MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER VIII - THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU, 26th AUGUST (continued) - FROM NOON TILL 5 P.M.

 

(Sketch 7 , Maps 3,10 & 11)

 

 

Shortly after noon the situation of the Suffolk and of the batteries supporting them, on the right of the line, became serious under the German enfilade fire. The 108th Heavy Battery, in action well behind the right flank, had silenced one troublesome group of guns near Croix; but, despite this piece of good shooting, the hostile artillery still far outmatched the British. (Apparently the greater part of the artillery of the German 5th and 7th Divisions was in action against the 5th Division. "" F.A. Regt. No. 18 " (5th Division), p. 21, states that the division deployed for action about 11 A.M. and one of its artillery brigades ," had to be given up to the IV. Corps, which was engaged in a hard fight, whilst one battery of the other brigade was attached to the 6th Division. The regimental commander was wounded. ," Regt. No. 26 (7th Division), pp. 57-8, gives the interesting information that the artillery of the 5th Division about 12.25 P.M. fired on one of its own battalions and on other infantry of the IV. Corps because ," troops of the III. Corps put up artillery screens, painted black-white-red , on the rear side in order to make clear their position to the artillery. As our corps did not show their screens, the III. Corps artillery believed it had the enemy in front of it. The fire received was " heavy and loss, bringing." The regiment was also fired on by its own corps artillery, which did not suppose the attackers had got so far forward.") Reserves there were none, except the four battalions of the 19th Brigade ; of these the Cameronians and Royal Welch Fusiliers, in view of the enemy's movement on Ligny, had at 10 A.M. been moved away westwards to Montigny, behind the left flank of the II. Corps ; a part of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had already been thrown into the fight ; and only the remainder of this battalion, together with the l/Middlesex, was available on the right. By the orders of Major-General L. G. Drummond, commanding the brigade, two half-companies of the Argylls, with the battalion machine guns, were now sent up the track which ran over the ridge to the right rear of the Suffolk ; and the l/Middlesex moved forward into position upon the right of the Highlanders. The only reassuring feature in the situation of the 5th Division was that the Germans were not pushing their way up the valley of the Selle past the right flank of the 14th Brigade with the rapidity and vigour that might have been expected. Whether the German III. Corps had been slow in following its advanced troops, or, as it came upon the field, had been diverted from Le Cateau westward, in support of the frontal attack on the 14th and 13th Brigades, was unknown. In any case, the detachment of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, seeing no German troops in the valley, turned its machine guns at long range on to the ridge east of Le Cateau. This drew the fire of the German artillery, which put both the machine guns out of action. But, at the moment, the danger lay not in the east but in the north. About noon, General Smith-Dorrien again visited 5th Division headquarters, and discussed with Sir Charles Fergusson the question of holding on or retiring. As the Germans were so near, it was thought that a counter-attack would be necessary to disengage, and the decision to retire was, temporarily, postponed.

 

 

