MILITARY OPERATIONS

FRANCE AND BELGIUM 1914

Compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds

Edited by Macmillan & Co, 1933

CHAPTER IX - THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU 5 P.M. TO NIGHTFALL

 

(Sketches A, 4, 6 & 7 ; , Maps 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 & 13)

 

 

The party of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (19th Brigade), together with the 59th Field Company R.E. and a collection of scattered men, last mentioned as being on the right, was deployed upon the spur that runs south-eastward from Reumont. The Royal Welch Fusiliers, Cameronians (both of the 19th Brigade, from Montigny), D C.L.I. and half the East Surrey (14th Brigade), Norfolk (15th Brigade) and one 60-pdr. of the 108th Heavy Battery were in rear of it, between Maurois and Honnechy. The Bays (1st Cavalry Brigade), with E and L Batteries, were at Escaufourt, E Battery being in action against the guns which were endeavouring to cover the advance of the German infantry up the valley of the Rivierette des Essarts. This infantry now extended across the Roman road on the Highlanders' left front, and, advancing in open order with company columns in rear, was engaged by the party at a thousand yards range. The enemy made no great progress, for the party had plenty of ammunition, and there was no immediate reason why it should fall back. After a time, however-about 5.30 P.M.-Lieut.-Colonel B. E. Ward of the l/Middlesex (19th Brigade) led his own battalion, which had been halted east of Reumont in the valley of the Rivierette des Essarts, and the various detachments on the spur near by, towards Reumont and the Roman road, detailing the Highlanders to act as his rear guard. The whole, therefore, moved off in succession, skirting Reumont, where German shells were now falling thickly . the rear guard had no sooner quitted its position than the German artillery searched the deserted spur with a hail of shrapnel. A company and a half of the Norfolk, sheltered in a quarry to the south-west of Reumont, were now left as the troops nearest to the enemy ; for about this time the cavalry and horse artillery also began to fall back slowly from Escaufourt towards Busigny (6 miles S.S.W. of Le Cateau), leaving the passage up the valley towards Honnechy open to the enemy. The Norfolk opened fire at a range of about 1,800 yards on the German infantry in extended order to the north-east, and in due time retired to the edge of Honnechy, passing as they went through a company of the R. Welch Fusiliers, which had been deployed to take over rear guard from them.

 

 

From this point the Norfolk companies had a clearer view of German columns, both of infantry and artillery, advancing on the road up the valley of the Rivierette, preceded by lines of skirmishers. They engaged them at long range, and the solitary 60-pdr. of the 108th Heavy Battery having no shrapnel left, opened fire with lyddite. Major d. H. Sanders commanding the 122nd Field Battery, having followed his two remaining guns to Reumont, collected two ammunition wagons, unlimbered south of the village, and also opened fire on the enemy columns.

The Germans had by this time advanced up the valley to the point where the road from Reumont to St. Souplet intersects that from Le Cateau to Busigny. but there, to the great surprise of the Norfolk, they stopped and showed themselves no more. (It appears from regimental histories that two battalions of the 7th Division reached Honnechy just in time to exchange shots with the British rear guard. The troops of the division then received orders to halt and clear the road for the III. Corps to pursue. But the leading battalion of this corps did not reach Honnechy until midnight (" Leib Gren. Regt. No. 8," p. 62). Kluck states truly that " the latter [III.] Corps, ordered to march on Maretz, did not get further than Honnechy on the 26th, so that the attempted enveloping movement failed.") It was now fully 6 P.M. A drizzling rain had just set in, and the light was beginning to fail early. The enemy's pursuit seemed to die away. His guns did indeed shell the position of the R. Welch Fusiliers ; but, instead of heavy masses of infantry, small parties of cavalry now hovered about the front, feeling their way forward and provoking constant little bursts of fire from the British rear guards, which in the meanwhile continued to fall back in succession as the Roman road gradually became clear for them. The congestion on that road was considerable, for it was packed with infantry, guns, transport and ambulances of the 5th Division and the 19th Brigade in no fixed order, just as each unit had happened to strike the highway There was some confusion, but the men marched on steadily and in silence. A few units, the l/Middlesex and a number of scattered men under Lieut.-Colonel H. P. Moulton-Barrett of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, made their way by two parallel tracks, east of the Roman road, to Busigny, where the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was in position to cover them, and thence turned westward into the Roman road. At 7 P.M. or a little later, German cavalry patrols ran into parties of the 11th and 19th Hussars north of Busigny, and men of the former regiment were shelled while crossing the railway near Busigny station. The Duke of Cornwall's L.I., the two companies of the East Surrey which were with them, the R. Welch Fusiliers and the Cameronians moved back steadily from position to position and arrived at Maretz, almost without firing a shot; the Cameronians waited at Maretz until 9.30 P.M. without seeing a sign of the enemy. Hostile pursuit, worthy of the name, had ceased after 6 P.M. ; in fact, contact was practically lost as darkness fell. The whole of the 5th Division and the 19th Brigade were now in retreat along the Roman road ; their right flank, which had been exposed all day, was no longer threatened.

