MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER XII - THE RETREAT (continued) - 1ST SEPTEMBER

 

NERY, CREPY EN VALOIS AND VILLERS COTTERETS

 

(Sketches A, 9, 10 & 11 ; Maps 4, 19 & 30)

 

 

THE FIGHT AT NERY

 

G.H.Q. operation orders sent out at 8.50 P.M. on the 31st August from Dammartin en Goële gave the information that the enemy appeared to have completed his westerly movement and to be wheeling to the south, and that large columns were advancing in a general south or south-easterly direction on Noyon-Compiègne, covered by at least two cavalry divisions which had reached the Oise that afternoon. The following movements towards the south-west, marches of some ten to fourteen miles, if all divisions reached their destinations on the 31st, were ordered to be carried out next day :

The I. Corps to move to the area La Ferté Milon-Betz.

The II. Corps to Betz-Nanteuil.

The III. Corps to Nanteuil-Baron.

The Cavalry Division to Baron-Mont l'Evêque.

 

 

Special instructions were given that the rear guard of the III. Corps was to reach a line drawn east and west through Néry by 6 A.M. ; but, owing to the lateness of the hour at which many units arrived at their billets, General Pulteney was obliged to represent that this was impossible.

 

 

In obedience to the spirit of the order, however, he reported that the transport of his corps would move off at 1 A.M.

The night passed quietly, with rather less than the usual disturbances and alarms, except those occasioned by the French in and near Verberie disappearing about midnight without a word of explanation. There was no indication that there would be contact with the enemy in the early morning. Several small actions, however, took place on the 1st September. They might be dismissed in a few words, were it not that they show that the British were more than able to hold their own when fortune brought them to grips with the enemy; whilst the practical destruction, with loss of its guns, of the German 4th Cavalry Division had important results on the conditions under which the Battle of the Marne opened a week later.

Dawn broke with dense mist, presaging another day of excessive heat. The 1st Cavalry Brigade and L Battery at Néry, bivouacking between the widely separated 5th and 4th Divisions, had been ordered to be ready to resume their march at 4.30 A.M., but, since it was impossible to see anything two hundred yards away, this was countermanded. The men were busy preparing their breakfasts and watering their horses when, at 5.30 A.M., the mist being as thick as ever, a patrol of the 11th Hussars returned with the report that it had ridden into a body of German cavalry in the fog, and had been hunted back to Néry. Immediately afterwards high-explosive shells burst over the village, and there was a roar of guns, machine guns and rifle fire from the ground, little more than six hundred yards distant, which overlooks the eastern side of the village. The horses of the Bays took fright and galloped down the road to the north. The battery was in mass, with the horses hooked in and poles down ; men and horses began to fall at once under German fire, and the battery commander was knocked over and temporarily disabled whilst hurrying back from brigade headquarters. In his absence, Captain E. K. Bradbury, with the help of the other officers and of such men as were not busy with the horses, unlimbered three guns and man-handled them round to reply to the German batteries which were taking them in flank. One gun was almost instantly put out of action by a direct hit. The other two opened fire, but had hardly done so before the gun under Lieut. J Giffard was silenced, he and every man of his detachment .being killed or wounded.