Shortly before 1 P.M., Sir Charles Fergusson from his lookout in Reumont village could see that the right of his division was shaken and might shortly give way, and he reported in that sense to corps headquarters. A little later he added that a German division (This was thought to be the head of the 5th Division of the III. Corps, but must have been the 165th Regiment of the 7th Division (in the same brigade as the 27th). This regiment went over the high ground east of Le Cateau, deployed south of the Le Cateau-Maubeuge railway and then, about 4 P.M., turned towards Honnechy, which it reached as the last British were leaving the village.) was working round his right from Bazuel. Finally at 1.20 P.M. he suggested that unless material assistance could be sent to him he had better begin retiring. It seems to have been about this time, during a lull in the German fire, that the teams of the 11th Battery came up to the guns, and got five of them away, that of the sixth being shot down. The teams of the 80th and 37th Batteries also came forward, and brought away five of the guns and four of the howitzers ; another howitzer as will be seen was recovered later on. But these three batteries were saved at the cost of the teams of the 52nd, whose guns had consequently to be abandoned. The gunners of this battery were ordered to retire, but a few remained and managed to keep one gun in action. Somewhat later, the teams of the 122nd Battery galloped up through the line of the West Kent, in brigade reserve, who stood up and cheered them loudly as they dashed between their trenches and onward down the slope towards their guns. As they came within view of the enemy, they were struck by a hurricane of shrapnel and of bullets from the machine guns in the Cambrai road ; but still they went on. The officer in charge of the teams was killed, and one team shot down in a heap before the position was reached ; but two guns of the 122nd Battery were carried off without mishap. A third was 1imbered up, but the horses went down instantly. It was an extraordinary sight : a short wild scene of galloping and falling horses, and then four guns standing derelict, a few 1imbers lying about, one on the skyline with its pole vertical, and dead men and dead horses everywhere. It was then decided to abandon the remaining guns, as also those of the 124th and 123rd Batteries, which were in an even more exposed position, the breech-blocks being first removed and the sights smashed. Altogether, twenty-four field guns and a howitzer were lost in this part of the field ; considering that the batteries were practically in the firing line, it is astonishing that any were rescued ; the feat redounds to the eternal honour of the officers and men of the 5th Division artillery.

 

 

It was now about 2 P.M. At 1.40 P.M., in response to the 1.20 P.M. message, General Smith-Dorrien had placed his two remaining battalions, the Cameronians and the Royal Welch Fusiliers, at Sir Charles Fergusson's disposal, ordering them to move from Montigny to Bertry, and asking him to hold his ground at any rate a little longer, so as to allow the preliminary movements of the retirement to take effect; he was to begin the withdrawal of the 5th Division as soon as he should think fit : after which the 3rd and 4th Divisions were to follow in succession. General Smith-Dorrien had already summoned to his headquarters the G.S.O.l of the 4th Division-to which he was, about midday, connected by signal cable-to receive orders. These were to the same effect as those given to the 5th Division. Roads were allotted for the retirement to the north-west of St. Quentin, when it should take place, as follows :

To the 5th Division and 19th Brigade :

(1) via Bertry-Maretz, and thence the Roman road to Vermand ;

(2) via Reumont - Maurois - Busigny - Bohain - Brancourt - Joncourt - Bellenglise.

To the 3rd Division, via Montigny - Clary - Elincourt - Malincourt (east of the Church) - Beaurevoir - Gouy - Bony - Hargicourt - Jeancourt.

To the 4th Division, via Selvigny - Malincourt (west of the Church) - Aubeneheul - Ronssoy - Templeux - Roisel.

To the Cavalry, any roads west of the 4th Division.

The pressure upon the British line immediately west of Le Cateau now became severe, and it seemed clear that the Germans were preparing for a great effort. Before the teams of the 122nd Battery advanced, three platoons of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had twice made gallant attempts to reach the trenches of the Suffolk, but had been beaten back with severe loss by artillery and machine-gun fire. They rallied under the protection of the 59th Field Company R.E., which gave up its trenches to them and lay down in the open. So intense, in fact, was the machine-gun fire upon the whole ridge to the rear of the Suffolk that the Highlanders had to abandon the line which they had taken up, and move further down the slope towards the valley of the Selle. Meanwhile, the German battalions were steadily gaining ground; in fact, as the last gun team of the 5th Division artillery was driving off, as described above, they were only four hundred yards from it, and were only kept back for a time by a party of the Manchester, which, with the machine-gun detachment, offered so stout a resistance as to gain a few minutes'respite. During this brief interval, Captain D. Reynolds of the 37th Battery, having obtained permission to call for volunteers, came galloping down with teams to rescue the two howitzers which had been left on the ground.

The German infantry was then within two hundred yards, yet by the gallantry and devotion of this little party both howitzers were 1imbered up; and though one team was shot down before it could move, the other galloped off with its howitzer and brought it safely away.