 

 

The narrative left the 3rd Division with two companies of the Royal Irish, some of the Royal Scots and the greater part of the Gordon Highlanders still occupying their original ground in front of Audencourt, having received no orders to retire, and successfully arresting any German advance ; the 9th Brigade was in a covering position between Bertry and Montigny (2 miles south of Caudry) ; and the bulk of the 7th and 8th were in orderly retreat on Montigny. These two latter formations passed through the 9th Brigade and marched away to Clary, making south-westwards for Beaurevoir (13 miles south-west of Le Cateau) by way of Elincourt and Malincourt. Not a German, not even a cavalry patrol, followed them; and not a shell was fired at the 9th Brigade, which at 6 P.M. became the rear guard to the 3rd Division. Evidently the enemy was wholly occupied with the detachments, not a thousand strong, all told-which had not retired from the original fighting line. At 6 P.M., after an hour spent in vain and costly attempts to break through the Gordons, his fire died down, but began again twenty minutes later, as he tried to work round the right of the Royal Scots. This was however foiled by the oblique fire of the right company of the Gordons, across the front of the Royal Scots ; and at 6.45 P.M. the Germans once again concentrated a heavy howitzer bombardment upon Audencourt. As darkness came down the firing died away into occasional fitful bursts ; but at 8.30 P.M. the German guns once more heaped shells upon Audencourt, not a little to the wonder of the 3rd Division, which, from the heights south of Clary some six miles away, watched the projectiles bursting over its deserted position with grim satisfaction. Thus the British centre had been withdrawn, from under the very eyes of the Germans, with very little difficulty and no serious loss.

In the 4th Division the infantry brigadiers received their orders to retreat about 5 P.M., the 10th Brigade being detailed as rear guard. At that hour the German Jager to the immediate front of the line were still quiescent from the effects of their repulse before Ligny. but the volume of hostile artillery fire had continued steadily to increase, and the turning movement round the western flank of Esnes had been renewed and pressed until the Inniskillings had been forced back to the western fringe of the village. The units of the 10th and 12th Brigades were so intermixed that the transmission of orders was exceedingly difficult ; but the sound of General Sordet's guns about Crevecoeur (2 1/2 miles west of Esnes) gave assurance that the division could retire without fear of serious attack on its western flank. The R. Irish Fusiliers and Seaforth Highlanders were already in position behind this flank, south-west of St. Aubert Farm, and, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade further east near Selvigny, were thus ready to cover the first stage of the retreat. Artillery support was also close at hand, for, meantime, Br.-General Milne, having had early warning of the intention to break off the action, had made general arrangements for the retirement of the artillery to a succession of covering positions. After the heavy attack on Caudry about 2 P.M. the XXIX. Brigade R.F.A. had retired to a position in the Iris valley between Caullery and Selvigny (2 miles S.S.W. of Ligny), and the XIV. Brigade had moved back about the same time to another one immediately north of Selvigny. About 4 P.M. the 35th (Howitzer) Battery had been ordered back behind the railway, so as to be prepared to cover the retirement of the remainder of its brigade, which was ready to do the same service for the XXXII. Brigade, still south-west of Ligny. At 4.30 P.M. orders were given for the brigade ammunition columns to get clear and join the route of the main column at Walincourt (3 miles S.S.W. of Ligny). About 5 P.M. the 31st and 55th (Howitzer) Batteries were withdrawn to the south of Selvigny, where the 35th Battery joined them.

It is difficult to ascertain which of the infantry was the first to be withdrawn; but it seems that part of the 12th Brigade, the Essex and the two forward companies of the Inniskillings, moved off soon after 5 P.M., halting and facing about on the road between Selvigny and Guillemin. The Lancashire Fusiliers, half of the Dublin Fusiliers (10th Brigade), and part of the King's Own appear to have started rather later, though half of the King's Own, receiving no warning to retire, remained in position at Haucourt. The rest of the Inniskillings slipped away from Esnes in small parties, just as the infantry of the 7th Reserve Division penetrated to the western houses of the village, and retreated upon Walincourt in good order. The enemy artillery searched the road with shrapnel, but the British columns moved on either side of it and escaped all damage.