The remaining two subalterns now joined Captain Bradbury at the third gun, and immediately afterwards Lieut. J. D. Campbell was killed, but the one gun remained in action against the German twelve with good effect. In vain the enemy concentrated his fire on it ; he could not silence it. Meantime, the three cavalry regiments had manned the eastern face of the village, secured the northern and southern exits and opened fire, particularly with their machine guns. The German cavalrymen pushed their way dismounted to within five hundred yards of the village, but no nearer. Towards 6 A.M. Br.-General Briggs, after strengthening his own right, ordered two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, his last remaining reserve, to attack the enemy's right flank. They accordingly galloped northwards and then wheeling to the east, dismounted and pushed in to close range. Whilst the 1st Cavalry Brigade was thus holding the German 4th Cavalry Division, there came a response to Br.-General Briggs's call for assistance. Just as the mist began to thin in the morning sun, the 4th Cavalry Brigade and I Battery arrived on the scene from St. Vaast on the north-west, followed by a composite battalion of the Warwickshire and Dublin Fusiliers of the 10th Brigade from Verberie in the same direction, and the 1/Middlesex from Saintines in the north. Four guns of I Battery unlimbered two thousand yards south-west of the German position. As they did so, the fire of L Battery ceased; and for good reason. For some time its fire had been desultory; Lieut. L. F. H. Mundy had been several times wounded, and man after man was struck down until there only remained Captain Bradbury, who was still untouched, and Sergt. D. Nelson, who had been wounded. Battery-Sergeant-Major G. T. Dorrell then joined them, and at that instant Captain Bradbury, whilst fetching ammunition from a wagon twenty yards off, fell mortally wounded. The survivors continued to fire until the last round was expended, and then, but not till then, L Battery was silent.

I Battery opened fire about 8 A.M. and speedily silenced the German artillery, and the enemy began to draw off. He made an attempt to save his guns, but the teams were caught by I Battery, and the men trying to man-handle the guns back were shot down by machine-gun fire; nevertheless, four out of the twelve were carried off, only, as will be seen, to fall into British hands next day. The l/Middlesex under Major F. G. M. Rowley followed by a squadron of the 11th Hussars charged into the batteries, to find that there was not a live German left near them. The Hussars thereupon pressed on in pursuit for a mile until they were recalled, capturing seventy-eight prisoners belonging to every regiment of the 4th Cavalry Division. By 8.45 A.M. the action was over.

 

 

On the western flank of the force, on the heights near St. Sauveur (3 1/2 miles E.N.E. of Verberie), the 11East Lancashire and l/Hampshire of the 11th Brigade had also been sharply engaged since dawn with German cavalry (2nd Cavalry Division). (Poscek, p. 77.) When the fighting at Néry was over, there was no object in leaving the battalions in an exposed position and they were withdrawn across the ravine of the Autonne through the l/Somerset L.I. and the l/Rifle Brigade, the other battalions of the brigade, which were occupying a position on the high ground at Saintines (2 miles east of Verberie).

There can be no doubt that the 1st Cavalry Brigade was taken by surprise ; but it is not less certain that the German 4th Cavalry Division was equally unaware of the near presence of a British force. Indeed, in an intercepted German wireless message, it was reported that the division had been surprised in its bivouac at Néry and surrounded by considerable hostile forces. Captain Bradbury died very shortly after he was hit, and never received the Victoria Cross which was awarded to him, to his gallant companion, Sergeant Nelson, and to Battery-sergeant-Major Dorrell. The casualties of the 1st Cavalry Brigade did not exceed one hundred and thirty -five officers and men killed and wounded; of these, five officers and forty-nine men belonged to L Battery. Among the killed was Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell of time 5th Dragoon Guards, who had already distinguished himself at Elouges. The German casualties are unknown. They can hardly have been fewer, and were probably more numerous, than the British.

