Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

 CHAPTER VII - THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU - 26TH AUGUST DAWN TILL NOON

(Sketch 7 ; Maps 3, 10 & 11)

The 26th August, the anniversary of Crécy, dawned hot and misty, with some prospect that the historic weather of A.D. 1346 would bc repeated, and the certainty that in an almost similarly desperate situation, the stout hearts of our island race would again triumph over superiority of numbers, and rob the enemy of what be considered an easy prey.

Although in the first instance it was the intention of G.H.Q. to occupy a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, a subsequent order had directed the retreat to be continued. It was upon the original understanding, however, and in expectation that the I. Corps would be in touch with the right flank of the II. Corps, that the disposition of the troops on the ground was made by General Smith-Dorrien. Officers had been sent ahead to reconnoitre the position, but most of the units did not come on to it until dark, and heavy rain had interfered with the observation of those which reached it earlier in the day. Moreover it was difficult to identify places by the map; for the only one then available was the French uncontoured hachured map of the 1 : 80,000 scale, to which British officers were not accustomed. When the troops stood to arms about 4 A.M. under orders to continue the retreat, there was a heavy ground mist, so that, though the troops were approximately in position, there was little opportunity, or apparent necessity, to rectify the line and choose the best ground to repel a determined attack by superior numbers.

The town of Le Cateau lies deep in the narrow valley of the river Selle, surrounded on all sides by open cultivated country, with never a fence, except in the immediate vicinity of the villages, and hardly a tree, except along the chaussées. The river, though small, is unfordable. The heights on the east, crescent shaped, slightly overlook those on the west, the highest ground of which is roughly a T in plan : the head (the Reumont ridge), running north to south, from Viesly to Reumont, and the stalk (the Le Cateau position or Caudry ridge) east to west from Le Cateau to Crévecoeur. The reverse or south side of the Caudry ridge drops sharply to the Warnelle stream, with higher undulating country behind it, dotted with villages and woods, admirably suited to cover a retirement, once the long slope from the stream up to the edge of the higher ground marked by Montigny and Ligny had been passed. The front or north side is broken by a succession of long spurs running northwards ; the western end drops to the Schelde canal.

Except for this canal with its accompanying stream, and the Selle river with its tributary the Rivierette des Essarts, the country was free for the movement of troops of all arms, and, from its open character, generally suited to defensive action, though there were numerous small valleys up which enterprising and well-trained infantry could approach unseen. Beetroot and clover covered part of the ground, but the other crops had mostly been cut and partly harvested. Here and there were lines of cattle, picketed Flemish fashion, in the forage patches. Crops had been held so sacred at British manoeuvres that there was occasionally hesitation before troops, particularly mounted troops, would move across them.

The town of Le Cateau on the right of the line of the II. Corps was at 4.40 A.M. still full of British transport, though the long columns, after protracted delay owing to the passage of General Sordet's cavalry corps across them, had for hours been pushing south-westwards along the Roman road. The l9th Brigade, placed under the II. Corps by G.H.Q. orders of the previous night, had not yet received any message postponing the retreat, as its headquarters could not be found in the dark ; it was delayed nearly two hours in starting by the congestion in the streets, and had hardly got clear, being the last troops to leave the town, when shortly after 6 A.M. the first German scouts made their appearance in Le Cateau. There was some firing, but the scouts were easily kept at a distance, and the brigade eventually pursued its march to Reumont with hardly a casualty. The 1/D.C.L.I. and half of the 1/East Surrey (l4th Brigade), which had bivouacked on the heights to the east of Le Cateau, and had likewise received no orders to stand fast, were at this time formed up in column of route by the railway bridge near the south-eastern corner of the town, facing west and ready to march off at 6.30 A.M. The remainder of the 14th Brigade had meanwhile occupied a position immediately to the west of Le Cateau : the Suffolk across the centre of the spur, which for convenience may be called the Montay spur, which runs from the Reumont ridge north-eastward to Montay, the remaining one and a half battalions south of them. Next to the 14th Brigade, but separated from it by a small valley between spurs, came the K.O.Y.L.I. of the l3th Brigade, with the XV. Brigade R.F.A. and the 37th Howitzer Battery in close support on the right, and the XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. in close support on the left. West of the K.O.Y.L.I., the Scottish Borderers of the same brigade occupied the next ridge of rising ground ; and west of them again, the l5th Brigade prolonged the line to the road that leads from Troisvilles to Inchy, with the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. in rear of it to the east and south-east of Troisvilles. Of the rest of the artillery of the 5th Division, the 6lst Howitzer Battery and 108th Heavy Battery took up positions of observation about a mile to the north of Reumont, while the 65th Howitzer Battery unlimbered to the south-west of Troisvilles. In reserve near Reumont was the l9th Brigade, as orders to halt there reached it soon after it left Le Cateau.