The 11th Brigade and the remainder of the 12th, much scattered, held their positions until 6 P.M. or even later. The 135th Battery (XXXII. Brigade R.F.A.), which was in close support of the infantry near Ligny, was so exposed that its withdrawal seemed impossible, and orders were actually issued that the guns should be abandoned; but the battery commander, Major C. H. Liveing, (He was awarded the D.S.O.) decided to try and save his guns and, withdrawing them and their wagons by hand, brought all of them except one wagon safely away. To the west of Ligny the position of the 27th Battery (XXXII. Brigade R.F.A.) was even worse ; nevertheless, the gunners, taking advantage of every lull, had succeeded in running back four guns and 1imbers to the sunken road in rear when increase in the German artillery fire compelled them to abandon the remaining two. The battery then formed up and awaited its opportunity : eventually it made a dash to the south-west, and, though it was pursued by German shells, got its four guns safely away. (The battery commander, Major H. E. Vallentin, received the D.S.O., and two sergeants and five gunners, the D.C.M.) Of the 11th Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Swayne of the Somerset L.I. brought away with him what survived of two companies ; the rest of the battalion under Major C. B. Prowse, having become separated from him, remained fighting at Ligny until a late hour. The East Lancashire withdrew in three distinct bodies, two of which united at Clary. The main body of the l/Rifle Brigade made its way to Selvigny and took up a covering position there, whilst another party, with scattered men of other regiments, came later to the same village with Br.-General Hunter-Weston. Last of all the Hampshire retired, about 7 P.M., and overtook the rest of the brigade on its way to Serain (4 miles south of Selvigny), where it passed the night. Of the 10th Brigade, only the Seaforth Highlanders and the Irish Fusiliers were under Br.-General Haldanc's hand.

Half of the Warwickshire and a good number of the Dublin Fusiliers were still in Haucourt, and the remainder were dispersed in various directions, some as escort to guns, others in small isolated bodies.

As with the rest of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's force, the enemy not only did not pursue the 4th Division, but did very little even to embarrass the retreat. The l/Rifle Brigade, the rear guard of the 11th Brigade, and the composite party with it, finding the roads blocked in every direction, bivouacked at Selvigny, within two miles of the battlefield, and the Irish Fusiliers and Seaforths were almost level with them on the east, at Hurtevent Farm. The remainder were directed on through Walincourt, by way of Malincourt, where a divisional column of march was made up with the artillery, and Aubencheul, to Vendhuille (2 miles north-west of Le Catelet). German shells, as we have seen, followed the British as long as they were within sight and range, and caused a few casualties, though not many ; the guns also bombarded the evacuated positions with great fury until dark; but the cavalry and infantry made no attempt to press on. In fact, Smith-Dorrien's troops had done what G.H.Q. feared was impossible. With both flanks more or less in the air, they had turned upon an enemy of at least twice their strength ; had struck him hard, and had withdrawn, except on the right front of the 5th Division, practically without interference, with neither flank enveloped, having suffered losses certainly severe, but, considering the circumstances, by no means extravagant. ( The total losses, after the stragglers had come in, were 7,812 men and 38 guns, including one 60-pdr. Abandoned - General von Zwehl stated in the Militar Wochenblatt of the 30th September 1919 that the prisoners taken, who included wounded, were 2,600 ; and this is confirmed by Kluck. The surprise of the King's Own in the early morning and the capture of the l/Gordon Highlanders, about to be described, added a considerable portion to the total casualties, and might have been avoided.). The men after their magnificent rifle-shooting looked upon themselves as victors; some indeed doubted whether they had been in a serious action. Yet they had inflicted upon the enemy casualties never revealed, which are believed to have been out of all proportion to their own ; and they had completely foiled the plan of the German commander and of O.H.L.

The suggestion has been made that the battle might have been avoided if G.H.Q. had ordered General Smith-Dorrien to continue his retreat and had detailed the 4th Division as rear guard to cover the movement. It will, however, be recalled that only the infantry and field artillery of the 4th Division were present on the field. Without cavalry, heavy battery, cyclists, engineers and signal company, it would have been difficult for Major-General Snow to carry out a step-by-step retirement in the face of the very superior number of German troops, three cavalry divisions and the IV. Corps, who were immediately available to deal with opposition. There is a consensus of opinion among the officers of the 4th Division that, had not the II. Corps stayed to fight, the division, whether appointed rear guard or not, would have been destroyed. (Until his death, General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was the guest at the annual dinner of the 4th Division. At the first at which he was present, Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Snow thanked him on behalf of the members of the division for saving them from death or captivity on the 26th August 1914,.)

It has also been suggested that General Smith-Dorrien might have ordered the retirement during the lull in the fighting about 1 P.M. Withdrawal might have been begun then with the greatest ease; but in the several hours of daylight which remained the real direction of retirement would have been noticed by the enemy; in the middle of the day his units were not only fresher but were not yet disorganised as a result of heavy fighting, and in all probability there would have been a close and disastrous pursuit.

Could the 5th Division have stood until dusk, or had the I. Corps given some assistance, there might have been fewer losses ; for the missing were largely made up of wounded left on the ground, and of parties which did not receive the order to retire.

