like that of yesterday." At noon, however, Sir John French gave Colonel Huguet a message, written by his own hand, to be telegraphed to General Joffre. In this he said that " the new plan of retreat having been explained to me, I consider it absolutely necessary to inform you that the British Army will not be in a state to take its place in the line for ten days. I am short of men and guns to replace losses which I have not been able to ascertain exactly owing to the uninterrupted retreat under the protection of fighting rear guards. You will understand in these circumstances that I cannot comply with your request to fill the gap between the Fifth and Sixth Armies, that is to say, on the line Soissons-Compiègne." (Neither the Field-Marshal nor any of his chief advisers had been near the fighting troops since the 27th, and he seems to have been unaware of the complete recovery of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions from the hard day of Le Cateau. Only the 5th Division had suffered any important loss of guns; the I. Corps had hardly been engaged, and General Haig had indicated its state by his readiness to co-operate with the French at Guise.)

Sir John French proposed to retire " westwards" behind the Seine, to an area just west of Paris ; (Maps of the area from Paris westward to St. Nazaire were ordered by the Sub-Chief of the General Staff to be procured for issue to the troops. See also "" Annals of an Active Life (p. 206), by General Sir Nevil Macready, who was at the time Adjutant-General to the B.E.F.) but it was pointed out to him by the French General Staff that such a march would cross the communications of the Sixth Army. He therefore agreed, at General Joffre's suggestion, to retire in the first instance by the east of Paris, behind the Marne between Meaux and Neuilly, so that, if necessary, he could pursue his retirement westwards by the south of the capital. At the same time, the French Commander-in-Chief informed his Government of Sir John French's state of mind.

At 5.15 P.M. G.H.Q. issued amended orders for the B.E.F. to move south, the I. Corps and 5th Cavalry Brigade to the area about Villers Cotterêts ; the II. Corps, on the west of the I. Corps, to the area Feigneux-Bethisy St. Martin-Crépy en Valois ; the III. Corps further to the north-west, to the area St. Sauveur-Verberie; and the Cavalry Division, most westerly of all, to the line of the Oise beyond Verberie. General Allenby was subsequently informed that, as the French had closed in on the British left, he could use the area between the III. Corps and the river.

 

 

31ST AUGUST

 

On the 31st, which saw the completion of the German victory at Tannenberg, the British accordingly resumed, their march under the same trying conditions of dust, heat and thirst as on the previous day. The I. Corps opened the operations with the passage of the Aisne in two columns, at Soissons and just west of it. The transport was often in difficulties, owing to the steep gradients of the roads to the south of the river, and the scarcity of water everywhere was a great trial to both men and horses. Once again the infantry was wholly untroubled by the enemy the men of the 6th Brigade actually had time for a bathe in the Aisne, and the cavalry rear guards, which covered the march, were never really pressed. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade had to keep some Uhlans at a distance when crossing the Aisne 6 miles west of Soissons at Fontenoy; and heads of German columns were reported at Noyon and south of it on the road to Compiègne. (The German III. Corps crossed the Oise in two columns at Noyon and Ribécourt, and Marwitz's cavalry crossed near Compiègne (see Klucks map).) In this quarter, west of the Oise, the 3rd Hussars (4th Cavalry Brigade) were in touch with hostile patrols from daybreak onward, the enemy's force gradually increasing until it drew the whole regiment into action. The fight was, however, broken off without difficulty, and at noon, the 3rd Hussars retired, having suffered trifling loss and killed a good many troopers of the German 3rd Hussars, divisional cavalry of the German III. Corps, which, by a curious coincidence, were opposed to them.

The heat of the day, the difficulty of the country and the exhaustion of the troops, however, compelled the greater part of the Army to stop short of their intended destinations. The I. Corps halted for the night on the northern, instead of on the western side, of the Forest of Villers Cotterêts, midway between it and the river Aisne : 1st Division around Missy, 2nd Division around Laversine. The left of the French Fifth Army, which was continuing its retreat, was near Vauxaillon, 12 miles to the north.The II. Corps halted at Coyolles, south-west of Villers Cotterêts, and at Crépy en Valois : 5th Division on the east, 3rd Division on the west.