This was the first encounter with the enemy on the 1st September. (A German account of Néry by an officer of the 18th Dragoon Regiment (of the 4th Cavalry Division) has appeared in "" Mecklenburgs Söhne im Weltkriege, Heft 13. He states that the three divisions of Marwitz's cavalry corps were sent forward at 4 A.M. on the 31st to reconnoitre towards Paris, and that his division marched without any halt worth mentioning ; this agrees with the statements of prisoners, who said that they had made a forced march of 26 hours to get to Néry. At dawn the advanced guard reported a British bivouac at Néry, and General von Garnier at first ordered the division to deploy and charge, but, the ground being found unsuitable, this was changed to an attack on foot, which progressed to within 500 yards of the village. British reinforcements then came up and " we held our ground against greatly superior numbers until 2 P.M. (sic). We then had to withdraw or be destroyed. The brigades were therefore directed to get through independently as best they could." Nothing is said about the guns. The Dragoon brigade apparently fled back into the forest of Compiègne. After dark it marched to the south-west (through Baron, according to inhabitants) and hid in the woods 15 miles south-west of Néry for 30 hours. On the 3rd September it escaped via Ermenonville back to Nanteuil. The traces found by the B.E.F. are noticed in the next chapter. According to Poseck, pp. 78, 79, the 4th Cavalry Division at first withdrew eastward, but, hearing the sound of firing at St. Sauveur in the north and at Crépy en Valois to the east (in actions described later in the text), decided that the path to safety lay to the south, and the brigades moved independently in that direction with the hope of concealing themselves in the forest and of doubling back north when the Allies had passed. This they actually accomplished, though at the cost of their remaining guns and of a considerable amount of transport and equipment. The brigades hid, without food or ammunition, in the great woods on either side of Rozières (just north-east of Baron) and saw the British columns march down the main road through Baron. ," On account of want of ammunition an attack of the isolated brigades on the numerically superior infantry columns was not possible." They remained in hiding until the afternoon of the 2nd September. Kluck merely states that after a successful surprise the 4th Cavalry Division became seriously engaged with superior forces, and incurred heavy losses. Kuhl (" Marne," p. 121) says that it suffered so heavily that on the 3rd September it was not reassembled and was not able to advance on the 4th with the rest of the corps. Altogether, the 1st September was decidedly to the disadvantage of the German cavalry, for, as will be seen, the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions were unable to advance, far less pursue as ordered ).

 

THE REAR-GUARD ACTION OF CREPY EN VALOIS

 

 

Further east, about Mermont and the ground north of Crépy en Valois, the outpost line of the 5th Division, held by the 13th Brigade, was attacked at 6 A.M. by mounted troops of the IV. Corps and by Jäger (According to Kluck, the IV. Corps was in action north of Crépy en Valois later in the afternoon and the first contact was with the five Jäger battalions of Marwitz's cavalry corps (Poseck, p. 77).) The pressure did not become serious until 10 A.M., when the 5th Division, which had delayed its march in consequence of the fighting at Néry, began to retire ; it then chiefly affected the West Kent on the left of the line, where the Germans delivered an infantry attack from Bethancourt (4 miles due north of Crépy). The West Kent were supported by a section of the 119th Battery which came into action within one hundred yards of the Aring line, opened at fourteen hundred yards' range and, firing one hundred and fifty rounds in five minutes, brought the Germans to a standstill. By noon the outposts having become rear guard had fallen back to the south of Crépy ; the Germans did not follow except with cavalry patrols, and all trouble ceased on this part of the line. On the right flank, the 2/Duke of Wellington's holding the cross roads at " Raperie " (1 mile N.N.E. of Crépy) were supported by the two remaining batteries of the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. ;

and under cover of these guns Br.-General Cuthbert was able to withdraw his battalions with little difficulty.

 

THE REAR-GUARD ACTIONS OF VILLERS COTTERETS

 

 

Still further to the east, the I. Corps marched at 4 A.M. by two roads through the forest of Villers-Cotterêts, a large area closely planted with trees, in which there was no view or field of fire except on the roads and rides which cross it. The 1st Division from Missy took the Soissons road, which skirts the eastern side of Villers Cotterêts, and turns thence south-eastward on La Ferté Milon.

The 2nd Division, on the west of the 1st, moved by the road which passes through Vivières (Spelt Viviers on some maps.) and Rond de la Reine and the western side of Villers Cotterêts, south-west upon Pisseleux and Boursonne.

The 5th Cavalry Brigade covered the right rear from the region of Montgobert, and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade the left rear from Mortefontaine and Taillefontaine, both outside the forest.

Here again it was the western flank that was first engaged, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade being attacked on reaching Taillefontaine (5 miles N.N.W. of Villers Cotterêts) by a force of all arms advancing from the north. (The advanced guard of the 6th Division.) As the brigade drew back to the north-western corner of the Forest of Villers Cotterêts, the 4th Hussars were continuously engaged until past noon, and lost their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel I. G. Hogg, in the sharp fighting in the woodlands.