The battalions of the 14th Brigade which lay west of Le Cateau did not receive their counter-orders to stand fast until about 6 A.M. ; those to the east of the town never received them at all. Hence the 5th Division was in a manner surprised, and compelled to accept battle in positions which were being held with a view to slipping away under cover of rear guards. The Suffolk in particular, who lay immediately to the west of Le Cateau, were badly placed for a general action : there was much dead ground on every side ; the field of fire was for the most part limited and could nowhere be called really good; while small valleys and sunken roads at sundry points gave hostile infantry every opportunity of concealing their approach. The battalion, in common with the other troops of the 5th Division, made shift to throw up such entrenchments as it could with its "grubbers," no better tools being obtainable. The XXVII. R.F.A. had time to dig in its batteries ; the XV. Brigade for the most part had to be content to mask its guns with corn-sheaves.

But the serious difficulties in which the 5th Division became involved during the action of the 26th August arose not so much from the lack of preparation of the position, as from the belief that the I. Corps would be on its right, and hold the high ground east of Le Cateau, whence an enemy could rake a considerable portion of the line. The risk that this ground would fall into German hands had to be accepted by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien when, late indeed but as early as in the circumstances it was possible to come to a decision, he resolved to stand and fight.

Passing to the dispositions of the 3rd Division, the 9th Brigade took up the line from Troisvilles westward to Audencourt. The brigadier, as has been told, had received timely notice of General Smith-Dorrien's intentions and , bringing his battalions early into position, enabled them to improve some mathematically straight trenches which had been hastily begun by French civilians, and to dig themselves fair shelter. The XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. was in close support on the reverse side of the ridge, with two sections dug in on the forward slope, one of the 107th Battery to the right front, and one of the 108th Battery on the left rear of the Lincolnshire, the left of the brigade. About a thousand yards to the south of these batteries was the 65th Howitzer Battery (5th Division), and about five hundred yards to the west of them the 48th Heavy Battery.

Next on the left of the 9th Brigade stood the 8th Brigade, holding Audencourt and the ground thence westward to Caudry. This brigade also was partly dug in, having taken in hand at dawn the work of improving and extending some trenches made by French civilians.

The 7th Brigade occupied Caudry and its vicinity. The right of the position along the ridge to the north-east of the town was held by the 1/Wiltshire ; an enclosure near Point 129, just north of the town, by the 2/South Lancashire and the 56th Field Company R.E. ; and the remainder of the line along the north and north-western outskirts by the 8/Worcestershire. The battalions of the 7th Brigade were very weak, many men having lost their way in the dark during the retirement from Solesmes. The Irish Rifles, indeed, had not yet rejoined, being still at Maurois with the 41st Battery. A divisional reserve was formed of men collected from first line transport, signal sections, etc.

Of the rest of the 3rd Division artillery, the XL. Brigade R.F.A. was in readiness south-west of Audencourt; two batteries of the XLII. Brigade R.F.A. at the north-eastern corner of Caudry ; a section of I Battery R.H.A. (of the Cavalry Division) at the north-western corner; and the XXX. Howitzer Brigade just south of the buildings of Caudry facing north-west. Speaking generally, the 3rd Division was better posted and more fully prepared for action than either the 5th Division on its right or the 4th on its left, having received earlier warning of what was expected of it.

Between Caudry and Fontaine au Pire there was a gap ; this, however, was of no importance, since it could be swept by crossfire from the two villages; and at Fontaine au Pire itself the rear guard of the 11th Brigade was still bickering with the advanced parties of the enemy. Its main body, as already described, was aligned from the east of the " Quarry " south-west towards the Warnelle ravine ; and by this time the King's Own had crossed the ravine from Haucourt, and was halted in mass near the cross roads five hundred yards north-east of Longsart, thus filling the gap between the 11th and 12th Brigades.