This episode was the last gleam of light upon this gloomy corner of the field. (It gained the Victoria Cross for Captain Reynolds and for Drivers Luke and Drain. Captain Reynolds was killed by gas near Ypres, 1916.) Between2.30and2.45 P.M. the end came. The Germans had by this time accumulated an overwhelming force in the shelter of the Cambrai road, and they now fell upon the Suffolk and Manchester from the front, right flank and right rear. The turning movement, however, did not at once make itself felt, and the two battalions and the Argylls with them opened rapid fire to their front with terrific effect, two officers of the Highlanders, in particular, bringing down man after man and counting their scores aloud as if at a competition. The Germans kept sounding the British " Cease fire " and gesticulating to persuade the men to surrender, but in vain. At length a rush of the enemy from the rear bore down all resistance. The Suffolk and Manchester and their Highland comrades were overwhelmed. They had for nine hours been under an incessant bombardment, and they had fought to the very last, covering themselves with undying glory.

Meanwhile orders had been issued about 2 P.M. (No records or messages of this period are available, as the 5th Division headquarters wagon was hit and blown up in Reumont.) by Sir Charles Fergusson for the retirement of the 5th Division to begin, but these do not appear to have reached any battalion much before 3 P.M. It was comparatively easy to communicate with brigades, but nearly impossible to get messages to the firing line, as the fighting there was almost hand-to-hand, and the ground in rear was swept by shell fire. Further, the 14th Brigade was handicapped by the loss of its signal section, which had been practically destroyed in the early morning fighting in Le Cateau. As a result no orders at all reached Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Bond and the companies of the K.O.Y L.I. in the firing line. The survivors of the Suffolk and the Manchester (14th) and the Argylls (19th) had drifted back towards Reumont ; thus the right of the K.O.Y.L.I., which faced eastwards, became heavily engaged with German infantry advancing over the ridge which the Suffolk had held. First two battalions in dense masses swept over the crest and down the beetroot-field on its western slopes. The Yorkshiremen, five platoons with two machine guns, allowed them to move well down the slope and then opened rapid fire, which drove the enemy back with heavy loss to the reverse side of the ridge. Meanwhile, the Duke of Wellington's and West Kent (13th Brigade) had begun to retire from the right rear of the K.O Y L.I., as did also the East Surrey, conforming to the movement of the West Kent; whilst the Scottish Borderers (13th) on the other flank of the brigade were also beginning to fall back. When, therefore, shortly after their first advance, the Germans reappeared on the crest of the ridge, they could outflank the right of the K.O.Y.L.I. This they proceeded to do, progressing slowly and warily, after the lessons which they had received, throwing out troops wide to the south-east so as completely to envelop the K.O.Y L.I.'s right rear. The five platoons and the machine guns once again found a good target at five hundred yards range and took full advantage of it ; but the Germans now pressed home their attack on the main front of the battalion from the Cambrai road, and on its left flank from the ground vacated by the Scottish Borderers. Although the left, by sheer marksmanship, was able to prevent the enemy from planting machine guns on the last-named ground, its occupation by increasing numbers of the enemy, who at once opened a destructive enfilade fire, could not be prevented. A desperate effort was made to reinforce this flank, but nearly every man sent forward was shot down; and the enemy now set himself systematically to roll up the attenuated line of Yorkshiremen from left to right. In spite of the gallant efforts of Major C. A. L. Yate, (Major Yate was awarded a posthumous V.C. He escaped from his prison camp in Germany and was found near Berlin with his throat cut.) who commanded the firing line, the end came soon afterwards. The company with him had lost over sixty men killed outright and many wounded, and the other companies had suffered equally ; when therefore about 4.30 P.M. the final rush of the enemy took place, the survivors were overpowered and made prisoners. That night the 2/K.O.Y L.I. mustered only 8 officers and 320 rank and file, but it had held up the Germans at the only point where they penetrated into the British position, and thus gave the rest of the 5th Division a clear start in their retirement.