In the circumstances, General Smith-Dorrien was fully justified in his decision to fight, and he was wise in delaying the retirement to the latest moment compatible with the safety of his force.

A number of air reconnaissances were made for G.H.Q. during the fighting, but the reports were not forwarded to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. One airman, however, made a forced landing near him, and reported three German batteries in action near Forest. For the first time airmen were used for liaison : about 11.30 A.M. one machine was sent to find where General Haig was, and, descending near a cavalry patrol, was able to do so ; another was sent to General Smith-Dorrien, who used the aviator to discover whether there was any menace to his left flank, where all was found well, and, later, to examine his right. After this, at 3 P.M., the general sent him back to G.H.Q. to report that the 5th Division had been unable to withstand a most determined artillery bombardment, and was retiring, but would get away somehow.The air reports for the day, owing no doubt to the retirement of G.H.Q. from St. Quentin to Noyon at 3.30 P.M., were not summarised : indeed, it is not certain when or where they were received. They were valuable both positively and negatively. The earliest one, 7.45-10.30 A.M., reported a British battle line formed, and on its left rear a French infantry division (really cavalry) in bivouac near Gauzeaucourt, and a cavalry division moving westward ; further, no sign of any enemy west of a line through Cambrai-Le Catelet. The next reconnaissance (8.15-9.45 A.M.) reported a column, without stating nationality, it was the 4th (Guards) Brigade-moving from Landrecies on La Groise; German columns moving south on Engelfontaine and Solesmes; a mixed force (it must have been part of Marwitz's cavalry corps) near Carnieres ; and Le Cateau clear of troops but on fire. A third. reconnaissance (9.55-11.15 A.M.) discovered troops marching south from Valenciennes (11. Corps), but found the roads to the north, except for transport, and to the east, clear, and at 11 A.M. a division (7th Reserve) approaching Carnieres ; the airman landed at Bertry, and gave this information to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. A fourth reconnaissance (11 A.M.-1.40 P.M.) reported shells bursting along the whole battle front, and Caudry partly in flames. The airman saw what was a brigade of the German 6th Division moving down the western side of the Forest of Mormal ; he reported Le Quesnoy full of troops, and dropped a bomb on a mass of transport ; he found Valenciennes and roads leading into it clear. A fifth reconnaissance (3.30-5.18 P.M.) observed shells bursting on Troisvilles, and Caudry on fire, and reported that one battery just east of Audencourt was all that could be seen of British troops on the battlefield :

but along the ridge north of the Le Cateau-Cambrai road there was visible a line of German infantry in close formation (local reserves no doubt) : and one German infantry regiment, moving south-west of Estournel (probably part of the 22nd Reserve Division), was outflanking the British left : later it was added that behind the British line retirement appeared general but orderly, and mainly down the Roman road : the final entry at 5.18 P.M. was that no infantry could now be seen engaged, but there was a good deal of artillery fire, principally from the Germans.

These reports, combined with what was known of the British troops and of the previous moves of the Germans, should have given G.H.Q. a fairly clear picture of the situation.

There can be little doubt that the comparative ease with which the first stages of the retreat were accomplished was due to the tenacity of the units which, having received no order to retire, clung with all their strength to the positions they had been ordered to hold. The story of the Suffolk and the K.O.Y.L.I. has already been related; it now remains to tell that of the isolated detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions. Some time after dark, firing having ceased, it became known to Lieut.Colonel F. H. Neish of the Gordons that an order had been shouted or signalled by two staff officers to different parts of the line for the 8th Brigade to retire, and that a signal to retire had been seen by one of his own junior officers ; but that the order had not reached his own regiment, the company of the Royal Scots which lay on its right and two companies of the Royal Irish on its left. At 7.45 P.M. Brevet-Colonel W. E. Gordon, V C., of the Gordon Highlanders, being the senior officer in army rank, assumed command of the whole of these troops ; but at 9.20 P.M. Colonel Neish sent an officer and two men to Troisvilles to obtain orders, if possible, from the headquarters of the 3rd Division. This officer not returning within the allotted time of two hours, he had fallen into the hands of the enemy at Troisvilles, Colonel Gordon assembled his force towards Caudry at midnight, and at 12.30 A.M. marched off, quite undisturbed, through Audencourt. All was quiet in the village, and at 1.30 A.M. the head of the column reached Montigny. Here a light was seen in a cottage, and the occupants reported that early in the morning the British troops had moved on Bertry and Maurois. A man was ordered to guide the party through Montigny on to the road to Bertry, which he did; and at 2 A.M. the head of the column reached the cross roads to the south-west of Bertry. Here three shots were fired, and after a few minutes' delay, during which the advanced guard endeavoured to ascertain the nationality of the post, there was a heavy outbreak of rifle fire. The men were extended, and answered it. Orders were them given for the column to move back along the road to Montigny. But in the darkness the road south-westward to Clary was taken instead, and the column came upon a field gun which was trained to fire down the highway. This gun was rushed and taken before it could be discharged, and a mounted German officer near it was pulled off his horse, but the rear of the column now received rifle fire from the south and south-west. Once again the men were extended and replied, but the fire from the front and rear showed them pretty clearly that they were trapped. The head of the column now made an effort to force its way into Clary, and stormed a house on the outskirts of the village, in which were a number of German officers. The enemy, however, was by this time thoroughly alarmed. Firing began on all sides, and after fighting against hopeless odds for the best part of an hour longer, the Gordons, and the parties with them, were overpowered. Their captors were the 66th Regiment (I V . Corps), which had engaged the 13th Brigade near Le Cateau. (" Regt. No. 66 (pp. 37-9) confirms this account. It states that the fight at Clary lasted an hour. A hurricane of fire was directed on the British. . Their losses were frightful, and there were considerable losses on the German side". Seven hundred prisoners of ten or eleven different regiments, including artillery are said to have been captured. The 72nd arrived from Troisvilles after the fight, at 7.30 A.M. ; its history (p. 73) speaks of "uncounted bodies of Highlanders, who had been surprised in the early morning, lying along the road.") Of the Gordon Highlanders about five hundred were taken, but a few escaped, and a handful of them actually made their way through the German lines to Antwerp, whence they were sent back to England. The fortune of war was hard upon the l/Gordons. For the time they practically ceased to exist as a battalion, but by their gallant resistance to all German attacks between 5 P.M. and dark on the 26th August they had rendered incalculable service to the 3rd Division and to the Army at large.