In reserve to General Smith-Dorrien's force there were nominally the Cavalry Division and the 19th Brigade; orders were issued for the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades to proceed to Bazuel and Mazinghien (2 miles east by south and 4 miles south-east of Le Cateau respectively), to guard the right flank ; whilst the 1st Cavalry Brigade was to take post at Escaufourt, about four miles south-west of Le Cateau. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, which had moved at midnight to Inchy fell back to Ligny as desired, at dawn. But the orders to the cavalry were for the most part difficult to execute, for only the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades were more or less complete and concentrated, and they were at opposite ends of the line. As it happened, however part of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades, as well as the 3rd Brigade, were in the vicinity of Le Cateau and thus, it was hoped, available to cover the gap between the I. and II. Corps.

Very soon after 6 A.M., while the morning mist was still thick, about a dozen German batteries opened fire from the vicinity of Forest (3 miles N.N.E. of Le Cateau) (These were batteries of the 7th Division.) upon the troops immediately west of Le Cateau, thereby putting a stop to entrenching except so far as it could be carried on by the men lying down, with their " grubbers." The Duke of Cornwall's L.I. and two companies of the East Surrey were, as mentioned, waiting in column of route in Le Cateau, by the railway bridge in the Faubourg de Landrecies when, at 6.30 A.M., exactly the time that they should have moved off, rifle fire was opened upon them from the windows of the neighbouring houses. (The account in the history (pp. 63-72) of the 72nd Regiment, which was concerned, is rather different. As advanced guard of the 8th Division, it started early from Solesmes ; on the ," point " nearing Le Cateau a cavalry officer, sent on ahead, galloped back, wounded in the arm, shouting " the exits are occupied." Pushing on, the leading half-battalion was fired on from houses and the railway embankment. Fire was opened on a train which was leaving the station, which the regiment heard from prisoners contained ," higher Staffs and probably General French." In the course of the battle the 72nd was cut off from its division by the advance of the 7th division into the gap between them.) Several men fell ; but the detachment, under the covering fire of the signal section and some of the headquarters of the 14th Brigade, was rapidly led back through a succession of wire fences to the high ground above the south-eastern corner of Le Cateau. Here the six companies formed a firing line, north and south, athwart the cross roads just to the south of the Faubourg de France. How the Germans had contrived to reach the south-eastern outskirts of Le Cateau without being seen, is unknown ; (The 5th Division had been deprived of its divisional squadron two days before, but still had a cyclist company for patrolling.) but the fact remains that, when the action opened, the Germans were in the town on the flank of the II. Corps, with every prospect of cutting off the detachment of the 14th Brigade which lay on the east of the town, and of pouring through the gap between the I. and II. Corps. They lost no time, in fact, in following up that detachment, which, however, under cover of a counter-attack by the half-battalion of the East Surrey, fell back south-east by successive companies along the road towards Bazuel, repelling simultaneous attacks against its front and its right flank. A mile from Bazuel portions of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, followed by the 5th Lancers of the 3rd with D Battery came to its help; (The 3rd Cavalry Brigade was proceeding to St. Souplet.) with their support the D.C.L.I. and East Surrey soon after 8 A.M. began to move westward to rejoin their brigade. The Germans, favoured by the mist, had by this time worked up the valley of the Selle southward from Le Cateau, for about a mile, with no very clear idea, probably, of what was going forward, when they were caught by the counter-attack on their eastern flank, and retired to the south edge of Le Cateau. (Where they remained until the 7th Division came into action on their left. (G.O.A., i. p. 520.))

Meanwhile fresh German batteries (of the 8th Division.) had opened fire from a concealed position near Rambourlieux Farm (2 miles W N.W. of Le Cateau) against the troops between Le Cateau and the Roman road, now the right of the British line, and practically enfiladed the whole of them with most destructive effect. The British guns replied as well as they could with nothing but the flashes to guide them ; for, though the German aeroplanes were active in this quarter of the field, British machines were not employed in aid of the artillery. The infantry, having no targets as yet, was obliged to endure the bombardment passively, though comparatively early in the day, that is to say, soon after 8 A.M., German skirmishers c1imbed to Point 150 on the summit of the Montay spur, and began firing at the British gunners. Upon these, and also upon a concealed German machine gun on the Cambrai road the left company of the Suffolk opened fire; but there was some doubt as to the situation, for it never occurred to any of the officers that the high ground immediately to the east and west of Le Cateau would be left open for occupation by the enemy. Of the fight that was going forward in the valley of the Selle they could see nothing nor, in the roar of the battle, hear anything.

The D.C.L.I. and the East Surrey were, as a matter of fact, progressing slowly but steadily westward in spite of considerable opposition ; although two companies of the former became separated from the rest of the detachment and losing touch turned to the south-west upon St. Benin.