Whilst the advance of the enemy through the gap immediately to the west of Le Cateau had thus been delayed by a single battalion, the progress of his outflanking movement to the east of the town was also checked. Three platoons of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, it will be remembered, had moved down the western slope of the valley of the Selle ; here they found the 59th Field Company R.E. ; and in the course of time, half the l/Middlesex, with two companies of the l/Scots Fusiliers (which had joined the 19th Brigade on the night of the 25th from the 9th Brigade reserve) prolonged the line to the right.

Towards 3 P.M. German troops (The 165th Regiment) were seen advancing westwards over the spur on the eastern side of the valley ; whereupon the Middlesex, Highlanders and Royal Engineers opened fire at fifteen hundred yards range, and effectually turned them back. Thus the Germans were held for a time both to the east and west of Le Cateau, and General Smith-Dorrien's dispositions, now in progress, to cover the retreat on this side had ample time to take effect. The long valley that runs up from Le Cateau southwards to Honnechy had been since 9 A.M. under the observation of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and E Battery, posted between Escaufourt and Honnechy, these troops having retired to that position, where they found L Battery in action, at the close of their first engagement with the enemy about Bazuel. At 1.15 P.M. the D.C.L.I., and the two companies of the East Surrey which were with them, were ordered from the reserve of the 5th Division to Honnechy . about 2 P.M. the 2/Royal Welch Fusiliers and l/Scottish Rifles of the 19th Brigade, General Smith-Dorrien's only corps reserve, now at the disposal of the 5th Division, were directed to march from Bertry, and to post themselves on the left of the Duke of Cornwall's at Maurois; and the 11Norfolk was sent back from the " Tree " on the Sunken road to Reumont. Lastly, a section of the 108th Heavy Battery was ordered to take up a position near Honnechy ; though one gun was unfortunately upset going through a gateway with a little bridge over a ditch and had to be abandoned, the other safely reached the place assigned to it. By 3 P.M., or very little later, the whole of these troops were in position behind the right flank : it only remained to be seen how vigorously the enemy would follow up his success. At 3.47 P.M. the II. Corps reported to G.H.Q. by a telegram, received at 3.50 P.M., that the retirement had begun.

Towards 3.30 P.M. Germans again showed themselves on the eastern side of the Selle, this time in extended order, so that the rifles and machine guns of the party of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had not the same chance against them as before. But, as they advanced, they were met by the shells of E and L Batteries, and, after working their way south for a time, took shelter under cover of the railway embankment, and there came to a temporary standstill. The l/Middlesex on the Highlanders'right next withdrew up the valley of the Rivierette des Essarts towards Reumont ; and the Argylls, being warned that the Germans were crossing the Roman road in their left rear, fell back to the spur which runs south-east from Reumont, where they found a mixed body of Manchesters and other units deployed, and took up position alongside them. The Germans had by this time-about 4.30 P.M. brought up guns to engage the British batteries near Escaufourt and were advancing up the valley of the Rivierette des Essarts; but their losses were heavy and their progress slow. An aeroplane detected the position of E and L Batteries, but the consequent German fire does not appear to have done any great damage. There was no sign of German cavalry hurrying forward in masses to the pursuit, and there seemed to be a good prospect that darkness would fall before the enemy could close with the rear guards retiring from the valley of the Selle. (No orders for pursuit were issued by Kluck until 8.13 P.M., and these directed the line Esnes-Caudry-Reumont to be crossed at 4 A.M. next day.)