The III. Corps, after a flank march through the Forest of Compiègne, reached its allotted area, at the south-western corner of the forest about Verberie, but at a late hour, some units not taking up their billets before 10 P.M. The corps was separated by a gap of some five miles from the nearest troops of the II. Corps at Crépy, but in touch with the French on its left, some of the Sixth Army troops actually being in Verberie.

The 5th and 3rd Cavalry Brigades halted in the same area as the I. Corps. Of the other brigades, the 4th was with the III. Corps at Verberie, and the 2nd west of it at Chevrières, in touch with the French Sixth Army, which, on this evening, reached the Chevrières-Beauvais line. The 1st Cavalry Brigade and L Battery R.H.A. on the western flank of the Army had moved out soon after dawn on the 31st from Compiègne on the road towards Amiens, and had remained halted for a considerable time, on the watch for German troops advancing in that quarter. Seeing no sign of any, the brigade, after a wide sweep westward, recrossed the Oise to Verberie, and made its way to Nery, there to form a link, though it could not fill up the gap, between the II. and III. Corps. It did not reach its destination until dusk, and L Battery did not join it until half an hour later.

Aerial reconnaissance upon this day confirmed the fact that Kluck had reached the limit of his western advance, and was wheeling south-eastward, covering his southern flank with his cavalry. The columns of the 18th, 6th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 3rd and 4th Divisions marching towards the Oise were reported, the heads of the first three close to it, and at 1 P.M. it was noticed that cavalry was moving south-east from the river at Thourotte, and that the road and railway bridges at Compiègne were blown up. At least two cavalry divisions were known to have reached the Oise during the afternoon of the 31st ; and it appeared that three actually crossed the river between Noyon and Compiègne, two of which were reported to be moving east upon Vauxaillon, while the third was passing through Bailly (8 miles north-east of Compiègne) at 2.30 P.M. (According to Kluck, on the 31st Marwitz's three cavalry divisions (2nd, 4th and 9th) crossed the Oise at Thourotte, and thence marched through the Forest of Laigue to Attichy on the Aisne, but Poseck (p. 76 and map) puts them at night about six miles south of Compiègne. Richthofen's two divisions (Guard and 5th) reached Noyon on the 30th, and moved on the 31st across the British front via Bailly and Ribécourt to Vauxaillon, actually between the British and the left of the French Fifth Army. General Lanrezac's fears of the previous day had materialised, but the German cavalry did not persevere. The two divisions (Guard and 5th) passed the night north of Soissons, and next day remained just north of the town.) The capture of a trooper of the German 8th Hussars, by the 2/Royal Welch Fusiliers after a brush with a German patrol towards dusk to the north-west of Verberie, seemed to indicate the presence of the German 4th Cavalry Division in this quarter. A heavy German column, reckoned to be ten thousand strong, was also reported to have reached Gournay (about eight miles north-west of Compiègne) at 3 P.M., and to be moving south. (These are now known to have been French troops.) A captured order issued to the 8th Division of the German IV . Corps from Beaucourt (14 miles south-east of Amiens) at 6.45 A.M. on the 31st, also revealed the project which was in Kluck's mind at the time. The order gave the information that the French troops (Maunoury's) on the Avre had been defeated on the 29th and had withdrawn; that the British were retreating south-eastward (sic); and that Bülow had defeated at Guise the French Fifth Army, large bodies of which were retiring through La Fère. and it set forth that the task of the German First Army was to cut off the retreat of that Army. It concluded : " Again, therefore, we must call upon the troops for forced marches." (Hauptmann Bloem relates that the three battalion commanders of his regiment made a protest to the regimental commander with regard to the excessive marching and were met by the brief reply ," Sweat saves blood.") However, at the moment, the one thing clear to Sir John French was that the German First Army, which had practically left the British Army alone since the 26th, was again closing in upon it in great force. During the day several telegrams passed between him and the Secretary of State for War and between G.Q.G. and G.H.Q. Lord Kitchener's communications clearly showed the surprise and consternation of the Government at the course which the British Commander-in-Chief was taking in withdrawing the B.E.F. from the fighting line, and their fear of its effect on the French. The latter had replied that he had already been left several times in the lurch by his Allies, that if there was a gap in the line it was their affair, and that the force under his command in its present condition could hardly withstand a strong attack from even one German corps : General Joffre had informed him in writing that, according to reports received, the Germans were withdrawing numerous troops (XI. and Guard Reserve Corps) from France for transfer to the Eastern Front, and that General Lanrezac's attack at Guise on the 29th had been a real check for the German Second Army, as Bülow's delay in the resumption of his advance was demonstrating. General Joffre had further stated that the Fifth and Sixth Armies now had instructions not to yield ground except under pressure; but that they could not of course be expected to stand if there was a gap between them. " I earnestly request " Field-Marshal French," he wrote, " not to withdraw the British Army until we are compelled to give ground, and at least to leave rear guards, so as not to give the enemy the clear impression of a retreat and of a gap between the Fifth and Sixth Armies." In spite of these suggestions and requests, at 8.50 P.M. Sir John French issued orders for the retreat to be continued on the morrow.