Some confusion was caused during the movement by the presence of Germans dressed in what appeared to be khaki, (Probably Jager, who wore a uniform of greenish-grey hue, and shakoes, not spiked helmets.) which more than once misled the battalions as to the action they should take in order to rejoin their division. However, D Battery and the southern half-battalion of the D.C.L.I. succeeded in enfilading the German troops in the valley, and the enemy withdrew to the eastward, to all appearances pretty severely punished. The greater number of the D.C.L.I. and East Surrey then moved south-west on Escaufourt, though one party, while still 500 yards short of St. Benin, turned westward, and made for Reumont, where 5th Division headquarters were established. The bulk of the D.C.L.I. arrived at Escaufourt between 11 A.M. and noon, and found that they had cut their way through the Germans at the comparatively small cost of two hundred casualties, and this number in the course of the following days was reduced to one-half by the return of missing men. The half-battalion of the East Surrey made its way to Maurois, beyond Reumont and the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Brigades retired with great deliberation due south up the valley towards St. Souplet. The first turning movement of the Germans on the eastern flank-attempted, it is true, in no great strength-had thus been foiled.

During this period the troubles of the troops immediately to the west of Le Cateau were increasing. About 10 A.M. the Germans brought guns up to the summit of the heights east of the town, and the devoted batteries and battalions of the 5th Division on the high ground between the town and the Roman road, were now enfiladed from both flanks. The 11th Battery man-handled two guns round to the east and replied effectively to the German fire ; but the concentration of a superior number of German guns, probably the artillery of the 7th and 8th Divisions, and very soon of the 5th Division also, upon the exposed batteries of the XV. and XXVIII. Brigades R.F.A. caused considerable losses : salvos of shells crashed down on gun after gun in succession, but the gunners stood to their work, and the supply of ammunition never failed.

The Suffolk and K.O.Y L.I., the front line of the 14th and 13th Brigades, were also assailed by an unceasing storm of shrapnel and high-explosive shell, but vied with the artillery in steadiness. At 9.45 A.M. the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, of the 19th Brigade, who had been ordered forward from Reumont, arrived on the right rear of the Suffolk ; two companies dug themselves such cover as they were able with their " grubbers " on the ridge, while the rest remained in the hollow to the west of them. About 10 A.M. the firing line at last had a target, as German battalions began to advance in thick masses along a front of over two miles from the valley of the Selle to Rambourlieux Farm. (This was the attack of the 7th Division with the 14th Brigade on both sides of the Forest-Le Cateau road and 13th Brigade on both sides of the Forest-Montay road (see Lohrisch). The orders of the 14th Brigade were to envelop the British right. ", Regt. No. 66 " (1930 edition), p. 25.) The 11th Battery, man-handling a second section round to the right, fired upon them in the valley at point-blank range with great execution. Before long, every officer of this battery had fallen, and so many men that only enough were left to work a single gun. But that single gun never ceased firing ; and the other batteries, nearly all of which had suffered heavily, showed the like indomitable spirit. From Reumont also the 108th Heavy Battery burst its sixty-pounder shells among the hostile infantry with beautiful precision, tearing great gaps in their swarming ranks and strewing the ground with killed and wounded.

But losses did not stop the German infantry of 1914. The gaps were instantly filled, and the advance of the enemy in the valley, though retarded, was not brought to a standstill. Parties reached a little copse upon Montay spur, and strove to enfilade the Suffolk from the north ;

but they were checked mainly by a machine gun of the K.O.Y L.I. posted on the Roman road. Further to the west, the Germans made less progress. From the region of Rambourlieux Farm, profiting by past experience, they came forward in small bodies, at wide intervals, and taking cover behind the corn-stooks which covered the fields ; but, though they attacked again and again, they were driven back by the shrapnel of the artillery. In the zone allotted to the 37th and 52nd Batteries and the XXVIII. Brigade R.F.A. the Germans came on in close formation, and suffered very heavily. The first target of the 122nd Battery was a platoon in line, with the men shoulder to shoulder, which emerged from a fold in time ground. The battery commander gave the order " one round gun fire," and every man of the Germans fell. At each subsequent effort of the enemy in this direction, much the same scene was repeated and each gathering line of Germans was laid low.