A little to the east of Taillefontaine the 4th (Guards) Brigade was covering the retirement of the 2nd Division, with the Irish Guards and 2/Coldstream, under Lieut.Colonel Hon. George Morris of the former regiment, in position between Vivières and Puisieux, and the 2/Grenadiers and 3/Coldstream in second line at Rond de la Reine. About 10 A.M. Colonel Morris's troops were attacked by a force of all arms moving from north-west to south-east. The 9th Battery replied effectively to the German guns, and the firing so far died away that Colonel Morris sent back the 2/ Coldstream with orders to retire to the railway north of Villers Cotterêts, and prepared to follow them with the Irish Guards. Just then, however, he received a verbal order from the brigadier not to fall back too quickly, since it was intended to give the main body of the division a long halt, from 10 A.M. till 1 P.M. The 2/Coldstream, owing to the density of the forest, were already gone past recall, but the Irish Guards stood fast, and, about 10.45 A.M., were again and more seriously attacked. A company of the Grenadiers was sent forward to reinforce them, but before the Irish Guards could be extricated, the Germans opened a direct attack upon the western flank and front of the second line.

This line was drawn up along a grass ride which followed the highest ridge in the forest, and passes from west to east through the open space called Rond de la Reine to another open space, about a mile distant, named Croix de Belle Vue.

The 3/Coldstream were on the west of Rond de la Reine, being widely extended so as to block the numerous rides that run from north to south towards Haramont, and therefore had wide intervals between companies. The 2/Grenadiers were on the right. The Germans soon detected the gaps between the companies of the Coldstream and penetrated between them; but the battalion, though compelled to fall back, did so very slowly, each isolated party fighting vigorously as best it could. The Grenadiers were in like case, and behaved in like manner, and both battalions were still close to their original positions when company by company the Irish Guards at last joined them. Colonel Morris was killed early in this the first serious engagement of his regiment ; Br.-General R. Scott-Kerr was severely wounded while leaving Rond de la Reine, the Germans having brought up a machine gun which raked the broad main ride. Thus there was for a time no one in general command; but the three British battalions were so much intermixed and the fighting in the woods was unavoidably so confused, that little or no control was possible. However, Grenadiers, Coldstream and Irish fought their way back, contesting every inch of ground, to Villers Cotterêts, the 3/Coldstream retiring on their second battalion, which was now on the railway line just to the north of the town, and the remainder further to the east. The 17th Battery was in position north of Villers Cotterêts to support them, but did not fire, the Guards having beaten off their assailants for the present. It was by then about 2 P.M.

Meanwhile the 6th Brigade had been halted about a mile south of Pisseleux, immediately south of Villers Cotterêts, to cover the retreat of the Guards, two companies of the Royal Berkshire being deployed upon either flank of the 9th Battery. The 5th Brigade had been ordered by 2nd Division headquarters to entrench in echelon a little further to the south-west, to serve as a rallying point for both brigades. Through the 5th Brigade the Guards retired, with the 2/ Coldstream as rear guard; the 17th Battery moved with them and unlimbered on the right of the 9th. Towards 4 P.M. the Germans, having apparently moved south-west from Villers Cotterêts, opened heavy rifle fire from the west of the railway, while their artillery engaged the British batteries. These last, after a sharp duel, were ordered to retire ; but the teams of the 17th Battery could not come up until the l/King's had pushed forward to the western side of the railway and effectually checked the advance of the German infantry and artillery. Fighting lasted until 6 P.M., when the King's withdrew, under cover of the 2/Coldstream, and the action came to an end. The number of the enemy engaged was very superior to the British. The fight cost the 4th (Guards) Brigade over three hundred officers and men, and the 6th Brigade one hundred and sixty. Two platoons of the Grenadiers were surrounded and killed at Rond de la Reine, fighting to the last man. Some weeks later it was ascertained from prisoners that the Germans had suffered very heavily in this affair, having lost all sense of direction and fired on each other.