 

 

THE BATTLE OF GUISE

 

(Called by the Germans, St. Quentin)

(See the French and German Official Accounts, the two official monographs, " Schlacht bei St. Quentin," I. and II., General Lanrezac's ," Le Plan de Campagne français, and General Rouquerols "" Bataille de Guise".)

 

29TH-30TH AUGUST 1914

 

As early as the 24th August, after the French defeats in the Battles of the Frontier General Joffre had proposed to make a counter-attack " in the centre " with the Fifth Army, ("Joffre et la Marne" p. 64, by Commandant Muller (General Joffre's officier d'ordonnance).) which, owing to the skilful leading of General Lanrezac, was still intact and unshaken. On the night of the 25th/26th, he postponed any action until he ," had constituted on the left by the junction of the Fourth, Fifth and British Armies, and forces drawn from the east, a mass capable of resuming the offensive. It was the intention of General Lanrezac himself to order a counter-attack directly he was clear of the enclosed and broken country of the Avesnes region, in which ", his intact artillery could not effectively support his infantry ". During the 27th his four corps, in line, crossed the Oise and its tributary, the Thon, his right being 25 miles east of Guise, and Valabregues group of two Reserve divisions, on his left, covering the passages near Guise. General Joffre, by telephone message, now urged the Fifth Army to take action, as the ground was suitable, adding, ," you need not pay attention to what the British do on your left."

 

 

For the 28th, therefore, General Lanrezac ordered his corps " to close on the left, so as to face north-west and be in position to attack any enemy columns which cross the Oise. " No sooner had these instructions been issued than he received from G.Q.G. (timed 10.10 P.M., date of receipt not stated), the following order :

"From information received, it appears that parts of the German ¥VII and IX. Corps, forming part of the Second Army, opposed to you, have been left before Maubeuge. [Actually these corps had just been relieved by the VII. Reserve Corps.] It is therefore possible to come to the help of the British Army by acting against the enemy forces [X. Reserve, VII. and half IX. Corps] which are advancing against it west of the Oise. You will in consequence send your left to-morrow between the Oise and St. Quentin to attack any enemy force marching against the British Army."

At 9 A.M. on the 28th General Joffre himself visited General Lanrezac's advanced headquarters at Marle (13 miles south-east of Guise), and gave him the following written order :

," The Fifth Army will attack as soon as possible the enemy forces which advanced yesterday against the British Army. It will cover its right with the minimum of forces, sending reconnaissances to a great distance on that flank."

The Fifth Army, therefore, made some modifications in the destinations allotted to its corps.

Near Guise the Oise, running in a large valley cut into the general plain of northern France, makes a nearly right-angled bend : by Lanrezac's orders, under cover of the X. Corps facing northwards behind the east and west course of the Oise, the III. and XVIII. Corps were to continue the march westwards on the 29th, and, with Valabregues Reserve divisions, cross the lower, north and south reach of the river towards St. Quentin to fall on the flank of the German forces moving west of the river. The I. Corps and 4th Cavalry Division were to follow in reserve, the former well to the south.

On the evening of the 28th the advanced guards of the left wing of the German Second Army (the Guard and X. Corps) gained possession of the bridges of the upper reach of the Oise, General von Bülow being under the impression that he had in front of him there only weak French and British rear guards. His right wing (X. Reserve and VII. Corps) was nearly twenty miles ahead of his left, south of St. Quentin, and aligned facing south-west, abreast of Klucks Army Thus there were two distinct battles on the 29th August, fought on different sides of the Oise.