Nevertheless, though the machine gun of the K.O.Y L.I. checked every attempt of the enemy to approach the Suffolk in force, it was possible for small parties of Germans to creep up into a cutting on the Cambrai road on their flank, and to enfilade them both with rifles and machine guns. Every attempt of these parties to build up a firing line in advance of the cutting was, however, foiled by the steady marksmanship of the Suffolk and by the shells of the 52nd Battery. The left company of this battalion had besides a very fair field of fire over the ground to the north-east, and forbade any hostile progress in that quarter. But the German machine guns could be neither discovered nor silenced ; and the Suffolk, except on their extreme left, which was protected by a sunken road, were falling fast under their fire. Lieut.-Colonel H. L. James of the Manchester had already pushed forward one company and a machine gun to the right rear of the Suffolk, prolonging their line to the south ; shortly after 11 A.M., judging the position to be critical, and being unable to find the brigadier, he ordered two more companies of his battalion to advance and reinforce the Suffolk. At the same time, he called upon the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and l/Middlesex, of the 19th Brigade, to support him.

The two companies of the Manchester accordingly moved forward under fire of artillery, rifles and machine guns, but, in spite of more than one check, succeeded in reaching the trenches of the Suffolk. The left company seems to have suffered less than the other, and on reaching the left company of the Suffolk found that it was not needed. The remainder, who bore more to the right, were thrown back more than once; eventually, however, a portion reached the right centre of the firing line. Ammunition for the Suffolk machine guns began to fail at this point ; it was vital to replenish it before the enemy could further develop his attack from the east. Major E. C. Doughty, who had succeeded to the command of the battalion upon the fall of Lieut.-Colonel C. A. H. Brett early in the day, with a small party managed to bring up a few bandoliers, but he fell desperately wounded at the moment of his arrival. Meanwhile, two half-companies of the Highlanders from the low ground, once again facing a storm of fire, rushed through the wreck of the 11th Battery into the right section of the trenches of the Suffolk and, though at heavy loss, brought them at least some assistance. It was about noon. Two German guns, reported to be " heavy," (Probably 4-2-inch field howitzers with telescopic trails, enabling them to be used for direct fire. Heavy howitzers (each German corps took into the field 4 batteries, each of four 5-9 howitzers) were brought up on other parts of the field against Caudry (" Regt. No. 153," p. 54) and against Troisville and Audencourt (" Regt. No. 93," p. 44).) now reached the summit of the Montay spur and opened fire at close range. The last gun of the 11th Battery was silenced, and the Suffolk and Manchester, together with their reinforcement of Highlanders, were in a worse plight than ever. Nevertheless, after nearly six hours of incessant fire, the troops on the right of the British line, which rested on Le Cateau, still stood firm. The German infantry w as steadily increasing in numbers on their front and, despite all efforts, was drawing steadily nearer; their right flank was open; they were searched with fire from front and right and left; strong columns, betokening the approach of the German III. Corps, were closing in upon the right flank. It mattered not : they had been ordered to stand. The I. Corps, for whose coming they waited, might be late, as Blücher had been at Waterloo ; but, until it should come, there must be no giving way. Nor did they yield the ground until the divisional orders for retirement reached them some hours later.

On the left of the K.O.Y L.I. the 2/Scottish Borderers . (13th Brigade) and the Bedfordshire and Dorsetshire (15th Brigade) were for the present hardly engaged. They saw nothing of the enemy but distant columns advancing upon Inchy from the north-east, which were observed to be caught by shell fire and forced to deploy. With the 9th Brigade, on the left again, the situation was nearly similar.

The German guns (Probably of the 4th Cavalry Division.) opened upon it soon after 6 A.M. before the men had completed the trenches begun overnight, but with so little effect that they were able to continue digging themselves in and, thus sheltered, suffered trifling loss. There was no sign of any infantry attack, no rifle fire, indeed, except that of a few skirmishers with here and there a machine gun, and it was pretty evident that the enemy had no idea for the present of any attack upon this portion of the line. On the other hand, German troops, (The 4th Cavalry Division. (Poseck, p. 63.)) working up the valley from Bethencourt and from the wood just to the east of it towards Inchy, were heavily shelled by the guns of the 6th Battery and of the XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. Some small parties, nevertheless, contrived to make their way into Beaumont and Inchy, only to be greeted by the lyddite shells of the 65th Howitzer Battery. all their efforts to build up a firing line in front of these twin villages were foiled by the deadly marksmanship of the British.