Further to the west, isolated parties of several battalions of the 4th Division remained behind about Haucourt and Ligny. Two companies of the Dublin Fusiliers under Major H. M. Shewan, and two of the King's Own under Major R. G. Parker, holding fast to their trenches north and east of Haucourt, were attacked soon after nightfall, but succeeded in beating off the enemy . and another party of the Dublin Fusiliers, attracted by the sound of the firing, moved up in time to shoot down a number of the retreating Germans. Major Shewan, and Major A. J. Poole of the Warwickshire, who had also remained behind on the east of Haucourt with three to four hundred men of his battalion, then consulted together as to what should be done, since the enemy had apparently moved round both their flanks. Major Poole, being familiar with the ground, undertook to lead the party southward across country, and at 11 P.M. the march began. About the same time Major Parker and his party of the King's Own started southward independently, and succeeded in making good their retreat. Major Poole, steering for Selvigny, struck the village of Caullery. Here he was joined at dawn of the 27th by another platoon of the Dublin Fusiliers under Lieutenant R. F. H. Massy-Westropp, who had retired at dusk from his trenches in the road between Ligny and Haucourt and, finding his retreat threatened by a party of Germans in a farm, had promptly attacked them, driven them away and gone on his way unmolested. These, together with his own party and some of the Irish Fusiliers who were with them, Major Poole later led on in the track of the 4th Division. The Dublin Fusiliers, however, lost touch of him in the darkness, and drifted into Ligny at 2 A.M. on the 27th, where they made a short halt to find food. The men dropped down on the road, and instantly fell asleep. After a time, the march was resumed southward upon Clary, but near the entrance to the village they were fired on from the east and, signalling to ascertain whether the aggressors were friend or foe (for in the dim light there was abundant room for error), were told to join them as quickly as possible. The column accordingly advanced, and was at once swept by machine-gun fire from front and flank. The men were deployed, and then ordered to retire by small groups mutually supporting each other. Eventually, the Dublin Fusiliers reached Ligny with about two hundred men, comprising soldiers from nearly every battalion of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions, and even two men of the 1st Division, who had drifted together upon the nucleus under Major Shewan. First they struck out south-east, but finding Germans on every side, turned north-west, and after many wanderings and more than one sharp engagement, eventually seventy-eight officers and men came through the German lines into Boulogne. The remainder of Major Shewan's party seems to have been killed or taken to a man.

On the whole, therefore, it appears that of these three detachments which may have numbered in all two thousand men, about one half escaped and rejoined the Army sooner or later. These details may be considered trivial, but they are a testimony to the courage and resource of the officers and men of the old army. Moreover, these detachments had done far better work than they imagined. Though a mere handful scattered along some eight thousand yards of front, they had prevented the enemy for several hours from advancing along the whole of that line. The perpetual bombardment of vacated positions, and in particular that of Audencourt which was repeated an hour after dark, is plain evidence that the Germans were exceedingly suspicious of what might be before them. Beyond question, they had suffered very heavily, as indeed was admitted by German officers to some of their British prisoners, and from one cause and another they were disinclined to take risks. That the isolation of these British detachments was undesigned in no way detracts from the merit of their achievement. ( Hauptmann Heubner, in his book ," Unter Emmich vor Luttich :Unter Kluck vor Paris," p. 87, confirms the view stated of the effect of the parties left behind. His battalion of the 20th Regiment, 6th Division, III. Corps, came on to the field late. He says, " in front of us there still swarmed a number of scattered English troops, who were easily able to hide in the large woods of the district, and again and again forced us to waste time in deployments, as we could not tell what their strength might be.")