Immediately to the west of Le Cateau in the 13th Brigade area, the enemy had equally failed to press his advantage ; the shells of the 61st Howitzer Battery and 108th Heavy Battery constantly broke up the German infantry when it tried to reassemble and reform. The 2/Duke of Wellington's was certainly heavily shelled as it retired. but suffered little harm, though the battalion became widely scattered. The West Kent fell back slowly and methodically, and their rear guard saw nothing to shoot at except a German company which showed itself for a few minutes passing eastward through the abandoned guns of the XV. Brigade R.F.A. more than a thousand yards away. Between 4.30 and 5 P.M. this rear guard retired in extended order without molestation even by artillery. The Scottish Borderers withdrew in the same way, though the order to retire unfortunately did not reach the greater part of one company, which was surrounded and captured. Near the " Tree " on the Sunken Road at least one company halted for the best part of an hour, and fired with great effect upon German infantry nine hundred yards to its right. Between 4.15 and 5 P.M. the battalion fell back by successive companies to Troisvilles, and then turned to cover the retreat of the 15th Brigade which was falling back in perfect order. Thus on the right of the line, the most critical point of all, things had not gone altogether ill in the first and most difficult stage of the retreat.

Until a little past noon, on the right centre of the line, the Bedfordshire and Dorsetshire in the firing line of the 15th Brigade, the left of the 5th Division, saw little or nothing of the enemy, except at a distance ; and even then they could perceive only small parties on the Cambrai road (which at this point except for one small house offered no shelter to the enemy) bringing up what appeared to be stretchers, but actually were machine guns carried by their folding legs. As soon as the real nature of their burdens was discovered they were engaged by the machine guns of the Dorsetshire, and the detachments, one of which endeavoured to take shelter in the small house, shot down ( Three infantry regiments of the 8th Division were endeavouring to reach the road on the front Inchy and east of it-Caudry, mainly against the 3rd Division.) before they could come into action. Later on the German infantry showed itself in front in greater force, but was so hotly received by the Bedfordshire and Dorsetshire, as well as by the batteries of the XXVII. Brigade R.F.A. that it would not venture upon a definite attack. Soon after 3 P.M. the order to retire was received by the 15th Brigade, and it was calmly and systematically obeyed. The 119th Battery was withdrawn first, and moved back to the spur just south of the " Tree " on the Sunken Road. About 3.30 P.M. the Bedfordshire and Dorsetshire fell back slowly in succession covered by the machine guns of the latter, and, together with the 121st Battery, faced about again at the south-eastern angle of Troisvilles. Germans had not yet crossed the Cambrai road on their front, having been checked by the rifle fire, at long range, of the right company of the Fifth Fusiliers (9th Brigade) ; but the enemy's artillery now concentrated a very heavy fire upon Troisvilles from the north and north-east, and, gradually finding the range, compelled this company, as well as the Scottish Borderers on its right, to retire once more. The 121st Battery was only 1imbered up with difficulty, but the Dorsetshire, well covered by their machine guns, got back to the southern end of Troisvilles with little loss. A German aeroplane now appeared over their heads, dropping smoke signals, and the German gunners guided by these put down a barrage of shrapnel on every road and track leading to the south. The Scottish Borderers, who had taken the road towards Reumont, were diverted from it to the open country further west. The Dorsetshire and the Bedfordshire broke into small parties and, passing through the barrage with little or no damage, headed south across country towards Maurois. Bedfordshire, Dorsetshire, Cheshire (15th Brigade reserve) and Scottish Borderers all entered the Roman road near Reumont or Maurois without the slightest pressure of German cavalry or infantry upon their rear. Only on their right-towards Le Cateau-had the enemy pushed on in any force ; and his advance there had been delayed as has already been described.

The withdrawal of the 5th Division from a broad and scattered front on to a single road at right angles thereto naturally brought as a consequence a thorough mix-up of all units-except in the case of the 15th Brigade, which entered it as a formed body. This state of affairs the Staff, as will be later narrated, took steps to remedy as soon as possible ; but the enemy was too close for any immediate attempt at re-forming to be made. There was, to quote one eye-witness, " confusion, but no disorganisation ; disorder, but no panic " . while another has exactly caught the scene by saying that it reminded him of a crowd leaving a race meeting and making its way earnestly towards a railway station.