Against the line of the 8th Brigade around Audencourt the German guns came into action rather later than against the 9th Brigade; but the German infantry showed itself almost immediately afterwards, trickling down in thin lines towards the Cambrai road, with its machine guns clearly visible. Its advance was, however, cautious, and three British platoons which had been pushed out to the north of the Cambrai road were able to rejoin the brigade without being seriously pressed. It was not until about 9 A.M. that first the 4/Middlesex to the east of Audencourt, and later the machine guns of the Royal Scots, in the country road just to the north of it, opened fire upon parties of Germans which had crossed the Cambrai road. Even then the engagement in this quarter throughout the forenoon was no more than desultory. The headquarters of the brigade and the whole of its transport were in Audencourt itself, and there seemed no immediate menace to their security. Masses of German infantry were indeed assembling upon the Cambrai road under a devastating fire from the British artillery ; but the 8th and 9th Brigades had a good field of fire, and there was little temptation to the enemy to waste strength in attacking them, when immediately to their left lay Caudry, forming a decided salient in the British line.

Upon Caudry the German shells fell very heavily from an early hour, and bullets were whistling down the streets even before the fall of the shells. Up to 6 A.M. and even later the units of the 7th Brigade were still under the impression that the retreat would be resumed; but the enemy's movements soon banished any such idea; for about7 A.M. the German riflemen (The 9th Cavalry Division and three Jager battalions. (Poseck, p. 59.)) moved against both flanks of the village with vigour, pouring a very heavy fire in particular upon the Worcestershire on the left. So pertinacious was the onset that reinforcements were summoned from the 8th Brigade ; in consequence about 8.30 A.M. two weak companies of the Royal Irish came up and took post in a railway cutting which skirts the eastern flank of the village. Half an hour later, at 9 A.M., the Irish Rifles and the 41st Battery ended their wanderings of the night by rejoining the brigade. The battalion entrenched itself about a thousand yards south of Caudry near Tronquoy, while the guns unlimbered to its right rear. Thus until noon the 7th Brigade contained the Germans without difficulty, so that they gained little or

no ground ; it seemed probable that here, as on the rest of the British centre, they were husbanding their strength until their main effort against both flanks of the British should produce its effect.

On the left wing, in the 4th Division, no orders had been issued for the retirement to be continued; those sent out on the previous evening to occupy the Haucourt position still held good and were confirmed as soon as General Smith-Dorrien's message reached divisional headquarters at 5 A.M. But, as on the right, the general action opened with misfortune for the British. Until 6 A.M., or thereabouts, the rear guard of the 11th Brigade on the right of the division continued exchanging shots with the enemy to the north of Fontaine au Pire, when it gradually withdrew, the l/Rifle Brigade coming in last of all and taking position in the hollow road which runs southward from Beauvois to Ligny. A platoon of Jager, which was imprudent enough to advance in pursuit through Fontaine au Pire, was annihilated by the accurate fire of a detachment of the l/Hampshire. After that the enemy made no further attempt to follow up the 11th Brigade. (This enemy was the 2nd Cavalry Division, with two Jager battalions, (Poseck, p. 55.)) Meanwhile, in the 12th Brigade, which was on the left of the 11th, the Lancashire Fusiliers and two companies of the Essex Regiment had from 4 A.M. onwards been preparing a position near Longsart and doing what digging was possible with their " grubbers." The King's Own had been delayed on the march, but towards 5 A.M. were seen approaching over the hill from Haucourt.

French cavalry patrols, as already related, had been understood to report the front to be clear . and the 4th Division had no divisional cavalry or cyclists to verify the French observations. Suddenly, shortly after 6 A.M., two French troopers riding towards Cattenieres were seen to turn and gallop at top speed to the south-west ; immediately afterwards devastating fire of machine guns, after opening on the outpost at the railway crossing north of Wambaix, swept down upon the King's Own. The battalion on arrival on the right of the brigade had halted in quarter-column that is, the companies were in line one behind the other at six paces distance-arms had been piled, the officers had fallen out and were in a group on the right front ; some of them and most of the men had lain down. At the moment that fire was opened, the rear company was moving off to the left to extend the line ; it was caught, as were most of the men of other companies who were standing up, and Lieut.Colonel A. M. Dykes was killed. The regimental transport, which was just arriving with rations, turned and stampeded, knocking over the brigadier and his brigade-major. The companies were at once ordered to lie down and all men who could safely use their rifles opened fire at about eight hundred yards range upon the German machine guns, with immediate effect. Five minutes later, however, two or three German batteries came into the open between Wambaix and Cattenieres railway station, unlimbered, and speedily picking up the range, poured upon the unlucky King's Own a storm of shells, which thinned their already depleted ranks still further. Two companies of the Warwickshire from the reserve, by direction of a staff officer, swarmed up the hill to extricate them, but were swept back upon reaching the crest with very heavy loss. For some twenty minutes this storm of shells burst over the King's Own, after which the fire of guns and machine guns slackened, and the survivors of the battalion moved away to their right into the shelter of a country lane, running east and west, from which they opened fire with such effect that the machine guns were smothered. A few men from the rear of the mass, who had sought shelter in the ravine, rallied and rejoined their comrades ; and the King's Own, though reduced by some four hundred casualties, recovered themselves with commendable rapidity.