 

THE RETREAT FROM THE BATTLEFIELD

 

While this handful of men was thus mystifying the German leaders, the main body of General Smith-Dorrien's force was in full retreat. The 5th Division train had started down the Roman road very early in the day, and two staff officers had accompanied it to keep it moving all night ; for there was fear of being overtaken by German cavalry. The 3rd Division train had followed it, cutting in on the Roman road from the north. Thus one serious encumbrance was removed, but the highway was, nevertheless, choked for miles with an interminable column of transport, with the inevitable consequence of long stoppages and frequent short checks. The bulk of the 5th Division and of the 19th Brigade reached Estrees (15 miles from Le Cateau) between 9 P.M. and midnight, where, wet, weary, hungry and longing for sleep, they were directed on to the cross roads, two miles beyond. There the sorting of the troops was taken in hand, a simple process on paper, but difficult enough in practice on a dark and dismal night : staff officers stood at the cross roads, shouting continuously, " Transport and mounted troops straight on, 3rd Division infantry to right, 5th Division infantry to left." Then, when the men turned as directed, they were sorted by other officers according to brigades and battalions. By 2 A.M. on the 27th sorting was completed, and orders were issued for a start at 4 A.M., at which time all units of the 5th Division and the detachments from other formations marched off in good order ; some units, of course, were very weak in numbers, as many men had not come in. The transport and mounted troops were sorted out south of St. Quentin, and there, well after sunrise, a rearrangement of the column of the 5th Division was also made . but this , was a matter of reorganising units, not individual soldiers as had been the case near Estrees.

About midnight, the 3rd Division, having marched by Elincourt and Malincourt, came into Beaurevoir, north of the 5th Division. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade with the Bays (1st Cavalry Brigade) and 4th Dragoon Guards (2nd Cavalry Brigade), seeing the crowd on the Roman road, retired east of Estrees to Brancourt, Montbrehain and Ramicourt. The 11th Hussars (1st Cavalry Brigade) came very late into Estrees. Half of the 9th Lancers (2nd Cavalry Brigade) withdrew a little to the south of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Fresnoy, the remainder having marched with the headquarters of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade right across the rear of the Army from Bohain, through Beaurevoir to Marquaix (11 miles north-west of St. Quentin). Of the 4th Division, the 10th and 12th Brigades, with the divisional artillery, retreated, 2 1/2 miles west of the 3rd Division, by Malincourt and Villers Outreaux to Le Catelet and Vendhuille, which were reached between 11 P.M. and midnight. The 11th Brigade, finding its way blocked by the 3rd Division at Elincourt, remained there for the night.

Everywhere, when the order to halt was given, the men dropped down on the road, and were asleep almost before they reached the ground. The only precautions possible at the late hour were to push small piquets out a few hundred yards on each side of the road. Officers of the cavalry and artillery, themselves half dead with fatigue, had to rouse their men from a semi-comatose state to water and feed the horses, then to rouse them once more to take the nose-bags off, taking care lest they should fall asleep in the very act. And all this had to be done in inky darkness under drizzling rain. After three or four hours halt, the order was given to resume the march. The officers roused the sergeants, and the men were hunted out, hustled on to their feet, hardly conscious of what they were doing, and by some means or other formed into a column. Then the column got under way, drivers and troopers drowsing in their saddles, infantry staggering half-asleep as they marched, every man stiff with cold and weak with hunger, but, under the miraculous power of discipline, plodding on.

Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien on arrival at St. Quentin on the evening of the 26th found that G.H.Q. had left for Noyon. After sending off a report of the situation in writing, (He had sent reports to G.H.Q. at 10.28 A.M., 12.10 P.M. and 3.47 P.M., in the last reporting the beginning of the retirement.) he proceeded there himself by motor car, to give personally to the Commander-in-Chief an account of the action and its successful breaking off. He arrived shortly after midnight and was informed that the orders, issued by G.H.Q. in the afternoon of the 26th, for the retirement to the St. Quentin (Crozat) canal-Somme line (La Fere-Ham) still held good. Earlier in the day, before Sir John French had quitted St. Quentin, General Joffre and General Lanrezac had visited him for a conference. Sir John pointed out the isolated position of the British Army, as he conceived it, and the French Commander-in-Chief had confirmed a " directive " already sent to British G.H.Q. In this he had stated his intention of withdrawing to the Laon-La Fere-Ham-Bray sur Somme position, and subsequently retaking the offensive, as soon as a new Army, the Sixth, could be formed on the left of the British. His main interest was that, in spite of the heavy losses they had suffered, the British should not fall out of the line. The Field-Marshal agreed to make his retirement as deliberate as possible.