On the left of the 15th Brigade in the 3rd Division . sector, the 9th had been perfectly secure. The enemy had established himself on the southern edge of Inchy, but had been unable to advance a yard further . and, though Br.General F. C. Shaw's battalions had had little opportunity of using their rifles, the XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. had inflicted very severe loss on the German infantry. Soon after 3 P.M. the brigadier observed that the troops on his right were retreating ; though it was plain that the Germans were not following them in any strength, he was relieved when orders reached him, at 3.30 P.M., to conform with the movement. Pushing up the Royal Fusiliers from the reserve to the north-western edge of Troisvilles, he brought away nearly all his wounded, after which he withdrew deliberately in succession the Fifth Fusiliers, the two companies of the R. Scots Fusiliers and the Lincolnshire with very trifling loss. The German skirmishers lining the southern edge of Inchy tried hard to hinder the movement, but were silenced by the advanced sections of the 107th and 108th Batteries. Although the Fifth Fusiliers, before they could reach the shelter of a hollow near Le Fayt, had to cross a thousand yards of open ground, the German artillery scarcely fired a round at them. As the last party of the Lincolnshire came abreast of the advanced section of the 108th Battery, the officer in command, having fired off his last round of ammunition, disabled and abandoned his guns. This and the other advanced section had done great work, but at the cost of four 18-pdrs. The retreat was then continued methodically, without pressure from the enemy, and the battalions re-formed as soon as they reached sheltered ground. The XXIII. Brigade R.F.A. was collected at Bertry. The 9th Brigade took position on the ridge between Bertry and Montigny to cover the retreat of the rest of the 3rd Division ; its casualties amounted to hardly one hundred and eighty.

The course of events west of the 9th Brigade is less easy to describe. From noon onwards there was a lull in the German fire, and advantage was taken of this to reinforce the troops at Caudry with half a company of the Irish Rifles. Some of the 12th Brigade likewise seized the opportunity to recross to the north side of the Warnelle ravine in order to bring in their wounded, but they were driven back by a steady fire from the enemy before they could collect many of them. Then about 1.40 P.M. the German guns opened fire once more with increased violence and in much greater numbers, concentrating in the first instance chiefly on Caudry, while simultaneously German infantry advanced against the junction of the Royal Scots and Gordon Highlanders immediately to the north of Audencourt. They failed however to gain any ground, being met by an accurate fire on their front and effectively enfiladed, at a range of six hundred yards, by the left company of the Gordons. At Caudry itself the enemy was more successful. About 2 P.M. he began a bombardment of the village with heavy guns, the first shell of which stunned Br.-General F. W N. McCracken and wounded his brigade-major. The brigadier was understood to order a retirement, and Caudry was evacuated, so that German infantry was able to enter and occupy it. (The bombardment of the village was by 5-9-inch howitzers. ," Regt No. 153, p56 (f.n.), quotes the text of the first edition of this volume, and says that nothing is known in the 8th Division of any infantry entering Caudry. But the British account, of the counter-attack which retook all but the northern part of the village, is circumstantial, and the presence of Germans in Caudry is supported by the evidence of the 11th Brigade.) About the same time large parties of enemy infantry (This was the advanced guard of the 7th Reserve Division, which got up at 2 P.M.) developed a strong attack from the north-west against the half-battalion of the Inniskilling Fusiliers which covered the western flank at Esnes. They were met by rapid rifle and machine-gun fire, supported shortly after by artillery. The answering German fire was wholly ineffective, and the Inniskillings were able to check this attack completely. Nevertheless, the situation was not reassuring ; for it was clear that fresh German infantry, the herald of another corps, had come up, and that, if it failed to break in on the north side of Esnes, it would work round to the left flank and rear.