The Germans then turned their fire upon portions of the right wing of the Lancashire Fusiliers, to the west of the King's Own; and soon German mounted men came out into the open, only to give place to a considerable body of infantry (Dismounted men of the 2nd Cavalry Division and Jager. (Poseck, p.56.)) in the space between Wambaix and Cattenieres. The Lancashire Fusiliers brought their two machine guns into action, and though one of these became jammed at once, the other did good execution. But the enemy, having a far greater number of machine guns, it was estimated that they had twenty-three in this quarter of the field alone at this time (Twenty-one, according to Poseck, p. 56 : the guns of the 4th M.G. Abteilung and two Jager battalions.), and being consequently able to use them with greater freedom, now crept away to the left flank of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and enfiladed them with deadly effect. Two companies of Inniskilling Fusiliers had already come up from Longsart to prolong the line of the Lancashire Fusiliers, one upon the eastern and the other upon the western flank; but the latter was at once engaged with German dismounted cavalry. There were signs also of the development of a hostile attack upon the front and western flank of Esnes, where the two remaining companies of the Inniskilling Fusiliers were already disposed for defence. Against them, across a cornfield that had recently been cut, advanced the 7th Jager, in open order, apparently without any suspicion that a foe was near. As soon as the Inniskillings opened fire the Germans took cover behind the corn-stooks. These availed them little, and after a time they ran back, leaving forty-seven dead in front of one of the companies when its commander in the lull that ensued went out to count them. Thus for at least an hour and a half the 12th Brigade held its own against the 2nd Cavalry Division and two Jager battalions, backed by artillery and numerous machine guns.

At length about 8.45 A.M. the German progress towards Wambaix, round the left flank of the advanced line, had gone so far that a retirement seemed to Br.-General H. F . M. Wilson imperative. The King's Own on the right were the first to be sent to the south side of the Warnelle ravine ; to cover this movement, two companies of the Warwickshire (10th Brigade) were ordered to deliver a counter-attack from Haucourt upon the ridge to the north of Longsart. The l/Hampshire, of the 11th Brigade, pushed forward two platoons to protect the Warwickshire's right flank, whereupon a German battery moved up and unlimbered close to the railway station just south of Cattenieres. The Hampshire men, after taking the range, opened rapid fire at a thousand and fifty yards, and within a minute the battery turned and galloped away to seek shelter. This little incident, though a triumph for British musketry, could not of course affect the main issue. The Warwickshire again reached the crest of the ridge, and so gained some little respite for the King's Own, but they suffered severely from the fire of artillery and machine guns and were forced to fall back. The Lancashire Fusiliers, covered by the fire of two companies of the Essex on the Haucourt-Esnes road, were the last to go ; not without difficulty, for the Germans were within three hundred yards of them. They rallied on the ridge to the south. The company of the Essex on their immediate left had retired a little earlier . but that of the Inniskillings on the right withdrew with them, with the exception of the left platoon, which remained where it had fought, amid a circle of German dead, with not a single man unwounded. The withdrawal of the 12th Brigade across the valley to the line Ligny-Esnes was now practically accomplished.

Meanwhile, the artillery of the 4th Division had come into action. At 5.30 A.M., immediately on the issue of the divisional operation orders sent out on receipt of General Smith-Dorrien's message, the C.R.A., Br.-General G. F. Milne, ordered his brigades to reconnoitre positions : the XXXVII. (Howitzer) and XXXII. Brigades R.F.A. to the east of the Iris stream, and the XIV. and XXIX. to the west of it ; the two last at once to take up positions of readiness south-east of Esnes. Shortly afterwards, they came into action : the XXXII. and XXIX. Brigades detailed to co-operate with the 11th Brigade, and the XIV. with the 12th Brigade.

The XXXII. Brigade was brought into action as rapidly as possible, as the 11th Brigade was asking for artillery support to divert from it some of the German gun fire to which it was being subjected. The 27th Battery un1imbered in the open to the west of Ligny, the 134th in a covered position on higher ground immediately to the south-west of the village, with the 135th, also under cover, to the left rear of the 27th.