Thus posted in the general situation, General Smith-Dorrien returned to his headquarters at St. Quentin. Under his instructions, the 5th Division and the 19th Brigade were intercepted at Bellenglise and turned south-eastward upon St. Quentin, where supplies awaited them, with directions to march thence upon Ollezy (4 miles east of Ham). The 3rd Division was to continue its march from Bellicourt and Hargicourt upon Vermand, heading for Ham. Unfortunately its supply column had missed it and it was without rations from the 25th until the afternoon of the 27th. The 4th Division was to proceed via Roisel, Hancourt, Monchy Lagache to Voyennes (4 miles west of Ham), picking up supplies en route.

 

THE I. CORPS ON THE 26TH AUGUST

 

It is now time to return to the I. Corps and see what it was doing on the morning of the 26th whilst the II. Corps was engaged at the Battle of Le Cateau.

Whatever loss the Germans might have suffered in their repulse by the Guards at Landrecies, they had succeeded in disturbing the repose of the I. Corps and in keeping it on the alert all night in expectation of an attack. Its strategic position, besides, was far from satisfactory; for the enemy appeared to be about to break in between it and the II. Corps, and to be threatening the flank of its retreat from the west. Soon after midnight, from his headquarters at Le Grand Fayt, five miles from Landrecies, Sir Douglas Haig took measures to meet the situation, and to occupy a position facing north and north-west, preparatory to retiring southward. The trains, after dumping supplies, were ordered to Etreux, carrying the men's packs in the empty lorries. The 1st Division was to take position near Favril, a mile and a half S.S.E. of Landrecies, to cover the withdrawal of the 2nd Division on its right. The 2nd Division was divided, part retiring to the right and part to the left rear of the 1st Division, as follows :

The 5th and 6th Brigades to close in from Noyelles and Maroilles upon Le Grand Fayt ;

The 4th (Guards) Brigade to retire as soon as possible from Landrecies on La Groise, 7 miles to the south ;

The 5th Cavalry Brigade to cover the western flank of the corps between Ors and Catillon on the Sambre canal.

Sir John French appears to have become uneasy about the prospect of the I. Corps retiring due south ; for about 6 A.M., whilst General Haig was still at Le Grand Fayt, a staff officer from G.H.Q. brought him instructions giving him the alternatives of retiring south-westward on St. Quentin, that is towards the II. Corps, or in a south-easterly direction to seek shelter with the French, (He informed General Lanrezac of this possibility.) in which case his troops would have to rejoin the Expeditionary Force by train. The G.O.C. I. Corps considered it best to allow the movements already ordered to proceed, as he could do no more than he had done to comply with the spirit of the instructions. He confirmed the fact that he was retiring southward by a message at 10 A.M. Unfortunately, by this decision direct touch with the II. Corps was broken, and not regained until the 1st September. (There was no direct connection or communication between the I. and II. Corps during the fighting on the 26th ; they were both, however, in signal communication with G.H.Q. No information was sent by G.H.Q. to either corps as regards the situation of the other after the message in the early morning to the II. Corps informing General Smith-Dorrien that the I. Corps had asked for assistance, and the subsequent message telling him that the news from the I. Corps was reassuring. At 1 P.M. G.H.Q. telegraphed to both corps and the Cavalry Division, " In case of retreat direct your movement on St. Quentin and then Noyon." There is then a pause in the liaison. At 8.30 P.M. General Haig despatched an enquiry to G.H.Q., " No news of II. Corps except sound of guns from direction of Le Cateau and Beaumont. Can I. Corps be of any assistance." to this enquiry no answer was vouchsafed. At this hour G.H.Q. seems to have given up the II. Corps as lost ; for from Noyon at 8.15 P.M. Colonel Huguet telegraphed in cipher to G.Q.G. :

" Bataille perdue par armée anglaise qui parait avoir perdu cohésion. Elle demandera, pour être reconstituée, d'être sérieusement protégée. Quartier général ce soir Noyon. Plus amples détails suivront." Receiving no reply from G.H.Q., at 11 P.M. General Haig sent a message . (probably drafted earlier) to the II. Corps, via G.H.Q. " Please let me know your situation and news. We are well able to co-operate with you to-day, we could hear the sound of your battle, but could get no information as to its progress, and could form no idea of how we could assist you.) The French Reserve divisions on the right of the I. Corps were warned of the retirement, and a brigade, sent by General Valabregue to gain touch with the right of the 2nd Division, occupied first the line Marbaix-Maroilles, and subsequently the high ground between Le Grand Fayt and Maroilles.