During these clashes of the rear guards, the main body of the British Army tramped on through intense heat until far into the evening. The 1st Division reached its halting place about La Ferté Milon, 16 miles from its starting point, between 7 and 9 P.M. The 2nd Division and the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades arrived at Betz (8 miles west of La Ferté Milon), and the villages to the east of it, after a nineteen-mile march, from one to two hours later. Of the II. Corps, the 3rd Division marched quite untroubled to the villages south-west of Betz, while the 5th Division, with greater precautions, but equally unhindered after the first bickering of the morning, came into Nanteuil (7 miles west of Betz) between 7.30 and 9 P.M.

On the extreme west, after the fight at Néry, the 11th Brigade as we have seen began to withdraw from St. Sauveur, the 12th Brigade at 9.30 A.M. being already in position 6 miles south of St. Sauveur between Mont Cornon and Chamicy. At10A.M. the Germans (The advanced guard of the II. Corps. Kluck says that " the II. Corps, supported by the Cavalry Corps, became involved in heavy fighting for the possession of the important Oise crossings at Verberie and St. Sauveur." The Provisional Division of Sordet's cavalry corps and some battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, the right of General Maunoury's Army which was also falling back, were engaged near Verberie.) attacked the 1/Somerset L.I. and l/Rifle Brigade, which were covering the retirement of the 11th Brigade, but were beaten off with considerable loss, and this ended the British fighting in this quarter for the day. At 11 A.M. the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were sent to take up a line from Mont Cornon north-westwards to Villeneuve, and shortly after noon the 4th Division, passing through them, continued its march southward to Fresnoy, Rozières and Baron, to the west of the 5th Division. The Cavalry Division took up its billets to the west of the 4th Division along the northern edge of the Forest of Ermenonville from Fontaine to Mont l'Evêque. The march, though absolutely unhindered by the enemy, was an anxious one, for there were persistent rumours that German cavalry was in the Forest of Ermenonville (Fugitives of the 4th Cavalry Division were hiding there, as we have seen.) to the south of the British Cavalry Division. When the l/Rifle Brigade entered Rozières at 7 P.M., they found that three hundred Uhlans had just quitted the village in great haste, leaving a machine gun and sundry articles of equipment behind them. ( These troops are now known to have been survivors of Néry. Kluck says that the 4th Cavalry Division "incurred heavy losses at Rozières.) During the 31st August, as already mentioned, several telegrams had passed between the Secretary of State for War and the British Commander-in-Chief. It appeared to the Cabinet that Sir John French had determined to retire so far out of the Allied line that he would frustrate their policy of co-operating closely with the French and rendering them continuous support. The French President and General Joffre also seemed to be under this impression. (According to M. Poincaré's preface to the French edition of Sir George Arthur's "Life of Lord Kitchener," p. ix : Field-Marshal French operated with excessive independence, and strove, above all, to maintain his divisions intact. On Sunday 30th August, General Joffre, uneasy at seeing French hold himself thus aloof, telephoned to M. Millerand, the Minister of War, that he feared the British were not for the moment disposed to fight. . . . Next day, Monday, the Commander-in-Chief of our Armies sent me a liaison officer to beg me to intervene and ensure that Field Marshal French should not carry out his retreat too rapidly, and should make up his mind to contain the enemy who was on the British front." The President then imparted his fears and the request of General Joffre to the British Ambassador, Sir Francis Bertie. About 10 P.M. Sir Francis came to the Elysée with an officer bearing a written answer from the British Commander-in-Chief to Joffre's request " An answer, unfortunately, not very conclusive." (This letter cannot be found in the British records. Sir John French in his ," 1914,' p. 95, merely says, ," I refused."))

As it was difficult to judge of the situation in London, it was decided that Lord Kitchener should himself proceed to France and discuss it verbally with the Commander-in-Chief, so as to ensure that there would be no break-down in the relations between the chiefs of the French and British Armies. Leaving the choice of the meeting place to Sir John French, who fixed the British Embassy at Paris, Lord Kitchener left London at 2 A.M. on the 1st September, crossed the Channel to Havre in a destroyer, arrived in Paris about 3 P.M., met Sir John shortly after, and spent nearly three hours with him.