The XXIX. Brigade took up its position south-east of Haucourt. Of the XIV., the 68th Battery came into action at once just south-west of the village, the 39th three-quarters of a mile in rear, with the 88th in the valley-head to the east of St. Aubert Farm. The XXXVII. (Howitzer) unlimbered in the Iris valley, but did not open fire from this position. The heavy battery, as already noted, was not present.

The fire of the XIV Brigade gained time for the 12th Brigade to rally ; and then the enemy came on, against the Lancashire Fusiliers, just as the British would have desired, in bunches, firing from the hip. A burst of rapid fire from a hastily formed line speedily brought the advance to a standstill, and the Lancashire Fusiliers took advantage of the lull to re-form on a better position a short distance in rear. The German artillery now redoubled its fire ; but between 9.30 and 10 A.M. the worst of the surprise attack was over, and Br.-General Wilson was able to reconstitute his line along a front from Ligny through Haucourt to Esnes, already occupied by part of the 10th Brigade. Br.-General J. A. L. Haldane, warned to secure the left flank of the division, indeed of the whole B.E.F., moved the R. Irish Fusiliers to a ridge south-east of Esnes, marked by St. Aubert Farm and Point 137, and later despatched the Seaforth to take a position in echelon to the Fusiliers. On this ridge the new position of the two brigades assumed the shape almost of a semicircle, with its convex side to the enemy. The units were very much mixed, and it is impossible to say precisely where parts of them were placed.

By 11 A.M. the firing in this quarter of the field had died down. The German attack, delivered by a force of cavalry and Jager, with a very powerful backing of artillery, had been repulsed, although the 12th Brigade had been forced back to the south side of the Warnelle ravine, and had suffered heavy casualties, chiefly owing to the mishap to the King's Own. The cavalry and the cyclists of the 4th Division, had they been available, would undoubtedly have prevented this surprise. Even as things were, the division had succeeded in holding its own. Moreover, if the Germans hoped to pin it to its ground, they had failed; for there was nothing now to prevent the 4th Division from continuing its retirement if it so desired.

During this period the 11th Brigade became isolated to a certain extent, on its left owing to the retirement of the 12th Brigade and, on its right, by the distance which separated it from the 7th Brigade ; but it held on with the greatest tenacity. Its position, it may be recalled, was on the Caudry plateau to the north of the Warnelle ravine, astride the " Quarry " knoll and extending thence south-west across the railway to the edge of the plateau, its general front being towards the north-west. Before part of this front, notably on the northern slope of the " Quarry" knoll, there was a natural glacis, but further to the west the field of fire was bad. The enemy, of course, avoided the glacis, and preferred to work round both flanks of the brigade and attack along the line of the railway from the west and from the southern margin of Fontaine au Pire from the north-east. But though the Germans brought up battery after battery, until the line of their guns extended from Wambaix to the north of Fontaine, (The artillery of the IV. Reserve Corps was sent up ahead of its infantry, and the whole of its batteries came into action between 11.10 and 11.30 A.M. to assist the Cavalry Corps. ("'Res. F.A. Regt. No. 7," p.28.)) and swept the plateau with them and with machine guns, the bombardment was not followed by the advance of infantry in large bodies. After a time the East Lancashire were compelled to retire from the northern slope of the " Quarry " to a sunken road upon the southern slope, and there they remained. The Rifle Brigade and two companies of the Somerset Light Infantry, on the right of the East Lancashire, also held their ground, though heavily shelled. They were rewarded occasionally by the sight of German infantry striving to advance over the stubble, and seized every opportunity of cutting them down by rapid fire.

More than once small parties of the 11th Brigade were forced out of the more exposed positions by the rain of shrapnel ; but they always reoccupied them, or were replaced by supports from the Warnelle ravine. Once the Hampshire, on the left of the line, essayed a counterattack, but it proved too costly The Germans dealt with it by fire, and then waited; they had an overwhelming force of artillery ; they had brought forward their machine guns with much skill ; and they might reasonably reckon that the 11th Brigade would soon retire and abandon the position without bitter fighting, or, better still, cling to it too long, and be surrounded. Here, therefore, as on the remainder of the left wing, there was a deadlock.

So far General Smith-Dorrien had held his ground successfully for some six hours ; and, except immediately west of Le Cateau, his line was not only unbroken but unshaken. Even there the enemy had not immediately pressed home the advantages which he had gained. But the situation was rapidly growing more serious. To that critical point we must now return.