As matters turned out, the Germans made no attempt to renew their attacks. (The Germans expected to be attacked across the Sambre, and as their 7th, 5th and 6th Divisions were marching to the field of Le Cateau, they left the bridges guarded. Thus a battalion of the 165th Regiment was for a time opposite Landrecies, being relieved by one of the 48th Regiment and one of the 35th Regiment ; the 12th Brigade (24th and 64th Regiments) arranged to guard the other bridges from Berlaimont upwards.)The 3rd Brigade entrenched at Favril, and the 4th had passed it, totally unmolested, by 4.15 A.M. The 3rd Brigade was slightly engaged later in the day, but would probably have been left in absolute peace had not a section of British guns, by firing at a distant column of German infantry marching west, (Part of the III. Corps moving from Landrecies on Le Cateau.) provoked retaliation and a sharp attack by some dismounted cavalry, which resulted in a few casualties to the l/Gloucestershire. At noon the 1st (Guards) Brigade relieved the 6th Brigade near Le Grand Fayt, enabling the latter to strike southward through Etreux, where the 4th (Guards) Brigade had secured the bridge leading across the 5ambre to Venerolles. The retirement of the 1st Division then began; between 1 P.M. and 2 P.M. the 1st (Guards) and 2nd Brigades left Favril for Fesmy and Oisy, both to the north of Etreux. Not one of these brigades reached its destination before 10 P.M., and the men were greatly fatigued. The 3rd Brigade remained at Favril till 5 P.M., and then marched straight to Oisy.

The progress of the 5th Brigade from Noyelles to Le Grand Fayt was arrested for several hours by the movement across its line of march south-westwards on Guise of General Valabregue's divisions. About half a mile to the south-west of Marbaix towards 1 P.M. the transport of the main body was blocked ; the 2/Connaught Rangers, which formed the rear guard, came perforce to a halt. One company remained in rear of the transport, and the rest of the battalion halted on the road from Maroilles to Marbaix, a mile south of Taisnieres. At this point French infantry was entrenching a position, whilst French cavalry patrols guarded the roads in all directions. From these it was understood that there was no enemy in the vicinity. After taking due precaution, therefore, to watch the approaches, the commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Abercrombie, allowed the Connaught Rangers to rest, sending word to Br.-General Haking that he would move on to Le Grand Fayt at 3 P.M. unless otherwise ordered. At 3.15 P.M. French patrols came in with the news that some two hundred Germans, with a machine gun, were close at hand. Colonel Abercrombie at once set out with two platoons towards Marbaix, and, after advancing some six hundred yards, was met by fire from artillery and a machine gun. Calling up the rest of the battalion, he deployed it south of the road. The companies then advanced over difficult country, of high hedges and small enclosures, under rifle fire, which however ceased after about an hour. A messenger sent to brigade headquarters to report the situation was unable to find them; and between 5 and 6 P.M. the company commanders, being out of touch with Colonel Abercrombie, began to withdraw independently through Le Grand Fayt south-westwards upon Barzy with such men as they could collect. At 6 P.M. Colonel Abercrombie followed with about a hundred men, being assured by an inhabitant that no enemy was in Le Grand Fayt; but, while passing through the village, his detachment was fired upon by Germans concealed in the houses, and comparatively few escaped. Other parties were also cut off, and altogether nearly three hundred officers and men of the Connaught Rangers were missing. (Vogel gives a full account of this fight. The attackers were the ls1 Guard Cavalry Brigade and the Garde-Schützenbataillon. He states that French troops also took part, and about 100 of them were taken prisoners, as well as 93 English. According to him, it was the German cavalry which was surprised, and the Divisional Staff, which was close up to the vanguard, was under fire. He mentions that the German cavalry fought on foot on this day for the first time in the war. His division billeted at Marbaix. The German official list of battles shows that the 2nd Guard Reserve Division of the X. Reserve Corps was also engaged at Marbaix on the20th August.)

The 5th Brigade finally went into billets at Barzy, 5 miles north-east of the bulk of the 2nd Division. The 5th Cavalry Brigade, which was little molested in its duty of covering the left flank except by occasional shells, fell back with trifling loss eight miles further to Hannapes, on the Oise, about two miles south-west of Etreux, not reaching its billets until far into the night.

The position of the I. Corps on the night of the 26th was in and around Etreux ; in detail as follows :

1st Division : Fesmy, Petit Cambresis, Oisy.

2nd Division : Etreux, Venerolles.

5th Cavalry Brigade : Hannapes.

Corps H.Q. : 1 1/2 miles east of Hannapes.

The II. Corps and 4th Division and remaining cavalry brigades were 18 miles to the west, in retreat south-westward to the Oise, on the front of St. Quentin-Le Catelet.

The French 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions were to the south-east of the I. Corps at Iron and Lavaqueresse.

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