In the thick mist of the early morning of that day the columns of the French X. Corps moving westwards as covering force, came into collision with the heads of the two German corps pushing southwards uphill from the river to the plateau above, combats taking place in the various villages where the roads, on which both sides were marching, crossed. Thus what had occurred in the original advance of the French Third and Fourth Armies ten days earlier was now reversed, the German columns blundering head, on into the broadside of French columns crossing their front.

The X. Corps, supported as the day went on by the artillery and part of the 5th Division of the III. Corps, and later by the I. Corps, though at first in some difficulty, eventually held its own, and at night the French made a slight general advance, which sent the German Guard and X Corps back towards the Oise, and some portions of them over it : the commander of the Guard Corps being authorized, " after long and earnest discussion, to withdraw behind the Oise." Actually, only Hutier's 1st Guard Division on the eastern flank appears to have recrossed.

 

 

On the western wing, on the other battlefield, the advance of the heads of the French III. and XVIII. Corps and Valabregues Group equally came as a complete surprise to Bülow's scattered right wing, their camp fires of the previous night having been mistaken by the Germans for those of their own left wing. The G.O.C. X. Reserve Corps and five of his staff actually motored up to a village occupied by the French, and were all wounded. Had the British I. Corps been permitted by Sir John French to take part in the battle, if only by fire on the German front whilst the French continued their flank attack, an important defeat might have been administered to the Second Army. In view, however, of the German advance against the French right wing, and the inaction of the British, the movement of the left wing could not be persisted in. At 11 A.M. the G.O.C. III. Corps reported that, his 5th Division having faced north to assist the X. Corps in warding off the flank attack, he had suspended the passage of any more of the 6th Division across the lower reach of the Oise ; and the G.O.C. XVIII. Corps thereupon halted his division, which, after holding on all day, recrossed the river at night, the Reserve divisions having retired a little earlier.

 

 

For the 30th, General Lanrezac ordered his left wing to hold the line of the Oise, whilst the III., I. and X. Corps drove into the river what Germans remained south of the upper reach. In view, however, of the dangerous position of his Army, with both its flanks exposed and no hope of assistance on either side, General Lanrezac telephoned to G.Q.G. for further instructions, pointing out that if he delayed withdrawal his troops ran the risk of being surrounded. In the absence of General Joffre General Belin, his Chief of the Staff, would give no orders ; but at 10 P.M. a ciphered telegram was despatched to General Lanrezac : " The effect of the attack of the Fifth Army having made itself felt and disengaged in part the Sixth Army [in action that day with Kluck], the Fifth Army will take measures to break off the battle and retire behind the Serre. The breaking-off should take place before daylight." Unfortunately, according to the French 0fficial Account, this telegram went astray and the first General Lanrezac heard of its contents was at 7 A.M. on the 30th, when it was sent to him over the telephone.

Fortunately the Germans had received too severe a blow for this curious delay to be of any consequence. Bülow ordered the X. and Guard Corps to renew the attack on the 30th, but General von Emmich, commanding the former refused to advance, fearing that the French were about to fall upon him : it was not until about 2 P.M. that his 19th Division moved, and 4.30 P.M. before the 20th Division did so. It is not clear from German accounts what the Guard Corps did ; but it did not renew the attack, and seems to have taken up a flank position alarmed by the appearance of the French 51st Reserve Division, which had come up from the east to Voulpaix on the right of the Fifth Army.

The corps of the Fifth Army therefore retired practically unnoticed and unhindered. About 1.50 P.M. a German aeroplane discovered that French columns were streaming away. At 3.45 Bülow informed his Army of its victory, and ordered that the enemy should be pursued by "artillery fire and infantry detachments," but that on the 31st the Army would ", halt and rest." In commenting on the order for a rest day instead of a general pursuit, the German official monograph defends Bülow's consideration for his troops, recalling that after the Battle of St. Quentin in January 1871 General von Goeben had not ordered a pursuit. The weather conditions and length of daylight were, however, somewhat dissimilar on tile two occasions.

 

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