Meanwhile, between 2.30 and 3 P.M. the 3/Worcestershire (7th Brigade) counter-attacked at Caudry, reoccupied the southern portion of the village and pushed advanced posts to the north and north-east. But the northern part of the village was not recovered, and the Germans had already made the 11th Brigade sensible of their presence on its right flank. Br.-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, naturally assuming that Caudry had been finally lost, decided to withdraw the 11th Brigade across the Warnelle ravine to a position before Ligny. The guns of the 135th Battery were brought forward and entrenched in and round Ligny for close defence ; and then, the l/Rifle Brigade, with a platoon of the East Lancashire, being left at the " Quarry" as rear guard, the remaining battalions of the brigade were shortly after 3 P.M. drawn off into the low ground of the ravine whilst a perfect tempest of shrapnel raged above and behind them. As they came into sight of the Germans again, on the slope just below Ligny, the enemy redoubled his fire, inflicting considerable loss, and when at last the rear guard withdrew from the " Quarry," the German infantrymen (The 3rd, 9th and 10th Jager and 19th Cavalry Brigade, according to Poseck, pp. 59, 60.) sprang up from their concealed positions and rushed forward in pursuit. Their ranks were instantly torn and mangled by the British guns ; but they speedily rallied and continued the advance regardless of losses. Before the 11th Brigade could be completely re-formed, they swarmed forward to the attack of Ligny. Met by shrapnel and rapid fire, they turned, unable to persist against the hail of bullets. Reinforced, they advanced again, only to suffer still more heavily ; for the British were now better prepared to receive them. They fell back again, too severely punished to find heart for a third attempt, and the 4th Division was left in undisputed possession of Ligny. These actions hardly came to a complete end before 5 P.M.

It was during this turmoil on his left that shortly after 3 P.M. General Hubert Hamilton rode down from Bertry to Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Bird, who was with his battalion of Irish Rifles at Troncquoy, and directed him to take command of the 7th Brigade, since Br.-General McCracken had been stunned by a shell, and to withdraw the troops from Caudry under cover of the Irish Rifles and two field batteries. Colonel Bird made his dispositions accordingly, and by 4.30 P.M. the companies which had reoccupied it were practically clear of the village. At that hour the troops in Audencourt, on the east of Caudry, suddenly fell back. About 3.30 P.M. the 8th Brigade had received its instructions to retire, but there had been difficulty and delay in communicating orders to the various units, and it is certain that some of them received none at all. The 4/Middlesex and the Royal Scots, with the exception of a detached party of the latter on the immediate right of the Gordons, were withdrawn without much difficulty. The party above named, together with the bulk of the Gordons, and two companies of the Royal Irish, having no orders to move, remained in their positions. Three platoons of the Gordons, however, heard of the order to retire, and managed to get away, as also did the reserve companies of the Royal Irish. These last were obliged to fight hard to extricate themselves and the batteries of the XL. Brigade R.F.A. ; (Their adversaries were two brigades of the 9th Cavalry Division, the three of the 4th (Poseck, pp. 61, 62), and the right of the 93rd Regiment.) but three guns of the 6th Battery were lost, the teams being shot down by a lucky salvo whilst in the act of withdrawing. Two platoons of the Royal Irish also were cut off from their main body, but contrived to make good their retreat independently. Meanwhile since 2.30 P.M. Audencourt had been furiously bombarded by 4-2-inch and 5-9-inch howitzers, and the vehicles and horses of 8th Brigade headquarters, and the whole of the brigade machine guns and transport were lost. The enemy, how ever, made no attempt to advance. The 41st Battery, working with Colonel Bird, opened fire on the glacis east of Caudry, as soon as our troops were clear of it ; but, so far as can be gathered, there was at the time not a single German upon this ground. Half an hour later, however, at 5 P.M. the German infantrymen did swarm forward, toiling painfully up a gentle slope through beetroot which reached to their knees. Whether they expected opposition or not is hard to say, but they were met by the rapid fire of the Gordon Highlanders and Royal Scots, who shot them down at a range of from four to six hundred yards with the greatest coolness. One subaltern of the Royal Scots reckoned that he hit thirty to forty of them himself. The Germans were unable to gain an inch of ground; for the best part of an hour they swayed backwards and forwards in front of these few isolated groups, probably exaggerating their strength both in men and machine guns, but completely at a loss how to clear them out of the way.