The result of the interview was recorded in a telegram sent by Lord Kitchener to the Government at 7.30 P.M., before he started on his return journey. It is as follows :

 

" French's troops are now engaged in the fighting line, where he will remain conforming to the movements of the French army, though at the same time acting with caution to avoid being in any way unsupported on his flanks."

In forwarding a copy of this telegram to Sir John French, Lord Kitchener added :

" I feel sure you will agree that the above represents the conclusions we came to ; but, in any case, until I can communicate with you further in answer to anything you may wish to tell me, please consider it as an instruction.

By being , in the fighting line , you of course understand I mean dispositions of your troops in contact with, though possibly behind, the French as they were to-day . of course you will judge as regards their position in this respect."

To this communication Sir John French replied on the 3rd September .

" I fully understand your instructions. . . . I am in full accord with Joffre and the French."

The British Commander-in-Chief, on returning to his headquarters at Dammartin, 20 miles from Paris, at 6.45 P.M., after the interview with Lord Kitchener, found that the day's work had not been unsatisfactory . the enemy had been shaken off after several sharp actions, and the march, though long and exhausting to the men, had finally reunited the British Army for the first time since the I. and II. Corps had been separated on the 25th August. The Cavalry Division was in touch with the French cavalry about Senlis, westwards of which, to a line from Creil to the vicinity of Beauvais, General Maunoury had successfully brought back the French Sixth Army. The left of the French Fifth Army was at Soissons ; as it had retired due south from Guise and the British Expeditionary Force had marched south-west a day ahead, the gap between the two was widening. Owing to the mist, aerial reconnaissance had been difficult until the afternoon, but from 3 P.M. onward the Flying Corps sent in a series of valuable observations, all tending to confirm the previous reports of a general wheel of Kluck's army to the south-east. German troops were thick upon both banks of the Oise from Noyon southward to Verberie ; the greater number were already on the eastern side of the river, and the heads of heavy columns had reached Villers Cotterêts and Crépy en Valois. These seemed to be wheeling to the south. It might be that this was due to the direction taken by the roads at these two points, but it was judged most important to withdraw the British Army out of reach of a night attack.

Soon after midday the corps commanders had been warned by the Chief of the General Staff that the retirement would be continued on the morrow towards the Marne, and roads had been allotted ; but at 7 P.M., on realising that the enemy was so near and in such force, and that some of his cavalry were actually behind the British front, Sir John French decided to continue the retreat earlier than he had intended and all the corps were ordered to get clear by a night march. At the same time, G.H.Q., to which German cavalry escaping from Néry had passed quite close, commenced moving back from Dammartin to Lagny.

 

THE ARMY OF PARIS

 

On the 25th August the Minister of War had given General Joffre an order that, should his forces be compelled to retreat, he should direct an Army of at least three corps on Paris to ensure its protection. On the 1st September the French Commander-in-Chief began to take measures to comply with this order and to reinforce the garrison. Being unable to detail a corps of the Fifth Army as he first proposed, owing to its being nearest the enemy, he directed the Third Army to supply one, and General Sarrail nominated the IV. Corps, which had been heavily engaged in the Ardennes, where its two divisions had suffered disastrous losses in the Battles of Ethe and Virton, respectively. To make up the balance, on the same day Joffre decided to incorporate the Sixth Army (then consisting of the 14th and the 63rd Reserve Divisions, called the VII. Corps, and Lamazes Group of the 55th and 56th Reserve Divisions) in the Garrison of Paris. " He considered that the Reserve divisions which it comprised would be very good behind entrenchments, and might constitute the garrison of the works, whilst the Active corps [actually containing only one Active division !] would furnish the mobile defence and might be called upon to take part in operations." General Gallieni, the Military Governor of Paris, was informed of this increase of his forces by telephone at 6.35 P.M., General Joffre having earlier in the day advised the Government to leave Paris, which they did on the 2nd September.

 

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