The rest of the 8th Brigade, having re-formed in dead ground, took the road to Montigny, and Colonel Bird, after waiting for fully twenty minutes without seeing a sign either of retreating British or advancing Germans, led back the 7th Brigade soon after 5 P.M. by the same road, without the slightest interference on the part of the enemy.

Thus by 5 P.M., roughly speaking, the whole of the 11. Corps had begun its retreat and its rear guards were all in position, and the moment had come for the 4th Division, which was on its left, to move off. There was no time to lose. For, although the right of the division was for the moment secure after the double repulse of the German attack upon Ligny, masses of the IV. Reserve Corps (The 7th Reserve Division; see Hauptmann Wirth's ," Von der Saale zur Aisne." He states that the advanced guard of the division reached the Cambrai high road north of Cattenieres about 2 P.M. The guns had been sent on ahead and were already in action. (See page l68, f.n. 1.) He adds that the German " cavalry had been thrown on the defensive and several regiments were cowering under cover behind the houses.") were now arriving from the direction of Cattenieres-Wambaix.. The appearance of Sordet's cavalry in the left rear of the 4th Division now provided a most opportune diversion. General Smith-Dorrien had naturally counted on this cooperation, and General Sordet, having visited Sir John French at 9 A.M., was fully conversant with the situation. His corps on the night of the 24th/25th had bivouacked near Avesnes-Dompierre, and on the 25th moved more than thirty miles across the line of march of the B.E.F. in order to reach its left flank. It arrived late at night in the neighbourhood of Walincourt, about ten miles west by south of Le Cateau, men and horses dog-tired and soaked with rain. Of its three divisions, the 5th halted for the night in and about Esnes, the 1st at Lesdain and the 3rd at Le Bosquet (3 miles south-west of Esnes). The corps moved out to the south of Cambrai on the morning of the 26th in observation of the ground on the left rear of the British and of the southern exits from Cambrai.

There, about 1 P.M., General Sordet received the following message from Colonel Huguet of the French Mission at G.H.Q. (The message is recorded as telephoned at 12.10 P.M.). " General Joffre requests that you will not only cover the left of the British Army, but do more and intervene in the battle with all the forces at your disposal." At 1.30 P.M., therefore, General Sordet issued orders for his three divisions to recross the Schelde, the 5th at Crevecoeur, the 3rd at Masnieres, and the 1st at Marcoing, sending reconnaissance parties ahead. (Historique du Corps de Cavalerie Sordet," pp. 77-9.) Towards 4 P.M., when the divisions of the German IV. Reserve Corps (The 22nd Reserve Division had followed the 7th, and advanced on its right.) were crossing the front of the French cavalry, the artillery of the latter came successively into action and took the Germans in flank, whilst cyclists engaged them with success near Seranvillers (2 miles north-west of Esnes). It was this gun fire which was heard by General Smith-Dorrien about 4.30 P.M. as he was moving south from Bertry to his new headquarters at St. Quentin, and, not knowing whether the sound came from French or German artillery, he had a bad moment. Then, galloping up to some high ground near Maretz, he was able to satisfy himself that it could only come from French 75's. (The action was broken off by General Sordet at 6.30 P.M. and the cavalry corps retired so as to cover the British left ; it reached the area north-west of Villers Fauçon (15 miles south by west of Cambrai), with the horses Completely exhausted.) Further, beyond the left of the French cavalry, it was known that troops of General d'Amade were in and about Cambrai. All, therefore, seemed well, and the British left flank secure. (Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Anley, commanding 2/Essex Regiment on the left of the line, received two direct reports from the French cavalry, one about ten minutes before the attack opened, and another about noon, both saying that the French were maintaining their position. He, most unfortunately, failed to get either of these messages through to 12th Brigade headquarters.)

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